Social justice, the role of business and the common good

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The phrase “social justice” has become loaded when used in Catholic circles. Some Catholics are described pejoratively as ‘social justice Catholics’ when they appear to have more interest in political matters and left-leaning politics than the evangelical mission of the Church or the Church’s liturgy. At the same time, supporters of a broadly free economy are often accused of ignoring the social teaching of the Church and, it is sometimes argued, their views are incompatible with Catholicism if they sympathise with the ideas of F. A. Hayek who wrote a renowned critique of the idea of social justice.

However, two early scholars who wrote about social justice in a Catholic context (Taparelli d’Azeglio and Rosmini) could certainly not be described as left-leaning. Indeed, Rosmini’s writings on matters of political economy have shades of Hayek. Furthermore, Hayek himself was a supporter of significant levels of income redistribution by the state which is the commonly understood manifestation of social justice. Given this, why did Hayek critique the ideas of Taparelli and Rosmini and why would ‘social justice Catholics’ who support income redistribution and a big role for the state in economic life argue that there is an incompatibility between Hayekian thinking and Catholic social teaching?

The answer to these questions is that the meaning of social justice has become confused. Hayek’s critique misunderstood the original meaning of the term. Furthermore, within modern Catholic social teaching, the term seems to have come to have more than one meaning and its original meaning is not well understood. More fruitful discussion about the meaning and application of social justice requires us to go back to the origins so that we can fully understand its original intended meaning.

This paper examines Hayek’s critique of the Catholic sources of social justice thinking in the context of their original meaning. It then considers some examples of how the idea of social justice as originally understood in Catholic teaching can be applied in economic life.

**Hayek’s critique of social justice**

Hayek was strongly critical of the idea of social justice in the second volume of *Law, Legislation and Liberty*. He argues that the concept is meaningless in a ‘great society’ or ‘extended order’. The outcome of a market economy is not intended by anybody. It is the result of a process of social co-operation. The rules by which the participants act might be just or unjust, but, if the rules are just, we cannot regard the outcome as ‘socially unjust’ because nobody is responsible for bringing about the outcome. The outcome is a result of a huge number of uncoordinated decisions.

He further argues (88-90) that social justice is a left-over from a bygone era when persons lived in small groups within which it was possible to think of resources being
shared out according to principles that might be regarded as ‘just’, perhaps depending on need or the contribution of individuals to obtaining the resources that were available for allocation, and so on.

According to these two aspects of the critique, Hayek argues that social justice is meaningless. He also argues that it is not feasible. If income is to be redistributed according to socially just principles, how can this be determined objectively? (Hayek, 1976, page 78). Different people will have different views on the principles that should be applied, never mind disagreement about their application in particular cases. How should we take into account an assessment of somebody’s contribution to producing the total output of society? Is it just to reward intelligence (the distribution of which is a matter of luck)? To what extent should hard work be rewarded and how do we measure it? Are some of the poor more undeserving than others? In what proportions do we apply these principles? The problem of distribution, which can be resolved, according to Hayek, by people acting co-operatively within a market economy just cannot be resolved objectively in the great society. It cannot be argued that they are resolved by voting and elections because that simply raises the question of whether an outcome is just simply because a majority of people (or the largest minority of people) agree with it.

As it happens, Hayek did not disagree with policies designed to ensure that the poor had enough to live on and be integrated into society, perhaps going beyond the level of state redistribution proposed in *Rerum Novarum*¹. However, he would not describe the process of bringing this about as one of promoting social justice.

Hayek also argues that the pursuit of social justice can be used to justify almost any intervention by the state and that those interventions would undermine the whole idea of a free society governed by rules of just conduct (Hayek, 1976, page 68). To give one example, many people argue that social justice is brought about when we have equality of opportunity rather than outcomes. If this simply means that nobody should face legal impediments to a particular occupation or to education, that is not only achievable but, according to Hayek, desirable. Hayek argues that this is precisely what the classical liberal movement fought for (Hayek, 1960, 154-155). On the other hand, former UK Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, in a government paper suggested: “Patterns of inequality are imprinted from one generation to the next. The true test of fairness is the distribution of opportunities.”² If this really is the true test of fairness, it is not clear how anything other than an equal distribution of opportunities can be fair. This is something which can surely only be achieved with government involvement in the intricacies of family life from before birth. If this is what social justice demands, it would be inimical to a free society.

