

La ética del don: un camino necesario de la economía.
Reflexiones a la luz de *Gaudium et spes* 35
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Introducción

Nuestras economías -en muchos aspectos- se han convertido en lugar de ejercicio de un poder abusivo y de una violencia disimulada, un ámbito impersonal y anónimo que favorece la disociación de la persona de sí misma y de los otros. Una cierta comprensión del hombre y de los bienes convierte a menudo al “otro” de la transacción en “objeto” subordinado a los propios intereses económicos. Si la economía se regula por un uso de la razón instrumental que busca el beneficio económico como fin supremo de la vida, se termina reduciendo el hombre al rango de “cosa” (materia) y de “medio” (instrumento): la cuestión del “valor” muta en la del “precio”. De esta manera las relaciones económicas, un modo de actividad humana, pervierten la fundamental dignidad del hombre. Por ello, inspirados en GS 35, urge volver a pensar a partir de una razón integradora, sapiencial, que pueda articular las cuestiones del sentido con las cuestiones de la eficacia, los fines con los medios, el desarrollo de las personas con el desarrollo económico.

“Pensar integralmente” significa respetar la especificidad propia de cada saber y, al mismo tiempo, integrarlo en un conjunto de sentido más amplio. Si las transacciones económicas son un modo de vincular personas, siguiendo a GS 35 habrá que pensar cómo tiene que ser ese vínculo para servir a la vocación integral del hombre. Somos testigos, en la actualidad, de la difusión de una mentalidad económica que se cierra a esta manera de pensar. Se excluye cualquier consideración que no provenga de una cierta concepción de la razón instrumental. Asimismo, pretende hacer de su propia comprensión de la economía la lógica rectora de otros ámbitos de la vida: la parte intenta erigirse en criterio del todo.

¿Son las transacciones económicas el reino del puro interés? ¿Hay algún espacio para la gratuidad? Para muchos, la lógica del interés y la lógica de la gratuidad son antagónicas e irreductibles. Aún más, corresponden a ámbitos separados como el mercado y la familia. A lo sumo, si se acepta introducir valores en el mercado, será siempre en función del mismo. La honestidad, por citar sólo un ejemplo, no es un altar del sacrificio del propio interés, sino lo que permite su libre despliegue. La esencia del proceso económico permanece inmutable en tanto que la ética es sólo un accidente.

Dado que la economía no es únicamente el lugar del puro interés, es fundamental pensar si hay lugar en ella para la gratuidad y cómo se podrían articular ambas dimensiones. Por de pronto, considero necesario liberar la cuestión de la gratuidad y la del interés de dos clausuras que no les permiten entrar en diálogo. El don puede ser atravesado por un cierto “interés” sin poner en riesgo su carácter específicamente gratuito; el negocio puede ser atravesado por una cierta gratuidad cuidando su naturaleza interesada. Respetando lo propio y el valor que aporta cada lógica propondré un modo de comprender las transacciones económicas que, sin absolutizar el aspecto del interés y del beneficio económico, pueda integrar algo de la lógica de la gratuidad. En mi parecer, el binomio “interés-gratuidad” se relaciona con la doble dimensión material-espiritual del hombre. El desafío es articularlo sabiendo que la integración nunca será plena.

A tal efecto, procederé de la siguiente manera. Comenzaré exponiendo el sentido de GS 35 y su articulación con el capítulo tercero (I). Luego haré un breve recorrido sobre cinco aspectos fundamentales que caracterizan el pensamiento del don (II). En un tercer momento, analizaré algunos aspectos de lo que he llamado la lógica del “anti-don”, centrada en la figura del *homo oeconomicus*. Esta lógica se caracteriza por pensar la acción económica y el hombre que la sustenta de una manera que, en algunos aspectos, excluye todo pensamiento sobre el don y la gratuidad que lo acompaña (III). Finalmente, propondré un modo de pensar la acción económica que permita una mayor integración con las cuestiones del don (IV).

I. El texto en el contexto

Como se sabe, la Constitución pastoral *Gaudium et spes* se divide en dos grandes partes: la primera de carácter más doctrinal: “La Iglesia y la vocación del hombre”; la segunda de carácter más pastoral: “Algunos problemas más urgentes”. Si la primera parte sienta las bases doctrinales, la segunda trata algunas cuestiones específicas de importancia para los padres conciliares. Los temas que trata la primera parte dan cuenta -en cierto modo- de la razón del interés de la Iglesia por el mundo.

En el centro de las consideraciones doctrinales se encuentra la dignidad de la persona humana individual y socialmente considerada (capítulos 1 y 2). La mirada sobre el “ser” del hombre en su doble dimensión individual y social culmina cristológicamente (cf. GS 22; 45). Asimismo, pone los fundamentos para pensar la actividad humana (capítulo 3) ya que el “obrar” sigue y se ordena al “ser”.

El capítulo tercero sobre “La actividad humana en el mundo” comprende los números 33 a 39, los cuales se pueden dividir en tres. A) El número 33 pone la pregunta fundamental que regirá el resto del capítulo: ¿Cuál es el sentido y el valor de la actividad humana? B) Los números 34 al 36 tratarán de la actividad humana en sí misma. Esta tiene un valor que le compete como tal (34), está ordenada al hombre (35) y goza de una autonomía heterónoma, relacional o abierta (36). C) Finalmente, los números 37 al 39 versarán sobre la actividad humana al servicio del Reino. Aunque el estigma del pecado marca la actividad del hombre (37), ésta está llamada a perfeccionarse en el misterio pascual (38). No obstante, es importante no confundir “progreso temporal” con “crecimiento del Reino”, aunque el progreso interese en gran medida al Reino.

Para poder abordar el número 35 es necesario entender la preocupación que subyace en el capítulo tercero. El avance de la técnica permite que el hombre obtenga por sus propias manos lo que antes le venía dado o simplemente no existía. Dado que el hombre se dignifica a través de su actuación, es pertinente preguntarse cómo usar el poder técnico del que dispone y hacia dónde orientar el esfuerzo por el progreso humano. Dentro de esta preocupación el número 34 dejará sentado que -como tal- el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida forma parte del designio divino.

El número 35 pone al hombre como origen y fin de la actividad humana. Esta centralidad del hombre se funda en la consideración de la acción humana en su doble carácter transitivo (técnico) e intransitivo (ético). La actuación humana integralmente considerada no es neutra: el

hombre mediante su actuación transforma las cosas y se perfecciona a sí mismo. En este número, el cuño antropológico de la actividad humana se trata desde dos puntos de vista. Por una parte, se afirma la prioridad del ser sobre el tener: *“Magis valet homo propter id quod est quam propter id quod habet”*. Por otra, la de la ética sobre la técnica: *“Pariter, omnia quae homines, ad maiorem iustitiam, ampliorem fraternitatem, humanioremque ordinationem in socialibus necessitudinibus obtinendam agunt, plus quam progressus technici valent”*.

Por tanto, la norma central que rige la consideración de toda la actividad humana es que ésta permita al hombre como individuo y miembro de la sociedad cultivar y realizar su íntegra vocación. Este principio antropológico es el criterio central de juicio del valor de las distintas realizaciones humanas (cf. GS 36). Respetando la legítima autonomía de las diversas ciencias, GS afirma que su legitimidad no se basa sólo en la corrección de su método científico, sino también en su conformidad con la norma moral.

