

The Ordering of Trinitarian Teaching in Thomas Aquinas' Second Commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*¹

Thomas Aquinas commented twice on the first book of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. As a bachelor in theology, Thomas commented on all four books at Paris (1252-56); as a master, Thomas commented on book 1 a second time at Rome (1265-66). This second commentary, only recently discovered, sheds much additional light on the year immediately preceding Thomas' undertaking of the *Summa theologiae*.²

In 1265, the Roman province of the Order of Preachers assigned Friar Thomas to teach at a new *studium* created for him in Rome, a task he began that same Fall.³ The details of Thomas' *studium* including its curriculum are, as yet, unknown, with a notable exception. Tolomeo of Lucca, Thomas' confrere, confessor, and biographer, writes that Thomas "already a Master, wrote at the time he was in Rome on the first book of the *Sentences*."⁴ This is unusual for a master of theology; the teaching of the *Sentences* was the task of the bachelor, not the master. Tolomeo says, as if a noteworthy fact, that Thomas was already a Master." Indeed,

1. A version of this paper was presented at the Twenty-fifth International Congress of Medieval Studies at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, May 1990.

2. The text of the second commentary, which we shall call the "Roman Commentary" to distinguish it from the earlier Parisian *Scriptum*, is found in Oxford, Lincoln College Ms. Lat. 95. The attribution of the text to St. Thomas was established by Leonard E. Boyle, in "Alia lectura fratris Thome," *Mediaeval Studies* 45 (1983), 418-29. The critical edition is being prepared for publication by Leonard E. Boyle and John F. Boyle. The texts provided in this article are provisional working texts prepared by the author. For incipits and explicits, see Mark F. Johnson, "'Alia lectura fratris thome': A List of the New Texts of St Thomas Aquinas found in Lincoln College, Oxford, MS. Lat. 95," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 57 (1990), 34-61.

3. See L. E. Boyle, *The Setting of the "Summa theologiae" of Saint Thomas* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982), 9-11.

4. See Boyle, "'Alia lectura,'" 418, esp. n. 2.

a master for almost a full decade, Thomas returns to the basic textbook for students in theology, the *Sentences* of Lombard. This suggests that Thomas' students were beginning their studies in theology. At a local school of a province deficient in the education of friars, the students were not likely advanced students in theology. Thus Thomas, already a master, returns to the textbook for beginners. Less than a year later in 1266, Thomas begins work on the *Summa theologiae*.

In the prolog to the *Summa*, Thomas explains that it is for those beginning their theological studies. According to Thomas, the common means of instruction tend to impede learning. The most fitting order of presentation, that according to the order of learning, is sacrificed to the demands of textual exposition or the topics of disputation. Frequent repetition induces both confusion and boredom. Thomas writes the *Summa theologiae*, in part, to overcome these pedagogical problems. Some of these problems, noted so pointedly in the prolog to the *Summa*, had hindered Thomas' efforts to teach the Trinity in his second commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. This second commentary makes clear the need for the *Summa theologiae*.

The genius of the *Summa* is not only in a given answer to a given question. It is as well in the very ordering of those questions. Thomas often expresses his most profound insights in the ordering of the matter before him. The questions of the *Summa* on the distinction of persons in the Trinity are an instance of Thomas' ordering of theological matter according to his deepening understanding of the truths of revelation. Let us note the first three questions on the Trinity. These questions proceed in a rather rigorous order from procession to relation to person. Question 27, the first question on the Trinity, is dedicated to procession as an internal divine activity. Thomas analyzes the two processions found in intellectual beings, namely, understanding and willing. The first procession with regard to understanding is generation, and the second procession with regard to willing, lacking a proper name, is simply called by the common name procession. Thomas begins his deliberations on the mystery of the Trinity with the internal activities of God considered principally as divine activities, not as proper or notional activities of specific divine persons. In question