In his attack on social justice, Hayek, not surprisingly, critiqued the purveyors of the idea and this included Catholic writers. Hayek argued that the phrase social justice had been taken over by most ‘teacher and preachers of morality’ (Hayek 1976, page

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¹ Compare *Rerum Novarum* 14 with Hayek (1960) pages 257 and 258 for example.

Hayek related this tendency to a loss of faith in the supernatural by the most important Christian denominations and made special reference to the Catholic Church (page 66). In Hayek’s discussion, he specifically refers to leading Catholic thinkers of the mid-to-late nineteenth century and to the Church teaching documents, *Quadragesimo Anno* and *Divini Redemptoris* both published in the 1930s.

Whilst critiquing the Christian usage of the term social justice, Hayek did admit that the concept was poorly defined. Indeed, in his criticisms, he seems to have projected a later use of the term back on to the writers of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. However, in Catholic teaching the term had a meaning which, though quite difficult to discern and define precisely, was quite different from egalitarian meanings of the term or the Rawlsian definition that developed in the 1960s and early-1970s. It was these conceptions of social justice which are the main targets of Hayek’s *Mirage*.

**What did social justice mean in Catholic writings and teaching?**

A number of scholars have traced the idea of social justice back to Taparelli. In his work *Saggio Teoretico di Dritto Naturale Appoggiato sul Fatto*, social justice is mentioned several times. Though the meaning expressed is complex, it has little to do with centralised processes of income redistribution by a political authority according to agreed principles of justice which is the idea Hayek has in his sights. Taparelli defines social justice as ‘justice between man and man’. This includes equality under the law, but not equality of outcomes. Indeed, Taparelli specifically argued that there are natural inequalities, but that this fact should not lead to a situation of inequality before the law. It is worth noting that equality before the law was an important concept in all Hayek’s work including in *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, the three-volume work in which *The Mirage of Social Justice* appeared.

For Taparelli, however, the reach of social justice is intended to go beyond equality before the law. It relates to the Thomist concept of ‘the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right’3. Taparelli, it would appear, intended social justice to be a new term for the area of justice defined by Thomas Aquinas as ‘legal justice’. This was a virtue of the citizen by which he or she directs his or her conduct towards the common good of the community. The state might be involved, but the word ‘legal’ did not mean that this function was only (or, indeed, mainly) for the state. Justice of this form was the responsibility of all members of and all institutions in society. Social justice in Thomist thinking was not the same as distributive justice (ensuring all received the goods that were due to them in justice). However, though distributive justice is not the same as (or even a subset of) social justice, it is argued in Catholic teaching that the exercise of social justice would help ensure that the distribution of the goods of the world was just.

Interpretations of Taparelli’s work help clarify the ideas. Newman, for example, (not Cardinal Newman) explains that ‘social justice is justice in society in general and not

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3 “[…] *Iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit*”, S.Th. IP-IIae q. 58 a. 1 co. All references to Aquinas are taken from the Corpus Thomisticum project ([www.corpusthomisticum.org](http://www.corpusthomisticum.org)).
merely in economic or political society’ (Newman, Foundations of Justice, 1954, page 107). In other words, it applies to the individual, the family, all institutions, the city, the state and to international society as well as to the Church. Newman suggests that social justice as a virtue is best described as that disposition of the will which inclines individuals and groups to work for the common good of the communities of which they are parts. It refers to acts which different social groups owe to each other. It goes beyond commutative justice which regulates what individuals owe to each other and which relates to the protection of property, the fulfilment of contracts and so on. This idea will be illustrated with examples below.

To end this part of the discussion, it is worth noting that the second Catholic philosopher cited by Hayek was Rosmini. He was more of a liberal disposition (in the classical sense of the word) whereas Taparelli was a conservative. The former strongly defended property rights, proportional taxes and attacked policies of redistribution. Indeed, Rosmini’s way of describing social justice was as “to each what he owns” and the inviolability of property. This is certainly different the use of the term in Taparelli, but Hayek would have surely found such ideas inoffensive. Indeed, Rosmini’s sense of justice in taxation was identical to that of Hayek (1960, page 314).