II. Aportes desde la reflexión contemporánea del don

Me propongo en este punto traer a la discusión algunos de los aspectos más salientes del pensamiento del don provenientes de algunos saberes como la filosofía, la sociología y la teología. El desarrollo no se organizará a partir de las ciencias que acabo de mencionar, sino a partir de los aspectos que considero más importantes para el propósito de este aporte. Aunque no dejo de tener en cuenta las discusiones suscitadas en torno a la reflexión sobre el don, especialmente en el ámbito filosófico y sociológico, no entro en ellas. No obstante, la caracterización que hago del don mostrará mi posición al lector interiorizado en los debates.

Como señala Chiara Fumagalli, «el lenguaje corriente indica habitualmente por “don” el gesto por el cual una persona transmite un bien a otra sin reclamar nada a cambio. Sin embargo, se señala universalmente que a un don sucede normalmente el intercambio de otro don, el “contra-don”, aparentemente no debido -del mismo modo que el don anterior- pero entendido por los actores como la respuesta apropiada a éste. Así, una simetría diferida nace de una asimetría inicial; de allí provienen numerosas relaciones que estructuran nuestras comunidades sociales».

Aunque el uso de expresiones como “contra-don” y “simetría” necesite ser aclarado, ya que se puede prestar a malentendidos, este primer acercamiento a la comprensión del don que nos propone la autora nos pone algunos interrogantes. Si el don significa -en el uso habitual- el traspaso gratuito de un bien de una persona a otra, emerge inmediatamente la pregunta sobre el motivo (¿por qué?) y el propósito (¿para qué?) de dicha transferencia.

El presente trabajo se concentrará en torno a estas cuestiones fundamentales. En mi opinión, hay cinco rasgos fundamentales que merecen destacarse, si se aborda la cuestión del don de una cierta manera. El pensamiento del don tal como lo veo yo es: a) objetivo: lo que se transmite es un bien real, aunque éste no coincida necesariamente con un objeto (cosa); b) excesivo: no se caracteriza por la búsqueda de equivalencia, sino de trascendencia; c) deudor: aunque exista intercambio no se agota en él; siempre hay un resto imposible de saldar; d) relacional: apunta a la constitución o gestación de vínculos personalizantes (libres); e) personal: reconoce al otro como sujeto, gestando su alteridad y su carácter inapropiable.

III. La lógica del “anti-don”

Entiendo por lógica del “anti-don” una manera de entender (nivel epistemológico) y de hacer economía (nivel de la práctica cotidiana) que excluyen cualquier posibilidad de gratuidad. Esto es, pensar y vivir las transacciones como si se agotaran en los objetos (cosas) que se intercambian; buscar la equivalencia en las mismas a través de medios de intercambio que permitan homologar los bienes y dejar saldada la operación; no aspirar a establecer ningún otro vínculo que el estrictamente comercial; considerar al otro de la transacción como un agente con el cual no tengo otra responsabilidad que lo acordado en la transacción.

Como se podrá ver, las notas señaladas son propias de los intercambios que hacemos a diario. En principio, no hay nada negativo en ellas. El problema no se encuentra en el carácter de necesarias o propias de la relación económica, sino en su pretensión de suficientes o únicas. En otras palabras, pensar que ellas dicen todo lo que se pueda decir sobre la relación económica. Si esto es así, esas notas se convierten en absolutas. Es lo absoluto o excluyente de las mismas lo que es necesario debatir. ¿Puede una operación económica quedar absolutamente cerrada mediante el acuerdo de las partes? En cierto modo sí y en cierto modo no. La necesidad de intercambiar magnitudes que nunca son del todo homogéneas lleva a que pongamos criterios que igualen y hagan posible la transacción. No obstante, hay que tener en cuenta que difícilmente una transacción queda cerrada. Lograr la satisfacción absoluta de las partes es un ideal muy difícil y hasta imposible de lograr.

Como encarnación de la lógica del anti-don elegí la figura del *homo oeconomicus*. Su existencia se encuentra repartida entre los libros y la práctica cotidiana. Esta figura sirve para focalizar esto que he denominado la lógica del anti-don. No obstante, cabe destacar que su descripción se puede hallar un tanto caricaturizada. Esto se debe a lo que he experimentado en mi praxis pastoral. Cuando una “criatura”, que sólo vive en las páginas de los libros, nace a la vida de todos los días suele sufrir ciertas metamorfosis. Por eso, cada vez que caracterizo al “hombre económico” no estoy sólo pensando en sus rasgos libresco, sino también en la forma que adquiere en la vida cotidiana de los mercados.

Cuando se observan ciertas conductas en el mercado, cabe preguntarse si las mismas son espontáneas o si obedecen a alguna suerte de “adoctrinamiento” universitario o post-universitario. Probablemente la respuesta se halle entre ambas opciones. Aunque no se pueda dar una respuesta precisa, sí se puede decir que entre saber y vida cotidiana hay una mutua interacción e influencia. Las doctrinas que se enseñan parten de lo que se vive en la realidad, aunque esto no es siempre así, y también modelan la misma realidad. Al tiempo que intentan hacer comprensible eso que llamamos “mundo”, lo transforman ejerciendo una suerte de causalidad “recursiva”.

Además, hay que considerar que el hombre es fundamentalmente un ser “hermenéutico”. La vida, el mundo y él mismo constituyen un exceso de sentido (misterio). El tránsito histórico de la ciencia se inscribe dentro de ese gran esfuerzo por develar y revelar el sentido de su existencia. Se trata de aportar la mayor claridad posible, de entender y de explicar. Dentro de este contexto, todo saber es provisional: la búsqueda de saber es un *in fieri* permanente. Pero también el hombre es un ser histórico. Su esfuerzo no se puede desgajar de los problemas y

dramas de su tiempo, de sus ilusiones y aspiraciones, de sus reacciones a épocas pasadas, de sus temores. Esto hace que el saber sea no sólo provisional, sino también situado. Por tanto, si se quiere interpretar el pensamiento de una época y sus teorías, habrá que tener en cuenta que los móviles y los fines no son siempre el “puro interés científico”.

El contenido de este punto se divide en dos. Por una parte, trataré algunas cuestiones de epistemología con especial acento en la cuestión de la economía como *value-free* o *Wertfrei* que se condensan en una manera de entender al *homo oeconomicus*. Por otra parte, arriesgaré una posible interpretación sobre el punto primero. La hipótesis de base es que el perfil del *homo oeconomicus* excede una mera necesidad de método para inscribirse en una imagen de hombre y de mundo (cosmovisión) que funciona como un presupuesto indiscutido.

IV. ¿Gratuidad versus utilidad?

En este punto, propongo una manera más “integrada” de entender al hombre y a la acción económica. Considero que cualquier intento por captar una realidad compleja primero separa sus diversos aspectos. No obstante, una cosa es separar para volver a unir y otra, bien distinta, separar. La primera opción distingue para poder comprender mejor en qué medida se articulan lo particular y lo universal, las partes y el todo: la preocupación se centra en la comprensión del fenómeno como integralidad. La segunda opción distingue las partes que permanecen como totalidades independientes entre sí, agotando cada una porción de sentido sin integrarse en una lógica o proyecto más amplios.

La división de funciones en nuestras sociedades occidentales no es casual: responde a la evolución, tamaño, complejidad y concentración que las caracteriza. Aunque rescatemos algunos aspectos, no es posible concebir las relaciones tal como lo hacían las sociedades tradicionales. En este sentido, la impersonalidad del mercado es en cierto modo necesaria y sana. Permite mantener fuera del circuito de las transacciones ciertas dimensiones de la persona que es necesario proteger. Como el “pudor”, cubre aquellas dimensiones de la persona que, por el grado de intimidad y densidad que comportan, no pueden ser expuestas a cualquiera. No obstante, la impersonalidad no sólo comporta beneficios, sino también riesgos. El anonimato ha sido la puerta abierta para un aparente doble fenómeno esquizofrénico: el padre que da la vida en su ámbito familiar y de amigos es quien la devora en el mercado.