28, Thomas analyzes relation affirming real relations in the divine, relations of opposition, which opposition is an opposition of origin, that is, according to the origin of the relations in the previously analyzed processions. Finally, in question 29, Thomas begins his consideration of person specifically as a subsisting relation of opposition. In these opening three questions of the *Summa* on the Trinity, Thomas presents with striking clarity and even simplicity the principles of his trinitarian teaching: procession as divine operation, divine relation founded upon the two processions, divine person as subsisting relation. From these principles, Thomas elaborates the doctrine of the Trinity in the following thirteen questions of the *Summa theologiae*.⁵

The doctrinal differences between the Roman Commentary and the *Summa theologiae* on the points outlined here are few and relatively insignificant. Thomas seems to have the vision that characterizes the questions on the Trinity in the *Summa theologiae*. It is, however, a vision clouded in its communication by the demands of commenting on the *Sentences* of Lombard.

The Roman Commentary has no division of the text. We do not know if this is because Thomas simply adopted his earlier division or whether a second division has been lost. Either way, Thomas struggles within the confines of Lombard's order. The text itself and the growing commentary tradition determine what topics are to be treated and where. In his efforts to teach the doctrine of the Trinity within the confines of Lombard's *Sentences*, Thomas reworks old articles and introduces new ones. But there is only so much he can do as a commentator. The problems of order and repetition plague him, and we can see this clearly in Thomas' treatment of procession, relation, and person—presented so neatly and clearly in the *Summa theologiae*. I shall briefly note a few articles in five different distinctions by way of illustration.

Peter Lombard's consideration of the Trinity begins with his consideration of God Himself in distinction 2. With characteristic directness, Lombard throws himself without much ado into a

5. For a detailed consideration of the order of Thomas' treatment of the Trinity in the *Summa theologiae* and its significance, see Paul Vanier, *Théologie trinitaire chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montreal: Institute d'Études Médiévales, 1953), 55-91, esp. 55-60.

presentation of the scriptural authorities for the Trinity of persons. Distinction 2 quickly became something of a catch-all among the commentators for preliminary considerations of the divine unity and plurality. In the Parisian *Scriptum*, distinction 2 contains four articles, each addressing different aspects of the divine unity and plurality. A lengthy disputed question on the plurality of divine attributes from Thomas' Roman period is inserted into the earlier Parisian *Scriptum* here in distinction 2 (article 3).⁶

In the Roman Commentary, distinction 2 contains eight articles: four consider the name of God; four consider more specifically the highest good. Book I of the *Sentences* has no obvious or traditional place to consider the highest good, so Thomas places it here.⁷ One article is of particular interest: "Whether there is a plurality of persons in the highest good." Because God is most perfect, He lacks no perfection. Among these perfections are to be counted the acts of understanding and willing, for God most perfectly knows and loves Himself. When someone knows something, he has that which is known in his mind; likewise, when someone loves something, he has that which is loved in his mind. So it is with God in knowing and loving Himself. When God knows Himself He is within Himself as that which is known; when God loves Himself, he is within Himself as that which is loved. Thomas concludes that there is in God one that proceeds by way of the intellect and

6. See Antoine Dondaine, "Saint Thomas a-t-il disputé à Rome la question des 'Attributs Divins'?" (*I Sent.*, dist. 2, qu. 1, art. 3)," *Bulletin Thomiste* (Notes et communications) 1 (1931-33), 171*-82*, and idem, "Saint Thomas et la dispute des attributs divins (*I Sent.*, d. 2, a. 3): authenticité et origine," *Archivum fratrum predicatorum* 8 (1938), 253-62. Dondaine suggested in the first of these that the inserted article might have been taken from Thomas' second commentary on the *Sentences* (181*-82*). The Roman Commentary as found in Lincoln 95 has an article dedicated to this topic ("Vtrum nomina de Deo dicta significant unum in Deo uel multa," 9va-10va) which is clearly distinct from the disputed question inserted into the Parisian *Scriptum*.