Whilst Hayek, no doubt, would have criticised the whole idea of social justice as promoted by Catholic writers, the specific objections Hayek raised relate to an entirely different use of the term. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he simply misinterpreted how the term was used in the Catholic context and then assumed that later uses of the term had the same meanings as earlier uses of the term.

**Social justice in Church teaching documents**

But, what about the use of social justice in Church teaching documents? Was Hayek’s aim more accurate here? The first formal social teaching document of the Catholic Church in modern times was *Rerum Novarum* published in 1891. Both Pope Leo XIII, in whose name the document was issued, and the drafter Matteo Liberatore had been students of Taparelli. As it happens, the phrase ‘social justice’ is not used in that document. There is much discussion of justice in general. As well as the encyclical expressing a trenchant defence of workers’ rights, it also contains strong justifications for the principle of private property and of the role of the family and civil society institutions.

However, *Rerum Novarum* introduces a discussion about behaviour in a number of areas of economic life to which it attaches the label ‘justice’ without the prefix ‘social’. Here we are perhaps beginning to see the development of the idea but without the application of the term which comes later. From paragraph 20 onwards, for example, various obligations of employers are laid out. Employers are told that, in justice, they must pay employees a family wage (45) and that they should not treat employees in such a way that employees are led to neglect home and family. These are not laid down as duties of the state (though the state could be involved). But, they are not aspects of particular or commutative justice. The term ‘social justice’ does seem to be a reasonable phrase to describe such actions.
Quadragesimo Anno, published to mark the 40th anniversary of Rerum Novarum, is often described as the 'social justice encyclical’ and is one of the documents criticised by Hayek. Social justice is mentioned on nine occasions in the encyclical and there is a detailed discussion of the concept. The tenor of that discussion is very important given Hayek’s critique. Social justice was very much linked to the idea of a just distribution of goods but was regarded as a pre-requisite for that end rather than the process of redistributing goods itself. Distributive justice was largely to be achieved by the practice of social justice amongst non-state actors. There is no explicit role for the state discussed at all in this respect in the encyclical. It is also of note that this is the encyclical in which the principle of subsidiarity is introduced. A guiding role for the state in economic life is proposed, but the state is certainly not proposed as the primary actor when it comes to social justice. The link between social justice and distributive justice is made clear when it is noted that:

“By this law of social justice, one class is forbidden to exclude the other from sharing in the benefits...To each, therefore, must be given his own share of goods, and the distribution of created goods, which...must be effectively called back to and brought into conformity with the norms of the common good, that is, social justice.” (57-58). It is not being proposed that the state should somehow redistribute goods according to some principles of social justice, but that people should act with social justice so that all get the share that is due to them. When it came to employers, the encyclical argued that a socially just wage would take into account the contract, the contribution made to the enterprise and the family situation of the worker. 4

Divini Redemptoris followed Quadragesimo Anno and was intended as an attack on communism. In this encyclical, it was suggested that social justice could not be satisfied until all people had sufficient to exercise their proper social functions. Successive Church teaching documents have emphasised a similar message relating the idea that all should have the necessities of life not just to the common good but to human dignity. It has generally been argued that all people are due in justice those goods necessary for a dignified living (food, shelter, healthcare etc). This encyclical argued that action by employers and the creation of professional associations and other bodies in society would be the means by which social justice was brought about. This role for non-state bodies in practising social justice and thereby bringing about distributive justice is echoed by the modern teaching in the Catechism. The fact that responsibilities for social justice are intended to obtain throughout the whole of society and the fact that social justice is intended to be something distinct from a process of income redistribution is illustrated when the encyclical suggests that nobody should believe that they are exempt from the duties imposed by justice by the making of ‘trifling’ donations to charity.

There may well have been grounds on which Hayek could have criticised the idea of social justice as it developed in Catholic social teaching, but social justice is clearly not the process of the state distributing the goods of the world according to some

4 Something that would almost certainly be illegal in the UK under equality legislation.
agreed principles of justice (equality, contribution, desert etc) which was the target of The Mirage of Social Justice.

Nell-Breuning, the drafter of Quadragesimo Anno, argued that the encyclical ‘has finally and definitively established, theologically canonized, so to speak, social justice’. Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that Hayek wrote the way he did about ‘teachers and preachers of morality’ adopting the idea. However, in his own work, Nell-Breuning gives few clues about its intended meaning – certainly not in any systematic way.