¿Cómo integrar evitando insanas disociaciones y respetando al mismo tiempo la especificidad propia de las partes que se integran? Dado que el *homo oeconomicus* se presenta en las antípodas del *homo donator*, cabe preguntarse si no existe un modo de integrar ambas figuras, de complementar la racionalidad económica con otras racionalidades. Para comenzar esta ardua y difícil tarea es fundamental abrir la imagen del hombre y, a partir de ella, repensar la acción económica. El hombre de la racionalidad utilitaria parece estar solo frente a su propio espejo. Librado a sus deseos incolmados, su actividad es centrípeta: todo nace y termina en él. El hombre del misterio busca más allá de sí un sentido integrador de su ser y su actividad: es una figura esencialmente abierta.

Esta cuarta y última parte se dividirá en tres. Parte de algunas consideraciones antropológicas (1). El hombre no actúa (dimensión de la eficiencia) sólo para satisfacer sus

necesidades, sino también para vivir su existencia con sentido. Esto significa que la primera necesidad, aunque desde cierto punto de vista sea la más “débil”, es la de sentido. No le basta al hombre con subsistir (dimensión biológico-material), necesita existir (dimensión cultural-espiritual) y hacerlo con sentido. No entender al hombre de esta manera lleva a la “reducción” de las relaciones económicas (2). Esta reducción culmina en una suerte de “empirismo pulsional” capaz de transformar cualquier fin en medio de satisfacción de las propias pulsiones. Por eso, resulta necesario “complejizar” las relaciones de intercambio (3). Esto es abrirlas más allá de su inmediata facticidad para pensarlas de otra manera. Así como el pensamiento del “puro don” termina en un “no-don” -la excesiva distancia termina vanificándose-, el pensamiento de la “pura utilidad” se convierte en una “no-utilidad”: culmina en un pensamiento “inútil” para promover la dignidad integral del hombre. Un modo de complejizar es captar la dimensión simbólica de los intercambios: forman parte de una determinada producción de sentido. No se trata de una “ley de naturaleza” librada a su inexorable dinamismo, sino de una manera de vincularnos con nosotros y los otros mediante la provisión de bienes. Pensar la economía como posibilidad de vinculación digna y humana es lo que abre a la posibilidad del don y de la gratuidad.

La Dimensión Ético-Cultural del Trabajo Humano en el Contexto del Consilio Vaticano II. La Redención del Trabajo Libre y del Ocio Criativo en la Posmodernidad.

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1. Introducción

“Dios dijo: hagamos al hombre a nuestra imagen y semejanza, y que domine sobre los peces del mar, las aves del cielo, los animales, todas las bestias salvajes que se arrastran por la tierra. Dios creó al hombre a su imagen, a la imagen de Dios lo creó, creó al hombre y a la mujer. Dios les bendijo y les dijo: Sed fecundos, multiplicaos, henchid la tierra y sometedla; dominad sobre los peces del mar, los pájaros del cielo, y todos los animales que se mueven sobre la tierra”.

En el escenario de una sociedad que busca el pensamiento único disfrazado de valores universales pero que conduce a una verdadera clandestinización de la vida humana, la actual sociedad del trabajo tiene que redimensionar su papel y buscar en el contexto de la realidad presente los fundamentos para la construcción de una sociedad justa y solidaria.

En el Concilio Vaticano II es posible encontrar valores cristianos identificados con la sociedad del trabajo en toda su dimensión y complejidad – de los sin tierra, de los sin techo, los sin empleo, de los que no tienen posibilidades de volver al mercado formal de trabajo, de los excluidos versus los que tienen una riqueza inimaginable pero que no hacen inversiones sociales, que no piensan en la distribución de la riqueza, que no tienen compromiso con el rescate de la ciudadanía.

En el momento en que el género humano se prepara para vivir en un nuevo tiempo y un nuevo espacio, en que la sociedad se mueve por encima de los estados y sin reglas; la ética cristiana formula alternativas para contraponerse al individualismo pseudo-universalista de raíz utilitarista, la explotación del trabajo humano y las injusticias sociales.

El Concilio ya ha indicado que si “consideramos el trabajo no ya en los efectos que causa en la misma persona que lo ejerce ni en su esencia de colaborador de la acción creadora de Dios, sino en su relación con la naturaleza, el mundo y las energías sobre las que actúa, descubrimos otro aspecto de su dignidad y de su grandeza: por el trabajo el hombre ejerce un dominio sobre la naturaleza. Con ese dominio no usurpa el hombre un derecho de Dios, no arrebató a Dios un pedazo de la soberanía divina, sino que un tal dominio del hombre sobre la naturaleza por el trabajo procede de la voluntad divina, es una participación del hombre en la suprema soberanía de Dios, que nos hace tener una visión más profunda del hombre hecho a imagen y semejanza de Dios.”.

2. La Historia del Trabajo Humano. Del Apogeo al Declive del Trabajo como Sinónimo de Deber.

El escenario donde el trabajo humano se concibió como sinónimo de castigo, de sacrificio delante del cielo, de los dioses justificó la clásica distinción entre trabajo manual y trabajo intelectual e incluso legitimó la existencia de la esclavitud o del trabajo forzoso.

Esquilo, el primero entre los clásicos de la tragedia griega, escribió Prometeo, en el siglo 470 antes de Cristo. La tragedia habla del castigo que fuera atribuido a Prometeo. En un pasaje, el “poder” se refiere al trabajo y a la libertad, diciendo: “Todos los trabajos son desagradables, menos el del rey de los dioses, pues nadie es libre sino Zeus” (ESQUILO, 1992:13).

Aristóteles, en el Libro Primero de la Política, sostiene que existen esclavos y hombres libres por la propia obra de la naturaleza. “Esa distinción subsiste en algunos seres, siempre que igualmente parezca útil y justa para alguien ser esclavo, para otro mandar, una vez que es preciso que aquel obedezca y éste ordene según su derecho natural y con autoridad absoluta. La ciencia del amo consiste justo en saber mandar lo que el esclavo debe saber hacer. El esclavo es así un instrumento, una propiedad viva. Como instrumento, el trabajador, es siempre el primero de todos” (ARISTÓTELES, 1955, 18-9)

Para los estudiosos de la cultura esa separación entre trabajo intelectual y trabajo manual tiene sus orígenes e identificación en la tradición escrita de la aristocracia instituida en la Grecia primitiva. El testigo más remoto de la antigua cultura aristocrática helénica es Homero. Pero en Hesíodo no se contempla la educación del tipo humano noble de la cultura dominante, sino una segunda cultura basada en el trabajo humano.

Seguidamente aparece el sistema romano “ius” y su cuadro del régimen de trabajo, y la clásica distinción entre el “locatio conductio operis” y la “locatio conductio operarum”. El prejuicio contra el trabajo manual era patente y tratado con desprecio. Es conocida la expresión de Cicerón según la cual, “es sórdido, el gano de todos los trabajos asalariados” (JHERING: 1956:107).

El feudalismo surgió del seno de la sociedad esclavista a través del sistema de colonato. Los colonos estaban obligados a cultivar las tierras de sus señores. Tenían que pagar a los grandes propietarios de tierras determinada renta en dinero o entregar parte considerable de su colecta, a parte de realizar en su favor varios servicios. El feudalismo terminó con el advenimiento del sistema manufacturero que se caracterizó por la creación de establecimientos fabriles basados en la producción artesanal. El trabajo era realizado por un gran número de operarios, que utilizan sus propios instrumentos individuales y realizan operaciones parciales bajo la dirección de un empresario.