7. The proper order of the articles of distinction 2 is unclear; the articles are: "Vtrum in summo bono sit pluralitas personarum" (1va-b); "Vtrum hoc nomen Deus sit nomen operationis uel nature" (1vb-2ra); "Vtrum aliquid sit summe bonum" (2va-b); "Vtrum sit tantum unum summum bonum" (2vb); "Vtrum nomina de Deo dicta significant unum in Deo uel multa" (9va-10va); "Vtrum summum bonum possit cognosci inmundis" (12ra-11vb [sic]); "Vtrum hoc nomen Deus predicetur de tribus personis in pluri" (123vb); "Vtrum hoc nomen Deus sit magis proprium nomen ipsius quam alia" (123vb-a [sic]).

this is the Word of God, and there is another that proceeds by way of love and this is the Holy Spirit.⁸

Although the question in the Roman Commentary is posed with regard to the highest good, the response makes almost no mention of that highest good; there is certainly no consideration of the self-diffusive good in relation to the plurality of persons; that line of analysis is wholly absent. The highest good merely provides an occasion for the consideration of the plurality of persons at the beginning of the commentary. In fact, although Thomas poses the question with regard to the plurality of persons, the response is an analysis of the divine processions. As the *Summa theologiae* makes clear, it is precisely the consideration of divine processions that serves as the foundation for Thomas' understanding of the plurality of persons. The teaching of the Roman Commentary here is that of the *Summa theologiae* as found in the first of the trinitarian questions, question 27.⁹

A comparison with the Parisian *Scriptum* highlights the significance of this article. In the Parisian commentary, Thomas asks "Whether there are many persons in the divine"; his answer, however, is quite perfunctory: merely an affirmation of the fact without

8. "Vtrum in summo bono sit pluralitas personarum," resp. (1va): "Responso. Dicendum quod sicut fides ponit ita et ratio, licet non usquaque perfecte, potest considerare Trinitatem personarum in diuinis in unitate essentie. Quia enim Deus est perfectissimus nulla ei perfectio deest, sicut infra ostendetur. Inter omnes autem perfectiones rerum sunt precipue intelligere et uelle, unde nec Deo deesse possunt. Omnis autem intelligens ex eo quod intelligit <habet> aliquid formaliter in mente sua, et similiter qui uult et amat habet in mente sua [*ms.* suam] rem amatam. Deus autem perfecte intelligit se et amat se. In quantum igitur intelligit se habet conceptum intellectus sui; in quantum uero amat habet in mente sua rem amatam. Nam amatum in quantum amatur oportet esse in amante, mouetur enim <amans> quodammodo ab amato quadam intrinseca motione. Vnde cum mouens contigit id quod mouetur, necesse est amatum intrinsecum amanti esse. Intellectum autem siue conceptio intellectus prout est in intelligente est uerbum quoddam intellectus. Hoc enim exteriori uerbo significamus quod interius intellectu comprehendimus. Sic enim secundum Philosophum uoces <sunt> signa intellectuum. Illud autem quod est in mente ut res amata est quo mouemur ad operandum, in quantum amatum trahit et mouet amantem secundum quadam motionem, ut dictum est, ad operandum.

"Dico ergo quod cum Deus intelligat seipsum est ibi uerbum Dei, et cum amet seipsum perfecte est in seipso ut amatum in amante. Et ideo oportet ponere in diuinis unum quod procedit per modum intellectus et hoc est uerbum Dei, et aliud quod procedit per modum amoris et hoc est Spiritus Sanctus."

9. *ST*, I.27.1,3, and 4.

explanation, as if the explanation is to come later.¹⁰ By the time of the Roman Commentary, Thomas can no longer put off the explanation. That explanation is essential to his trinitarian deliberations, even if not to Lombard's. Thomas now sees clearly that he must begin with the processions in so far as they are divine activities, not in so far as they are notional activities of particular persons. Such an analysis has no obvious place of presentation in the *Sentences*; it may well not have been an important point for Lombard; it may not have been particularly important to Thomas at the beginning of his career when he first commented on the *Sentences* in Paris. It is sufficiently important now, however, to be given a place in distinction 2 at the beginning of his Roman Commentary. This placement of divine procession should alert us that Thomas faces a textbook that is ill-suited to his own theological teaching.