Nell-Breuning did argue that the state should be a directing force for the economy, something with which Hayek would have disagreed profoundly. However, this was not to bring about a particular distribution of incomes and neither was it to displace the responsibilities of all actors in society to practise the virtue of social justice. The purpose of the state was to assist other structures in society realise the common good. It is quite clear that the actors in relation to social justice are all the groups and associations that make up society (including businesses) and the objective is the promotion of the common good. It is impossible to read Catholic social teaching and conclude otherwise. Nell-Breuning explicitly contrasts the approach of promoting social justice in Quadragesimo Anno with the redistribution of property, suggesting that, if the economic order were appropriately regulated by social justice, there would be no need for what he describes as the ‘socialist’ redistribution of property.

**Hayek’s target and Catholic social teaching – defining the differences**

There is a clear difference between the Catholic Church’s understanding of social justice and Hayek’s understanding of justice in general. However, at this stage in the development of the Catholic Church’s teaching (pre-1938), it is not the difference with which Hayek is concerned in The Mirage of Social Justice and nor is it the difference that modern commentators identify. For Catholics writing in the tradition of their Church, the idea of justice can certainly be expanded beyond the ‘rules of the game’, especially those related to commutative justice, that are enforced by the state to also include the encouragement of those actions that are necessary to promote the common good of the whole community or bring the community to virtue. The sphere of social justice includes rules in the social and economic sphere that are not enforced by the state and not written down in the law. This notion of social justice was not the revolutionary innovation Hayek was suggesting. It had been part of Catholic thinking for centuries and did not relate to some notion a set of agreed principles of justice applying to the distribution of income.

**Social justice – practical examples**

From our reading of the material, there does not appear to be much discussion of examples of social justice in the original nineteenth century works. The Church documents discussed above help shed some more light on the concept and how it

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6 See, for example: Rolf H. Hasse, Hermann Schneider & Klaus Weigelt, [http://www.dphu.org/uploads/attachements/books/books_5128_0.pdf](http://www.dphu.org/uploads/attachements/books/books_5128_0.pdf)
might be put into practice. This section of the paper raises some examples which might help illuminate the meaning of social justice or which perhaps may simply clarify where there are grey areas. Some of the examples might be debatable. Examples of acts which offend aspects of justice other than social justice are used to help illustrate the concept.

A business that does not pay an invoice that is due acts sinfully and against the precepts of particular and commutative justice. However, it does not act principally against social justice. On the other hand, an employer who withholds wages such that an employee has to beg offends social justice too because the common good cannot be achieved if employees are unable to obtain the goods that allow them to live in dignity. An employer who pays a worker less than another because he is black probably does not offend commutative justice, but he certainly offends social justice. The action has ramifications beyond the individuals involved and it undermines the common good of the whole community. This is the case even if the worker does not know he is being paid less. Another example of the absence of social justice might arise where an employer hires an employee at a low wage by free agreement (thus fulfilling the demands of commutative justice) but where that wage is less than that of other employees who contribute as much to the enterprise. This may happen because the lower-paid employee is ignorant of market conditions or prevented from moving to a competing employer by family circumstances. Catholic teaching would argue that the employee is a victim of social injustice. It would not necessarily be a matter for the state, but it would certainly be a manifestation of the absence of virtue and of unjust treatment. It is unclear what phrase Hayek would use to describe such behaviour, but it is certainly not unreasonable to use the term ‘social injustice’. Hayek did, in fact, argue that firms should use just principles to determine how much employees were paid. Interestingly, libertarian author, Elaine Sternberg (Sternberg, 2004) discussed the importance of firms acting with ‘distributive justice’ and ‘ordinary decency’ at length clearly distinguishing what she argued was the correct application of this term from attempts by government to redistribute income on a large scale. Thus, some of these applications may well be uncontroversial amongst followers of Hayek even if their classifications might be.

A farmer who diverts a stream the ownership of which is clearly shared, thus requiring a neighbouring farmer to sink a borehole at great cost, also offends particular and commutative justice, but does not principally act against social justice. On the other hand, a mining company that poisons the water supply of a whole village without consultation or compensation offends social justice because it prevents the villagers from obtaining a living that is due to them. The company may or may not offend commutative justice or commit a tort depending on the ownership rights that exist.