La concepción capitalista del trabajo se estableció ya en el siglo XVIII, a través de la economía política clásica. Esta, contrariando las tesis de los fisiócratas, sostenía que el valor de la riqueza de la sociedad no provenía de los productos de la tierra, de la agricultura, sino que el salario sería el precio del trabajo, definido en el mercado, a través de la relación entre oferta y demanda. Para las doctrinas modernas la sociedad pre-industrial no conocía la diferenciación

entre actividad de trabajo y demás actividades pertenecientes a la vida social. Fue justo la noción burguesa la que estableció la oposición entre trabajo y no trabajo u ocio, apartado de la esfera doméstica y pública de la vida social.

La aparición del capitalismo ha desencadenado la necesidad de operarios en el interior de las organizaciones productivas. Fuera en ese periodo que se consolidó la fuerza ideológica del trabajo como sinónimo de deber. Las expresiones del jurista portugués Caetano d'Albuquerque resumen, de manera clara, toda esta concepción:

“El trabajo es una obligación inevitable en nombre de las necesidades sociales y particulares. No trabajar es, por lo tanto, un acto de lesa sociedad y, al mismo tiempo, una especie de suicidio: Es, por un lado, la anulación del individuo y, por otro, la substracción ilícita de una fuerza, de una inteligencia, de un importante instrumento de producción en ese grande laboratorio de nuestra vida industrial; el trabajo, hace el hombre; la pereza, que ya es un pecado delante del cielo, se convierte en un crimen en relación con la humanidad” (ALBUQUERQUE, 1870:193).

La ideología del trabajo-dever, que ha ocupado el centro de la experiencia y del discurso social – en contraposición a la pereza caracterizada como un crimen social – está en completo proceso de desaparición en la posmodernidad, a partir de la inserción masiva de las nuevas tecnologías, del desempleo estructural y de larga duración, del subempleo, del trabajo precario, de corta duración y de tiempo parcial.

3. Las Diversas Etapas de la Formación Económica y su Importancia para el Trabajo Humano.

Desde la primera fase, es decir, de la Sociedad Pre-capitalista hacia la moderna Sociedad Burguesa; de la Era del Imperialismo –del Capitalismo de Monopolio- y la Grand Depresión; de la Era Keynes al Estado del Bienestar; de La Crisis del Estado del Bienestar y el Retorno del Liberalismo; hasta la era del capitalismo global y financiero en su Estadio pos-moderno, es posible identificar el desarrollo, el apogeo y el declive de este modelo de relaciones sociales centrado en el trabajo-dever, “apriori” fundamental de las diversas concepciones teóricas desencadenadas por la sociología clásica. Por otro lado, confirma la evidencia fenomenológica según la cual el prejuicio en contra la labor –el trabajo manual- es producto de las ideologías dominantes instituidas a lo largo de la historia de la humanidad. Pero, fue la “labor de nuestro cuerpo” responsable del desarrollo y de la constitución de la sociedad industrial moderna –de los obreros- mediante la cultura del trabajo-dever.

4. El Trabajo Humano Frente al Estado-nación y la Sociedade Global Centrada en la Economía de Mercado Flexible y en la Tecnología de la Información y de la Comunicación

Los temas predominantes en este título son: el itinerario de las doctrinas políticas, la Crisis del Estado-Nación. El dilema entre estado regulador y el estado mínimo del pensamiento único; entre los nuevos paradigmas producto de la globalización y de la nueva formación tecninfosocietaria y la gobernabilidad supranacional; las nuevas pautas hermenéuticas para la

interpretación de la realidad socioeconómica; el contraste entre los complejos sociales autoreguladores y el declive de las funciones reguladoras del derecho positivo.

La sociedad actual vive un proceso de transición entre Modernidad y Pos-modernidad, entre Estados Interdependientes y un Nuevo Orden Mundial basado en la desindustrialización, en la desertización de los puestos tradicionales de trabajo, en la civilización de la información y de la telecomunicación, en la supremacía del capital financiero sobre el capital productivo, en la imposibilidad de control de esos nuevos fenómenos a partir de las instancias estatales de resolución de conflictos sociales o de los tradicionales sistemas de cooperación.

Esas radicales transformaciones han potenciado los conflictos sociales y disminuido el papel del Estado como órgano catalizador y regulador de los problemas socioeconómicos. En virtud de la reestructuración productiva, de una nueva fase del capitalismo, con sus poderes supra-estatales, aparte de una reorganización societaria centrada en la sociedad de la información –con sus adecuaciones terminológicas, cognitivas, perceptivas, culturales e ideológicas- no hay espacio para garantizar el poder absoluto y la interdependencia de los estados, sin introducir otro concepto de autodeterminación de los pueblos, basado ahora en el proceso de integración supranacional.

5. La Dimensión Ético-cultural del Trabajo Humano en el Contexto de la Doctrina de la Iglesia e en la Constitución Pastoral del Concilio Vaticano II.

La versión moderna en el plan teórico-práctico de las doctrinas cristianas se inició a partir de la Encíclica *Rerum novarum* del Papa León XIII, escrita en 1885, seguida por otras Encíclicas importantes sobre el trabajo humano, como: *Quadragesimo anno*, del Papa Pío XI, *Mater et magistra*, de Juan XXIII, *Populorum progreso*, de Pablo VI, la “Constitución Pastoral *Gaudium et spes*” del Concilio Vaticano II, y a través de las Encíclicas y demás escritos producidos por el Papa Juan Pablo II.

Economía, Política, Trabajo y Sociedad en el contexto ético-cultural de la Doctrina de la Iglesia, sus Encíclicas y del Concilio Vaticano II tienen los siguientes significados: un desarrollo productivo con equidad que respecta las distintas culturas y modos de vida. Del punto de vista de una ética cristiana conduce a una teoría compartida de la sociedad basada en la justicia distributiva ya que la finalidad social de la economía es la satisfacción de las necesidades humanas. El carácter universalista de esa doctrina tiene un papel fundamental para el modelo de sociedad que se mueve en dimensión planetaria y por en cima del Estado-nación.

El Concilio habla claramente de las radicales transformaciones en las estructuras del estado, del derecho, de la economía, de la cultura, del cotidiano, del lenguaje, de las actitudes individuales e colectivas. Desde el punto de vista específico de la Sociedad del Trabajo se produce una verdadera rotura de paradigmas. La tecnología del conocimiento provoca una drástica reducción de los puestos tradicionales de trabajo, una verdadera metamorfosis a través del desempleo estructural, de la aparición de distintas modalidades de empleos y rentas e instituye la presencia de millones de excluidos incluso en los países desarrollados.

Se el trabajo-dever fuera concebido por la sociedad industrial la substitución de ese modelo de trabajo mecánico por las máquinas inteligentes y la tecnología de los “softwares” deve significar la redención del hombre.

El trabajo livre y el ocio criactivo estan sincronizados con la dimensión ético-cultural de la Doctrina de la Iglesia e del Concilio Vaticano II en los dos sentidos: objetivo e sujeto. “El hombre al ‘someter la tierra’ con su trabajo, en todas las etapas históricas, realiza un acto de creación, de su dominio sobre la naturaleza y el sujeto próprio del trabajo continua siendo el hombre. Pero, cuando el hombre ejerce el dominio sobre la tierra, lo hace como un ser dotado de subjetividad. Al ser capaz de actuar de manera programada y racional, debe encarar el trabajo como la realización de sí mismo. Es pues como persona que el hombre es sujeto del trabajo, lo que confiere al trabajo humano su innegable valor ético”. (SARTORI, LMA. Encíclias do Papa João Paulo II. São Paulo:LTR, 1996, p. 107.