Let us now turn to distinction 9, which, according to Thomas' Parisian division, begins Lombard's presentation of divine persons; or more precisely, it begins Lombard's presentation of two of the divine persons, the Son (distinction 9) and the Holy Spirit (distinctions 10 to 18).¹¹ Lombard does not discuss what the term person means until distinction 23.

Thomas first asks in distinction 9 of the Roman Commentary "Whether there is generation in the divine." He explains generation and then applies it to God. Thomas notes two characteristics of generation: the generated has the nature of the generator and, in the case of living things, the generated receives something of the substance of the generator. Both of these are found in the most perfect generation in God because there is both the likeness of substance and the communication of the complete divine substance. Thomas then applies this specifically to the act of understanding and the Word for in understanding Himself completely, God forms a complete and perfect Word, which Word has the entire nature of the Father.¹² In answering this question, Thomas repeats much of

10. Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros sententiarum*, ed. P. Mandonnet, vol. 1 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), bk. I, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 4; pp. 73-4.

11. *Scriptum*, I.9.div.; 243.

12. "Vtrum generatio sit in diuinis," resp. (30r): "Responsio. Dicendum quod secundum doctrinam fidei, oportet nos dicere et firmiter tenere quod in diuinis sit generans et genitus. Ad huius euentiam sciendum est quod in qualibet generatione

what he has already said in distinction 2 with regard to procession and understanding. He further explains how understanding in God is fittingly called generation. This question corresponds in substance to the second article of the *Summa's* first question on the Trinity, question 27. Although the teaching in the *Summa* is more refined, the task is clearly the same: explaining generation in light of procession (understanding) as an act of God. The question is not even asked in the Parisian *Scriptum*.

Thomas' second article in distinction 9 of the Roman Commentary is "Whether the Son can be called other (*alius*) than the Father." The response is an analysis of relation as the only basis of real distinction in the divine processions. These real relations are subsisting relations, and these subsisting relations are in turn hypostases or persons. On this basis, Thomas then answers the specific question posed with regard to grammatical gender and the distinction between *alius* and *aliud*.¹³

duo sunt. Vnum quod est commune in omne generatione secundum quod generatum habet naturam generantis. Vnde si aliquid sit ad similitudinem alterius et non habeat naturam eius, non dicatur generatum set similem. Aliud uero quod est diuersum in diuersis generationibus. In quibusdam enim generationibus inuenitur quod generatum non <recipit> aliquid de substantia generantis, licet recipiat naturam generantis secundum speciem; et hoc est in omnibus generantibus inanimatis. Licet enim calefactum recipiat naturam ignis secundum speciem, nunquam tamen recipit eandem substantiam. Inuenitur etiam quod generans tradit naturam suam generato et aliquid de substantia sua; et hoc est in generantibus uiuentibus, nam in ipsis per decisionem aliquam fit generatio. Dico ergo quod in diuinis est perfectissima generatio quia non solum est ibi similitudo nature in generante et generato, set etiam communicatio substantie sue et totius substantie cum ibi nulla sit pars. Et ideo Pater dat substantiam suam Filio. Quod sic patet: Deus enim est ipse intellectus, et suum esse est suum intelligere. Quandocumque aliquis intelligit format sibi uerbum sui intellectus. Si ergo Deus intelligit, oportet quod format sibi uerbum sui intellectus quod, quia in Deo suum intelligere est suum esse, ideo ipsum uerbum habet naturam et substantiam Patris; et quia Deus intelligit se totum, ideo habet totam naturam Patris. In nobis autem quia intelligere nostrum est aliud quam esse nostrum, ideo uerbum intellectus nostri non est idem nobiscum nec habet naturam nostram. Licet ergo in diuinis generatum perfecte assimiletur generanti et habeat totam naturam suam, nichilominus tamen remanet ibi distinctio per relationes quibus generans distinguitur a generato in quantum scilicet unus est dans et alius accipiens."