Bribes used to gain entry to a university or corruption in public life more generally are offences against social justice because they are actions that are orientated against the common good of the whole society. They may, in fact, harm no particular individual and they may or may not be illegal and they may or may not offend other aspects of justice. Similarly, it would be reasonable to describe an admissions tutor of a university who made judgements about whether to admit students on the basis of how attractive

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7 Except in the sense that it affects the culture in which all businesses operate and such actions therefore tend to move society as a whole away from virtue thus undermining the common good.
he found them as acting ‘unjustly’. The same could apply to discrimination on the grounds of race which is specifically raised in the section of the Catechism of the Catholic Church on social justice. However, it is not self-evident that this sort of behaviour should in every circumstance be the subject of state law enforced by the political authority. It could, though, be regarded as an aspect of justice and it would not be unreasonable to describe it as ‘social justice’. Such rules of justice operating in non-political society would be distinct from acts of charity.

A further aspect of the sphere of social justice has been suggested by Catholic theologian Rhonheimer. He argued that that governments that grant legal privileges or indulge in corrupt behaviour that prevent entry into markets would be indicative of an absence of justice in the social and economic sphere. Indeed, Hayek notes that the classical liberal movement has regarded as appropriate the removal of man-made obstacles to the rise of individuals, the abolition of legal privileges and that, where the state contributed to improving somebody’s condition, they should do so in a way that did not discriminate. This is not far from an important aspect of Rhonheimer’s conception of social justice and is an aspect of justice frequently referred to in Catholic teaching, including in Pope Francis’ critiques of how capitalism is perceived to operate in many countries. Ronheimer’s perspective is also close to Taparelli’s example of equality before the law being an important example of social justice.

A further example could be raised in relation to prostitution. Here, there is no offence against commutative justice assuming that the person being paid for sex is able to consent. However, in a number of ways it would offend social justice as derived from its Thomist meaning: it would move society away from a position of virtue or the promotion of the common good as understood in modern Catholic social teaching. There may or may not be a role for the state either directly or indirectly in dealing with prostitution or the conditions that may give rise to it, but the potential role of the state is irrelevant to the fact that the sale of women for sex is an offence against social justice.

Another possible area where the concept of social justice applies in relation to actions that affect culture. Indeed, some of the above examples relate to the development of a culture that helps promote virtue. It may be more difficult, for example, not to take bribes if others working around one are: if for no other reason, this may be because employers pay employees less if they are able to earn money from bribes and it becomes the expectation the employees will take bribes to which a blind eye will be turned. Alves, Booth and Fryzel (2016) argued that the creation of a virtuous culture was one of the ‘social responsibilities’ of business whilst arguing that ‘corporate social responsibility’ was a mis-used term in general. It was suggested that behaviour within markets is affected by the cultural environment within which business organisations operate. It was also argued that culture itself is not exogenous but shaped by the decisions of human persons. From this it was concluded that an important aspect of a corporate social responsibility policy within an organisation should be the promotion of virtuous behaviour in order to help create a culture of virtue in the business sector.

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8 See section 1935. This is also relevant to the black employee example above.
9 Rhonheimer, “The True Meaning of ‘Social Justice.’”
more generally. As part of this, both individuals and companies have a responsibility to help foster a culture of virtue within the business environment in which they operate which has ‘spillovers’ outside the organisation itself. It seems that all the elements of social justice are here: the virtuous actions relate to and have implications for society as a whole – it is not just a question of justice in relationships between individuals; furthermore, the promotion of virtue in the business sector in this way is not simply a matter of commutative and other forms of justice between individuals. The kind of actions that this might involve could include paying invoices in good time to smaller companies; treating employees with respect; and not concealing material facts to clients that there is no legal duty or duty in commutative justice to reveal.

In a book on social justice, Novak and Adams suggest a definition of social justice which relates to the virtue of free associations forming through the industry and sacrifice of people whose acts have ramifications that go far beyond their family or even the neighbourhood. They describe this kind of contribution as both virtuous and obviously ‘social’. The actions described above which have spillovers (an alternative term for ‘ramifications for society as a whole’) would fall into this category, but Novak and Adams’ definition is not sufficiently precise to capture the meaning of social justice in Catholic social teaching.