El Concilio Vaticano II y la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia Católica objetivan también contraponerse a los pensamientos materialistas e economicistas que, para ellos, constituyen una amenaza a la jerarquía de los valores humanos. La superación de este peligro depende de la realización de la justicia social, que a su vez, necesita de nuevos movimientos de solidaridad, identificando las diversas modalidades de explotación de los trabajadores, de la situación de miseria y del hambre. En este sentido, el trabajo libre asume la dimensión de la dignidad humana. “El trabajo es un bien del hombre porque, mediante el trabajo, el hombre no solamente transforma la naturaleza, adaptándola a las propias necesidades, sino que se realiza a sí mismo como hombre y en cierto sentido, se volve más hombre” (SARTORI:1996, 116).

Los teóricos se ponen de acuerdo en señalar la multitud de iniciativas heterogéneas y de difícil calificación que se establecen entre instituciones públicas y mercado. Este nuevo espacio presenta, desde el punto de vista teórico, una clave interpretativa basada, según Roca, en la “distribución tripartida del espacio social entre el poder, el dinero y la solidaridad. La identificación, como privado-social, enfatiza los elementos político-sociales, mientras que los términos organizativos –no-profit, tercer sistema, economía social- proponen una aproximación económica que acentúa la producción de valores de uso, la ausencia de ganancia y la participación social en la gestión.” (ROCCA: 1996: 11). A parte de todo esto, se desarrollan otros contingentes de actividades empresariales fundamentadas en la autogestión, la solidaridad y la democratización de las relaciones de trabajo.

Como el desarrollo sin trabajo aparece como algo irreversible, la sociedad pos-moderna tendrá que llevar la sociedad del desempleo a la sociedad del tiempo libre donde las personas trabajarán cada vez menos y tenderá a invertir la cultura del consumo para “elevarse por medio del arte y de la mente como medida de superación de las angustias materiales” (DE MASI: 1999a: 16).

Es por lo tanto el trabajo libre “el trabajo que hay que verlo también bajo el ángulo de la recapitulación de todas las cosas en Cristo”. BRUGAROLA, Martin. El concilio y la Vida Económico- Social. Santander: Editorial Sal Terrae, 1966, p. 181.

Duty of Democracies to Care More About Intergenerational and International Solidarities

Edmond Malinvaud

Introduction

Gaudium et spes did not explicitly recognize the value of democracy as a political system but contained enough that praised this value. It spoke against absolutism and despotism, and for the rule of law, the balance of powers, the role of civil society. However, after forty years and considering now the calls of the time, we see two major domains in which teachings of the conciliar document were deficient, in which present democracies are challenged and in which the Church mission in the social order has to be fostered: the duties of present generations with respect to future generations; the difficult building of institutions for the world human community.

A first brief part will here substantiate the point just made. The two subsequent parts will deal respectively with each one of the too often neglected solidarities. This paper substantially draws from what the author learned during the last decade at the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.

1. Two failings in our teaching

Gaudium et spes mentions the duty toward "the mounting generation". It would be difficult to argue that this recommendation was much listened to. If anything, parental concern for the education and other needs of children seems to have declined in the developed world : the modern freedom of divorce and unmarried parentage contributed to increase the scope for immediate self-satisfaction of mature adults ; but taking advantage of new liberties turned, in several respects and in a number of cases, to run counter to the needs of children, teenagers and young adults. Moreover we now realize that concern for future generations must extend much beyond the mounting one : long-run transmission of moral and cultural values, as well as prudent management of natural and environmental resources impose on us to look far ahead when we behave and decide.

Gaudium et spes deals at length with the duties of developed toward underdeveloped countries. It also argues for the universal common good and praises progress then made in the organization of the community of nations. So international solidarity is present in the document. But forty years later the assessment has to be less favourable than it was at the time, and the message then given is no longer fully appropriate. Many signs show that Catholic teaching ought now to go deeper into the causes of international misunderstandings and conflicts.

2. Intergenerational solidarity

A relative neglect of the future in democracies

Democratic controls on politics mainly occur by way of periodic elections. Voters tend to decide mostly on the basis of their current situation. Forecasts into the future seem to have only weak relevance: the future context is uncertain, future wishes of citizens are uncertain, programs and promises of competing politicians are even more uncertain. Not surprisingly,

public expenditure tends to reflect the immediate interest of contemporaneous voters, public debts are easily accepted, as their cost will fall on a future electorate. Such behaviour constitute an offence against intergenerational solidarity, particularly now at the eve of four decades of deep aging in many regions of the world.

In this respect current opinion trends offer contradictory features. The voice of the Church about the family, the main provider of intergenerational solidarity, is less and less listened to. However, some concerns for the future find increasing public expression, motivated in particular by a perceived depletion of natural resources and deterioration of the environment, as well as by an improved awareness of the need for institutional reforms. In order to better meet these concerns the Church will have to redepoly or deepen her teaching toward new issues of public policy.

Stewardship: the value to be promoted¹

Children have neither the self-knowledge of their desires nor the moral capabilities which would enable them to properly rank their needs. They have to be represented by their parents, who must then act as "stewards", the word conveying the idea of an obligation to discharge.

Similarly people of the present generation must act in part as stewards for the future. What they do may have strong influence on what will happen in the future, perhaps even in the distant future. They must feel this duty to represent the yet unborn generations. They must invest in productive infrastructures, see that future teachers are being learned, devote part of their human resource to research and development, aiming at increasing knowledge on a wide front, hence economic productivity and social justice.

Some associations and organizations of the civil society are developing a good sense of future needs. They ought to bring precious testimonies. Similarly, social sciences are enriching the conceptual and empirical bases of our knowledge. In particular an important economic literature now exists for clarifying how long term issues ought to be tackled. For instance: up to which point would deprivations in the present generations be justified by a small but permanent future benefit over many decades. The paper brings some hints as to how this literature could foster reflections in the Church.

Sustainable development

Many specific examples, such as overfishing and consequences of excessive emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases generating greenhouse effects, testify that natural resources are mismanaged. Venturing to give an overall assessment of a different kind, a group of economists and ecologists found some support to the view that current consumption levels might imperish the quality of life of future generations². Such an increasingly widespread concern calls for a renewed elaboration of the doctrine of the Church about what the agenda of sustainable development should be.

¹The author here takes inspiration from K. Arrow, "Speaking for the children and for the future", to appear in the proceedings of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, *Acta 10*.

²Arrow, Dasgupta, Goulder, Daily, Ehrlich, Heal, Levin, Mäler, Schneider, Starrett and Walker, "Are we consuming too much ?", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Summer 2004, pages 147 to 172.

This task is not an easy matter because there are so many different aspects and components in environment problems that statements of general principles cannot suffice. A think tank would be required in which scientists would confront their knowledge of the phenomena with the experience of competent members of the civil society and with the reflections of moralists. Lessons to be learned from an abundant literature would also be reviewed.

Among the many issues to be surveyed, particular attention should be placed on what may now be reasonably expected to be achieved by technological innovations³ and by substitution of man-made capital for exhaustible natural resources⁴. Often in the past the possibilities open by such innovations and substitutions turned out to have been seriously underestimated, particularly when alarmist concerns were voiced about the danger of overpopulation or of rapid exhaustion of reserves of natural resources. But it would be now hazardous to be confident in a simple-minded extrapolation of these past successes and good fortunes.