13. "Vtrum Filius possit dici alius a Patre," resp. (30v): "Responsio. Dicendum quod sicut dictum est, in generatione eterna non remanet distinctio nisi secundum relationes, cum Pater det totam substantiam suam Filio. Et huiusmodi relationes sunt reales et subsistentes, scilicet hoc quod est esse Patrem et Filium, quia paternitas est Pater et filiatio est Filius. Huiusmodi relationes in quantum

Thomas posed the same question in distinction 9 of the Parisian *Scriptum*. The answer, however, is quite different. In the Parisian commentary, Thomas relies upon his analysis of grammatical gender to establish the difference between *alius* and *aliud*. Relation plays no role, and person is considered simply as existing in divine nature, without reference to relation.¹⁴

The first two articles of distinction 9 in the Roman Commentary are quite striking. The vision of the first three questions on the Trinity of the *Summa theologiae* is here: procession as divine operation to subsisting relation to person. To present this, Thomas has added a new question and answered an old question in a new way. But the limitations of the commentary form are starting to show. This presentation of Thomas' mature trinitarian teaching is found not in a consideration of procession, relation, or person in general, but in a distinction dedicated to one of the persons in particular. In order to explain that one person—the Son—Thomas must establish his general principles with regard to procession, relation, and person; unfortunately, Lombard's order rather frustrates Thomas' effort. Lombard's consideration of person is not to be found until distinction 23, and relation not until distinction 26. Thus, on the one hand, Thomas must substantially repeat what he has already said in distinction 2 on procession. On the other hand, he must anticipate by some fifteen distinctions the analysis of relation and person.

We now turn to distinction 10, which begins Lombard's presentation of the Holy Spirit. Thomas first asks in the Roman Commentary "Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds as love." In presenting the Holy Spirit, Thomas proceeds as he did in presenting the

sunt subsistentes sunt ypostases. Ex hoc ergo apparet quod in diuinis substantia dicitur dupliciter, scilicet de essentia et de ypostasibus siue de personis. Et sic est inuenire ibi distinctionem ypostasum. Et quantum ad hanc distinctionem possumus dicere quod alius est Pater et alius est Filius, quia alia est ypostasis Patris ab ypostasi Filii. Non autem possumus dicere quod aliud est Pater et aliud Filius. Cuius ratio est quia neutrum genus pertinet ad naturam in se consideratam absolute, et ideo aliud inportat diuersitatem simpliciter et absolute que est diuersitas essentie. Et ideo non potest Pater dici aliud a Filio. Masculinum uero genus dicit quoddam in se formatum, et ideo trahitur ad significandum pro persona; et hoc modo dicitur Filius alius a Patre quia alia est ypostasis Filii alia Patris."

14. *Scriptum*, I.9.1.1.resp. and answers to objections; 246-47.

Son in distinction 9: he determines the specific procession of the Holy Spirit according to the procession already established in distinction 2. Furthermore, he draws closely the parallel between understanding as he presented it in the preceding distinction and willing: when God perfectly understands Himself, He is in Himself, as what is understood is in the one who understands; this is the Word. Likewise, when God perfectly loves Himself, He is in Himself, as the beloved is in the lover; this is the Holy Spirit.¹⁵ The position in detail is that of the *Summa's* first question dedicated to the Trinity, question 27 on divine procession.¹⁶ The position in the corresponding question of the Parisian *Scriptum* bears little resemblance to that in the Roman Commentary and the *Summa theologiae*.¹⁷

Let us note what Thomas does, however awkwardly, in the Roman Commentary. He lays a partial foundation for his trinitarian theology in distinction 2, and then according to the demands of Lombard's order, he develops it with the consideration of the Son and then the Holy Spirit as these particular considerations require further elaboration of the principles. The vision is indeed unified; the presentation is not.