**Conclusion**

It is quite clear from our analysis that, when Hayek was critiquing and criticising the concept of social justice, he had in mind a concept quite different from the ideas of the 19th century Catholic thinkers and 20th century papal teaching documents to which he referred. Since 1938, the idea of social justice in Catholic teaching has evolved somewhat. It has sometimes been used to refer to a wider set of policies perhaps including policies of income redistribution which were the main target of ‘mirage’, though its meaning is not entirely clear and the term often seems to have more than one meaning.

The fact that Hayek missed the target when firing his ammunition at Catholic writers and teaching documents is important in current debate. Catholics intellectuals who criticise followers of Hayek because of his views on social justice are wrong to do so on those grounds alone because Hayek was criticising something different from the use of social justice in Catholic thinking and teaching at the time the documents were written. We argue that Hayek made an error in drawing the Catholic thinkers and writers into his attack on social justice and therefore Catholic supporters of social justice should accept that Hayek was not attacking them or Catholic teaching except in error. The Catholic ‘teachers and preachers of morality’ should have been exempt from his particular criticisms. The phrase ‘social justice’ may well have been an introduction in Catholic teaching in the 1930s and in Catholic social thought in the nineteenth century, but it was not a conceptual innovation: it was simply a new term for older ideas.

At the same time, it does not make sense for one group of Catholics to criticise another for emphasising social justice too much or for playing it down unless those using the term ‘social justice’ use it in the proper context of the Church’s social teaching rather than in the modern, secular sense.
Furthermore, a strong commitment to the Church’s teaching on social justice properly understood does not indicate whether somebody stands on the political left or has a belief in free markets. It is certainly clear that, as the term found its way into Catholic social teaching in the 1930s, a role for the state was intended in the promotion of social justice, but what that role was is ambiguous and the role proposed is not obviously synonymous with the role for the state proposed by modern social democrats.

It is not being argued that Hayek would have approved of the Catholic use of the term ‘social justice’. To begin with, Hayek was famously scathing of the use of the word ‘social’ in this kind of context. He described the word ‘social’ as an adjective that silently sucked the meaning out of the word that followed it in the same way that a weasel could empty the contents of an egg without leaving behind any discernible trace. As such, he would not have approved of the use of the word ‘social’ to describe the form of justice we have described. It is also highly unlikely that he would have approved of the idea of a specific category of justice that referred to action relating to society as a whole and which was designed to promote the common good. However, it does not follow that all his criticisms of social justice as Hayek understood it apply to the Catholic interpretation of the term in the sources he cites.

It is also not being argued that Catholic social teaching is consistent with Hayek’s attack on social justice as Hayek actually understood the idea. As has been noted, Hayek’s views on income redistribution are not radically different from those expressed by the Church. However, whilst Hayek would not regard such as process of redistributing income as an aspect of justice, most Catholic Church teaching would do so.

It is argued though that the conversation about social justice has often gone along parallel lines. Social justice in Catholic social teaching was not intended to be a synonym for distributive justice. It is unhelpful, as we have noted, that the precise meaning of social justice in the Catholic Church’s teaching is not well defined and was not discussed as explicitly as it might have been after the publication of the ‘social justice encyclical’. However, in its origins and applications, it is clear that the idea is something that should be applied to human action in the economic and social sphere, including by groups such as employers, businesses and civil society associations. What is much less clear is the proposed role of the state – though some role is clearly intended. Social justice is intended to be the virtue that leads to the promotion of the common good in society as a whole or, as would have been understood in the nineteenth century, leads society to a higher position of virtue.

We would argue that those who follow Hayekian lines of thinking should be comfortable with the application of ideas of justice in the non-state arena. Much Hayekian and post-Hayekian thought is about the importance of sophisticated social constructs that are not the direct domain of the state. To put it another way, justice should not be a state monopoly – and the Catholic Church is saying that it is not: it is a virtue that all individuals and social institutions should practice\(^\text{11}\). The concept should be reflected upon by academics, by those developing the Church’s teaching and by

\(^{11}\) This conclusion has many analogies with that drawn by Adam Tebble (Tebble, “Hayek and Social Justice.”), though Tebble is considering social justice defined as distributive justice.
those who have responsibility for decision-making in the economic sphere in order to understand the idea and its applications better.