Elaboration of a Catholic teaching about strategies of sustainable development is going to be both challenging and rewarding. Highly challenging for two reasons : first, knowledge about future conditions is very uncertain ; second, important irreversibilities affect the phenomena to be faced. Hence, the ethics of public decisions ought to be raised to the level of the challenge. But reaching this goal will also be more generally rewarding for the doctrine of the Church. Indeed, as mastery of humans over their destiny is improving, it becomes more and more necessary for them to act in front of uncertainties and irreversibilities, which can be grasped by wise evaluations but not fully eliminated. *Nolens, volens* humans are now developing a new capability, a new culture in this respect. Catholic teaching has to keep up with it.

Reform of social institutions and policies

Present generations have also the duty to bequeath to future generations adequate social institutions, as well as adequate norms for social behaviors and policies, because institutions and norms cannot be quickly built. About the extent of social protection in particular, there is a wide gap between what is respectively provided in the affluent North and in the poor or emerging Southern societies. Moreover in a number of Northern countries social institutions turn out to appear unsustainable in the coming decades, which will notably experience fast aging of populations. Realization of this imbalance seems to have been the main reason why in 1991 the encyclical *Centesimus annus* warned against the dangers of an excessive Welfare State, which would "deprive society of its responsibility" (N.48).

During the last two decades reform of the Welfare State and of other public activities entered as a major item in the political agenda of an increasing number of rich countries. Simultaneously, quite a few emerging countries grew more productive. This might be the proper time for a new forward-looking message of the Church, stressing the concern for transmission of a better social environment to our descendants. For that topic also, putting to work a think tank might be wise.

³On this see for instance the two articles published in the Fall 1995 issue of the *Journal of Economic Perspectives* within the symposium on "Might environmental regulation promote growth ?".

⁴Importance of this question and possibility of a long-term blocking of development is studied by R. Guesnerie, "Calcul économique et développement durable", *Revue Economique*, Mai 2004.

3. International solidarity in the global political order⁵

The challenge

Democracy matured in a world that was and remained parcelled into states : into territories, nations and domains of government. This division of the earth, and of mankind living on it, into states coexisted with the perception that the earth is larger than one's own territory and mankind is more than one's people. With globalization the vision now emerges of one world and of one mankind organized as a democracy. Yet this vision hardly gives answers to the questions it raises. Global governance stands as a tentative and fuzzy concept, while national democracies often exhibit mutual disharmony, to say the least. There is a long way to go before emerging elements of a global civil society develop and work beyond national borders, up to the point where they will fully interact with a variety of national governments and international organizations.

These new signs of the time pose a very complex challenge to the Catholic Church. She carries both a universal message and more specific pronouncements understood to apply in the concrete context of time and place, local tradition and local social trends. Both levels have to be coherent, but they cannot have the same contents. The pope, bishops, priests and laymen all have to correctly discern their respective new responsibilities in imparting the catholic message to the world, particularly with respect to international solidarity.

National democracies and the international regime

National governments share their responsibilities with international organizations, and national law shares its effects with international law. Here lies the source of many conflicts, none appearing more challenging than those between different methods of legitimation. There is first a minimal and general foundation in the principles of sovereignty and equality of states. It is complemented by a second layer of legitimation: the values, goods and interests, for which the state and its government stand. International institutions give a functional legitimation in specific domains, for which values, goods and interests are supposed to be common to the states involved.

The international "community" has no democratic sovereignty and no general mandate. In a truly global system national democracies and international institutions should complement each other. The values served by democracies should, as far as that is consistent with their international character, be respected also within the international structures.

Global values

To find and declare universal social values might be the result of spiritual life, moral discernment, intellectual effort and practical experience. The process could in principle follow from the same pattern as was successful in national democracies, where law placed actions and regulations concerning values under an elaborate regime which stimulated, urged or even forced society to handle that concern for values in the most careful and responsible way.

⁵This is directly inspired by Part IV in the document "Democracy : element for the development of the social doctrine of the Church", elaborated by H. Zacher and adopted by the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences on 3 May 2004.

But such is not the process occurring at the world level. Actually there is a great need to find a common basis for a global legal order. But whatever may now be the signs of its appearance, such a common basis still greatly lacks substance. The globalizing world too often falls prey to claims voiced by those who pretend to directly impose their own values. The most important place where this occurs is in declarations of human rights. Not surprisingly we see that the so declared human rights frequently fall victims to the strategy of clothing particular convictions, opinions or interests as a human right. The strategy then injures the authority of this right and endangers its underlying value. Overall, there is an urgent need to develop the culture of values and to stabilize the culture of human rights.

A transnational civil society

Whereas internationality implies a possible scope of actions for states and governments, transnationality implies such a scope for civil society. But whereas, within the democratic national state, there is a permanent and deep mutual penetration between government and society, this cannot apply to the global arena. The network of international institutions, as well as transnational units and actors, are far too selective, diversified and unique for such a mutual penetration.

Transnationality is the global mode of civil society. Control of transnational entities may come from national law and policies, or from international law and institutions, or still from internationally harmonized national laws and policies. Overall however, transnational entities and their activities are subject to less constraint and control than that given by a national civil society. On the other hand manifestations of transnational civil society are less manifold and frequent than those of national civil society.

The reality in which transnationality occurs depends also on the intellectual, economic, technological, ideological strengths and weaknesses of the transnational factors and on their aims. This is well exemplified by the development of the transnational economy and of NGOs. More and more NGOs are becoming independent transnational actors. They form transnational elites which influence public opinion and the international scene. They are vaguely accepted as a replacement for the missing international democratic basis. But their impacts may also have the character of usurpations.

All in all, the transnational civil society has an extremely complex relationship to democracy. Transnational elements may affect national democracies and the international regime. But due to a lack of democratic legitimation they have difficulty in finding the right approach and the right limits.

Towards an enlarged concept of international solidarity

Particular attention should now be given to the consequences of the new international scene for the Social Teaching of the Church. Her earlier message about international solidarity certainly stands. But it has to find ways for closer adaptations to the complex features of the new landscape. Teaching ought to extend beyond the present voice of the Holy See in the international regime. It will require first and foremost a better knowledge of the structures, values and conducts of the transnational civil society.

***Gaudium et spes* and Catholic Politicians—Some American Case Studies**

Wilson D. Miscamble, C.S.C.

Introduction: This paper initially summarizes the position of the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World regarding the role of those who pursue the political vocation. But it is not primarily an analysis of the meaning of the document. Rather it is an exploration of its impact—or lack thereof—in the United States. It examines whether *Gaudium et spes* penetrated to Catholics in American public life and, if so, to what effect. The paper looks at a number of significant figures among “Catholic politicians.” The list of those examined is neither representative nor exhaustive. [All considered are Democrats!] Nonetheless, I trust that exploring their experiences will further understanding of the impact of the pastoral constitution.

***Gaudium et spes* and the Role of the Politician:**

As numerous commentators have noted *Gaudium et spes* developed a theme of openness to the world. Its optimistic tone gave voice to a sense that there was much common ground among Christians and non-Christians as they sought to work for the common good. In its second chapter the document stated clearly that God “has willed that all men should constitute one family and treat one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” (para 24) Man’s vocation was communitarian in nature. The Council fathers emphasized the interdependence of the person and the society, the importance of the common good and the innate dignity of every human person.