15. "Vtrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat ut amor," resp. (31vb-32ra): "Respon- sio. Dicendum quod in qualibet natura intellectiua, necesse est ponere duas operationes, unam scilicet intellectus et aliam uoluntatis. Cum igitur Deus sit maxime intelligens, oportet istas operationes in ipso ponere, non quod differant in Deo, set differunt ex parte nostra secundum rationem tantum; quia cum loquimur de Deo, oportet nos loqui de ipso ut de intelligente et uolente, cum tamen intellectus et uoluntas sint unum in Deo. Quandocumque autem intelligitur aliquid, oportet ipsum intellectum siue ipsam rem intellectam esse in intelligente. Similiter autem et quandocumque aliquid amatur, oportet ipsum esse in amante, iuxta quod etiam Apostolus loquitur ad Philippenses dicens eo quod habeam uos in uisceribus caritate, etc. [cf. Phil 1:7-8]. Quando ergo homo intelligit siue cognoscit se, est in seipso secundum esse intelligibile, et hoc uocatur uerbum suum. Quando ergo amat se, est in seipso ut in amante. Deus ergo cum perfecte intelligat se, est in seipso ut intellectum in intelligente. Et hoc est uerbum suum, scilicet conceptio intellectus sui. Cum uero perfecte amet se, est in seipso ut amatum in amante, et hoc uocatur Spiritus Sanctus. Et quia in Deo suum intelligere et suum amare est suum esse, et ideo uerbum et Spiritus Sanctus habent naturam et totam substantiam Patris, set differunt relationibus ut supra dictum est. Patet ergo sicut in diuinis uerbum procedit per modum intellectus, ita Spiritus Sanctus per modum amoris."

16. *ST*, I.27.1 and 3.

17. *Scriptum*, I.10.1.1.resp.; 262.

Distinction 13 is still within Lombard's treatment of the Holy Spirit; however, according to Thomas' Parisian division it considers the relation between the two divine processions.¹⁸ In the Roman Commentary, he first asks "Whether there is only one or many processions in the divine." The answer is a succinct affirmation of the necessity of only two processions according to the internal operations of an intellective nature.¹⁹ It corresponds once again to *Summa theologiae*, question 27.²⁰

The second article of distinction 13 of the Roman Commentary asks "Whether the processions differ really or only according to reason." Thomas argues that the distinction of the procession of persons is from the termini of the processions, which termini can be taken in two ways, either the proceeding persons themselves or the divine nature communicated to them. No distinction according to divine nature is possible, therefore the distinction is according to divine persons. The persons are really distinct because they are opposite relations of origin. Thomas concludes that because the persons are really distinct, the processions are really distinct.²¹ In

18. *Scriptum*, I.10.div.; 260 and 13.div.; 300.

19. "Vtrum in diuinis sit una processio tantum uel plures," resp. (36v): "Responsio. Dicendum quod impossibile est ponere in diuinis nisi duas processiones, et has duas de necessitate oportet ponere. Processio enim diuine persone est processio alicuius quod est intra. Persona enim non est seperata in diuinis secundum essentiam ab eo a quo procedit. Vnde non oportet quod huiusmodi processio que est in diuinis intelligatur secundum modum quo aliquid est extrinsecum set secundum quod aliquid est instrinsecum [*ms.* extrinsecus]. Hoc autem potest esse in diuinis duobus modis tantum, scilicet secundum quod aliquid procedit per modum intellectus, et secundum quod aliquid procedit per modum uoluntatis. Et illa persona que per modum intellectus procedit dicitur uerbum siue Filius. Illa uero que per modum uoluntatis procedit ut amor et dicitur Spiritus Sanctus. Et ideo in diuinis non ponuntur nisi huiusmodi due processiones, et has oportet ponere, scilicet processionem que est per intellectum et processionem que est per uoluntatem."

20. *ST*, I.27.1 and 5.