While the tone was optimistic the Council was clear that there was much work to be done. The Council fathers made clear to believers that one could not be content “with a merely individualistic morality.” Each person was to contribute to the common good, “according to his own abilities and the needs of others.” (para 30) Every one was encouraged to step away from the individualistic ethic and to participate in common endeavors. Through such efforts Christians would participate in the Church’s mission to serve “as a leaven and as a kind of soul for human society as it is to be renewed in Christ and transformed into God’s family.” (para 40)

From such foundations *Gaudium et spes* approached very positively the whole issue of political participation. “The Church regards as worthy of praise and consideration,” the document states, “the work of those who, as a service to others, dedicate themselves to the welfare of the state and undertake the burden of this task.” (para 75) With the political vocation so honored the Council encouraged all Christians in the political community to “give conspicuous example of devotion to the sense of duty and of service to the advancement of the common good.” (para 75)

In summary both the text and spirit of *Gaudium et spes* conveyed clearly that Christian politicians were called upon to engage the modern world in ways that would promote the dignity of each person and the common good. They were to serve within their own domain as “leaven” if you will. They were not to see their political activities as separate from their religious commitments. The Council fathers made this clear in an oft-quoted passage which I include here in full:

“This council exhorts Christians, as citizens of two cities, to strive to discharge their earthly duties conscientiously and in response to the gospel spirit. They are mistaken who, knowing that we have here no abiding city but seek one which is to come, think that they may therefore shirk their earthly responsibilities. For they are forgetting that by the faith itself they are more than ever obliged to measure up to these duties, each according to his proper vocation.

Nor, on the contrary, are they any less wide of the mark who think that religion consists in acts of worship alone and in the discharge of certain moral obligation, and who imagine they can plunge themselves into earthly affairs in such a way as to imply that these are altogether divorced from the religious life. This split between the faith which many profess and their daily lives deserves to be counted among the more serious errors of our age.” (para 43)

The Council was very clear: “Therefore, let there be no false opposition between professional and social activities on the one part, and religious life on the other.” (para 43)

John F. Kennedy and Privatized Religion

In order to gauge the impact of *Gaudium et spes* on Catholic politicians in the United States, it is necessary to set a context. The key part of that relates to John F. Kennedy’s election to the American presidency in 1960 and the conditions to which he readily agreed so as to secure his election.

The election of a Catholic to the presidency in 1960 was undoubtedly a milestone. John Kennedy’s election seemed to shatter the last political barrier obstructing America’s acceptance of Catholics. Yet, the election of JFK meant only a conditional acceptance of Catholicism into the mainstream of American life. It was an acceptance made on conditions which Kennedy explicitly promised he would accept that he would “relegate his religion to a purely private status” and that he would not act on public policy in any recognizably Catholic way. JFK does not appear to have been overly influenced by a religious worldview or by religiously-based convictions. Both critics like Garry Wills, who finds JFK “rootless,” and court historians like Arthur Schlesinger who claims that JFK “took religion . . . with detachment” agree on this. He was guided instead by a “modern pragmatism.” Who knows what role faith plays in someone’s inner life but the external evidence suggests that JFK was a “political Catholic” -- a public persona maintained because it was essential to his winning office in Massachusetts but then a problem to be dealt with when seeking higher national office in a nation still suspicious of Catholics.

In narrow political terms JFK dealt with the issue effectively. In his famous speech to the Protestant ministers in Houston in 1960 he advocated an extreme form of church-state separation and essentially the privatization of religion. His religion would not influence how he exercised his public office. He would compartmentalize his faith. By and large, he kept his promise. The impact of the election of a Catholic rather ironically meant a further triumph of the secular in the public sphere as Mark Massa has demonstrated so well in his *Catholics and American Culture*. Sadly, Kennedy blazed a trail which many subsequent politicians who are Catholics have followed. Documents from the Second Vatican Council would hardly have some privileged role in guiding Catholic politicians. Instead, many would tend to look to the approach pursued by the most successful Catholic in American politics to that point.

Initial Response: Eugene McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy

Gaudium et spes received Pope Paul VI's signature on December 7, 1965. Its initial impact in the United States coincided with a period in which the optimistic mood which began the 1960s was considerably tempered. Nonetheless, the efforts of the Johnson administration in civil rights and in its "war on poverty" seemed broadly in synch with the thrust of the pastoral constitution in regard to promoting the common good and enhancing the dignity of persons. Catholic liberals seemed supported in a general sense by the social teachings of the Council. While conservative Catholics like William F. Buckley expressed reservations about the work of Vatican II, Catholic liberals took heart from the pastoral constitution. After 1966 two liberal Catholic senators increasingly moved towards the center stage of American politics—Eugene McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy. In 1968 they emerged as top contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Robert Kennedy was a more 'tribal' Catholic than McCarthy. He felt his religion much more deeply than his brother and it certainly influenced his values and approach to public policy. Especially after his political "conversion experience" following his brother's assassination, he emerged as a man deeply concerned for the common good, a man who could genuinely identify with suffering and who possessed an aptitude for empathy. His biographer Arthur Schlesinger would describe him as the "tribune of the underclass" deeply committed to social change similar to the solidarity with others of which the Council fathers had spoken. RFK displayed qualities of compassion and courage which appeared rooted in religious and moral conviction. His emphasis on strengthening community pursued from 1965 to 1968 certainly seemed in synch with the spirit of the Council.

Eugene McCarthy, more so than either Kennedy, "was very clearly a Catholic, a man whose public stance reflected an inner commitment and temperament characteristic of Christian Democracy." Born in rural Minnesota, McCarthy attended St. John's University in Collegeville where he developed a firm grasp of and commitment to the principles of Catholic social thought. McCarthy was a long-time contributor of articles to the liberal Catholic magazine, *Commonweal*, and as Rodger Van Allen commented, he was "a person to whom the tag 'Commonweal Catholic' might suitably be applied." He clearly saw politics as a vocation and rejected the privatizing of religion. In his book *Frontiers of American Democracy* published in 1960 McCarthy argued that a religious politician, if he were "whole," was necessarily driven by his faith. McCarthy explained that both his own anti-communism and his liberalism emerged from his faith. He stood in stark contrast to the views that JFK put before the protestant ministers in Houston.

Both Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy in their different ways gave hope of modeling for a new generation of Catholic politicians a way of relating religious convictions with political endeavors that would be in line with the call of the Second Vatican Council. Sadly, little came of this hope. Neither gained power and so was able to demonstrate through action the nature of his approach. Robert Kennedy was slain in Los Angeles in June of 1968 and Eugene McCarthy lost the nomination to Hubert Humphrey and with it, it seems, his bearings. He went into "a prolonged sulk" and left the senate and the world of serious politics behind. This was a tragic loss as he was a politician gifted with the intellectual powers to forge a political

approach which combined concern for the dignity of the individual with concern for the common good.

1968 Revisited: Political, Cultural and Religious Upheaval

Not only did the year 1968 see the removal of RFK and McCarthy as potential exemplars for Catholic politicians, it (along with the years that surround it) also marked the occasion for an enormous upheaval in the U.S. *Gaudium et spes* had referred rather optimistically to the Church's contributing to the social and cultural transformation of the world, but the late sixties saw unleashed a series of forces that changed significantly and deleteriously the arena in which Catholic politicians would be called upon to work. We can only allude to these forces here, although one gets a sense of the magnitude of them if one takes seriously the judgment of the [very sober] historian Philip Gleason that during the decade "the nation as a whole experienced its greatest upheaval—indeed, crisis—since the Civil War." At the very time the nation went through this upheaval the Church through the work of the Council set about a series of changes in its own practices and institutions that left Catholics in what Gleason termed (with some understatement) a "state of 'confusion.'" It was hardly an easy combination.