21. "Vtrum processionem differant re uel ratione tantum," resp. (36v-37r): "Responsio. Dicendum quod oportet motus et operationes omnes distinguere secundum rationem et distinctionem terminorum. Et ideo distinctio processionum diuinarum <personarum> sumenda est a terminis processionum ipsarum. Termini autem in processione diuinarum personarum possunt dupliciter accipi, quia uel ipse persone procedentes, uel natura diuina ipsis personis per processionem communicata. Et cum secundum naturam non sit aliqua distinctio in diuinis, huius processionem non distinguuntur secundum naturam diuinam; constat ergo quod distinguuntur secundum personas. Cum autem persone procedentes sint in diuinis

answering this question in the Parisian *Scriptum*, Thomas makes much the same point although more awkwardly.²² Lombard forces the question of the real distinction of processions; unfortunately, the question, as Thomas wants to answer it, is out of order: it demands the exposition of relation and person. As in the articles of distinction 9, Thomas must refer to ideas yet to receive their full treatment.

Thomas' response in the Roman Commentary, however, suggests a yet deeper tension, for Thomas does not really answer the question posed—"Whether the processions differ really or only according to reason"—but rather shifts the weight from distinction in procession to distinction in relation and person. The question of real distinction is not ultimately one of procession, but one of relation. In the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas does not even ask this question, an instance of his eloquent silence. In the *Summa*, the question of distinction is not raised in question 27 on divine processions; instead, it is raised in question 28 (art. 3)—on divine relations. The demands of the *Sentences* are such as to affect not only the order of material, but to force questions which, in the light of Thomas' own trinitarian doctrine, are poor and perhaps even misleading.

The Roman Commentary, as we have it in Lincoln 95, stops at distinction 17, the second to last distinction on the Holy Spirit. Four articles in distinction 23 on person constitute the notable exception. The teaching in these articles is that of the *Summa theologiae*. Without knowing more precisely the state of the text, we

realiter distincte, oportet quod et ipse processionem diuinarum personarum realiter distinguantur. Que quidem distinctio est per relationes originis oppositas, que relationes non reducuntur ad aliquid unum, quia sic possibile esset eas inuenire in uno, unde non facerent distinctionem realem set rationis tantum. Distinguntur ergo oppositis relationibus originis prout scilicet Spiritus Sanctus est a Filio. Vnde dato quod Spiritus Sanctus non esset a Filio, non distinguerentur ab inuicem. Sic igitur processionem in diuinis realiter distinguuntur, ut natiuitas sit prout unus scilicet Filius est ab uno tantum non procedente scilicet a Patre; processio uero sit prout Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre non procedente et a Filio procedente. Et ideo est quod unus dicitur procedere per intellectum ut uerbum, et alius per modum uoluntatis ut amor. Nam amor procedit a uoluntate mediante intellectu, quamquam secundum hoc non distinguantur realiter nisi ratione relationum originis oppositorum, ut dictum est."

22. *Scriptum*, I.13.1.2.resp.; 303-304.

cannot know if our scribe was selective and simply omitted Thomas' articles on the intervening distinctions or whether Thomas never commented on them, but felt compelled at some point to consider distinction 23 out of order because it dealt with the term 'person', and Thomas could not wait until distinction 23 to explain it.

For the time being, we do not know if the text ends where it does because Thomas stopped commenting or simply because the scribe stopped writing. Nonetheless, if Thomas is to have ended in frustrated exasperation, distinction 17 is a good place. What lies ahead is, from a thomistic point of view, a rather frightful Lombardian quagmire. Among the many topics yet to be treated, in an order quite unlike Thomas' own in the *Summa theologiae*, are person and relation (both of which Thomas has to some extent already considered), as well as property, notion, and notional acts. One cannot help but wonder if Thomas despaired of embarking on the remainder of this commentary precisely because the order was to be dictated by Lombard, and as Thomas himself was so keenly aware, order is at the heart of the matter.

In the few topics we have touched upon here, we can see Thomas struggle to present his own increasingly integrated and synthetic doctrine of the Trinity within Lombard's order. The result is awkward. If we did not have the *Summa theologiae*, it would be all too easy to miss the real substance of the Roman Commentary. Indeed, it would appear confusing and repetitious—all the more, one suspects, if Thomas had continued on. Perhaps this was the experience of his students in Rome. In the end, the *Sentence* commentary is not a vehicle well suited to St. Thomas' genius: to which his Roman Commentary considered in relation to the *Summa theologiae* gives clear witness.

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