In Gleason's view "the turmoil unleashed by the racial crisis, the Vietnam War and protests against it, the New Left, campus riots, the sexual revolution, the drug culture, and other manifestations of social, political and cultural radicalism greatly augmented the more specifically religious destabilization caused by Vatican II and the post-conciliar spirit." These years marked a challenge to traditional institutions and authorities including political, educational and religious. In this atmosphere of considerable dissent Pope Paul VI's encyclical *Humanae Vitae* (issued in July 1968) sparked a severe American reaction. Many Catholics simply rejected the encyclical's ban on artificial birth control and encouraged by various theologians and opinion leaders they fell back on the argument of individual conscience to justify their stance. It seems that the new attitude to Church teaching in the area of sexuality and birth control flowed quickly into other areas. The emphasis came to be placed on the individual's consideration of the Church's teaching.

This emphasis was completely in line with what in hindsight we can now see as the driving forces of the 'sixties revolution'—namely "individualism and atomization." Emerging from the sixties came an "ethos of personal liberation, sexual freedom and self-fulfillment." And, this 'ethos' found its political home in the Democratic Party, especially with the 'McGovernization' of the party during 1972. The party that had been the traditional home of Catholics from the mid-19th century onwards began to move in directions decidedly contrary to the social teachings of the Catholic Church. In particular the efforts to legalize abortion which intensified in the late 1960s put special stress on the liberal-Catholic alliance that had proved so successful in American politics from the time of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.

Catholic Democrats in a New Party

Strangely, as this remarkable transformation of the Democratic Party took place most Catholic office holders largely stood by and acquiesced in the process. Edward Kennedy, the third prominent Kennedy brother in politics, quickly overcame any reservations about the new

direction of the Democratic Party and became a vocal spokesperson for it. His brother-in-law Sargent Shriver, a deeply serious and committed Catholic, tried to hold to a more 'pro-life' stance but met only electoral defeat in Democratic primaries during 1976. Without any great or significant debate the 'social/cultural liberalism' of the contemporary Democratic Party quickly took control. Catholic Democrats even old-style New Deal Catholic liberals like house Speaker Thomas P. 'Tip' O'Neill—discovered that to get ahead one must go along with the now dominant wing of the party. The new expression developed that while one was 'personally opposed' to something on moral grounds, one could not seek to impose one's views on others. One must leave decisions to their individual choice. This approach was certainly evidenced by the Catholic Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro in her run for the vice-presidency in 1984.

Ferraro's position appeared to develop from the political requirements necessary to make her way in the Democratic Party. She gave no well-considered defense of it. This task fell to Governor Mario Cuomo who gave a much-publicized address at the University of Notre Dame in 1984. Cuomo announced that he accepted the teaching authority of his church and its doctrine on abortion. But he refused to concede that this should lead him to support either legislation or a constitutional amendment to limit or ban abortion. Instead, he appealed to "Catholic realism," suggesting that any ban on abortion would be divisive and would not work anyway. Thus came his fundamental principle: "The values derived from religious belief will not—and should not—be accepted as part of the public morality unless they are shared by the pluralistic community at large, by consensus."

Thoughtful commentators dismantled Cuomo's 'Catholic realism' principle, asking if it should be applied on other great moral questions such as racial discrimination. What became apparent was that Cuomo joined JFK in consigning his religious convictions to a private domain contrary to the call of *Gaudium et spes*. And like JFK before him, he provided helpful cover for the battalions of "I'm-personally-opposed-but" Catholic politicians who lacked the courage to take a principled stand on the abortion issue. Cuomo's refusal to do anything to build a political consensus in opposition to abortion confirmed the moral bankruptcy of his stance.

The privatized religion model triumphed despite the efforts and appeal of those who pushed the 'consistent ethic of life/seamless garment' approach in the 1980s and the courageous witness of the pro-life governor of Pennsylvania, Robert P. Casey, who was denied the opportunity to speak at the Democratic convention in 1992. The increasingly blunt pronouncements from official Church teaching regarding the responsibilities of Catholic politicians in encyclicals like *Evangelium vitae* (1995) and later in the "Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political Life" went largely unnoticed. Hence in 2004 John Kerry could describe himself as "a believing and practicing Catholic," yet there was a sense that he was guided essentially by the same "modern pragmatism" that had guided his hero, John F. Kennedy. Forty years on from Vatican II, Kerry wanted to make it clear, just as JFK had done, that he would be a president who happened to be Catholic, not a Catholic president. Perhaps not surprisingly he came across as a secular, ivy-league trained, Massachusetts-type liberal. Kerry had difficulty speaking in religious terms or conveying anything of his religious outlook beyond some unproblematic generalities. Harkening back to JFK he tried to suggest that one's personal religious convictions should be kept out of politics and he claimed a New Englander's reticence to discuss his faith in public. He indicated little

familiarity with Catholic social teaching and on a range of controversial issues he adopted positions which placed him in explicit opposition to his Church's formal teaching. He went to Mass regularly on Sunday and got ashes on his forehead on Ash Wednesday but didn't seem able to convey that his religion shaped his public outlook—perhaps because it didn't in any noticeable way.

A Task Ahead

Sadly the impact of *Gaudium et spes* on Catholic politicians has been minimal at best. Catholic politicians have hid behind the notion that religion is a private matter and have blended in and refrained from utilizing their religion as an inspiration and guide for their actions. And this despite the fact that the fundamental problems of the American polity and society—the decline of family and community, unrestrained individualism at the expense of the common good, rampant relativism in values—presented a unique opportunity and challenge to Catholics in the public domain. The “private religion” excuse has spread far and is now well implanted among the increasing number of Catholics in the Republican Party—among them George Pataki, Rudy Giuliani, Tom Ridge and Arnold Schwarzenegger.

Prospects for any rapid change seem dim and yet we might conclude with a recognition that we are still receiving the teachings of the Second Vatican Council and still understanding its depths. The task ahead for those gathered here is to dedicate ourselves anew to seeking to propagate the teachings of the Council and thus to convey that one's religious convictions are not to be divorced from one's political actions. Those of us involved in the work of education might take special heart from the call of *Gaudium et spes* for the “education of youth” so as to produce “those great-souled persons who are so desperately required by our times.” (para 31). We need them now more than ever.

The Role of International Catholic Organizations in Promoting the Gospel in the “Community of Nations”

Kevin Ahern

Introduction

For more than 80 years, Catholic international organizations and movements have played an important role in promoting the Gospel values of peace, justice and solidarity within the Community of Nations, first at the League of Nations and later at the United Nations (UN) and UN agencies. In *Gaudium et spes 90*, the Council speaks to the important role of these organizations:

Different Catholic international bodies can assist the community of nations on the way to peace and brotherhood; these bodies should be strengthened by enlarging their number of well-trained members, by increasing the subsidies they need so badly, and by suitable coordination of their forces ... Organizations of this kind, moreover, contribute more than a little to the instilling of a feeling of universality, which is certainly appropriate for Catholics, and to the formation of truly worldwide solidarity and responsibility.

The developments in the Church and in the world since *Gaudium et spes* have significantly transformed the world in which these organizations work. Since 1965, the scope and the mandate of the UN and UN agencies have grown with the emergence of 74 new member states and with the development of new global challenges including HIV/AIDS and terrorism. At the same time, the number of Catholic Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working with the UN has grown exponentially, due in no small part to the involvement of religious orders and congregations.

This paper will examine the situation and impact of Catholic NGOs (CNGOs) 40 years after *Gaudium et spes*. Some of the reflections in this paper are based on the 20 responses to an informal survey sent out to the CNGOs. The full text will look more deeply at three CNGOs and examine the impact of *Gaudium et spes* in their work.

Historical Background and Present Reality

Catholic organizations first began to engage in the Community of Nations with the League of Nations. By 1927, 11 Catholic lay organizations were working with the League. To help facilitate cooperation among one another, the 11 met in Fribourg and founded the Conference of Presidents of International Catholic Organizations.

The involvement of CNGOs in the Community of Nations deepened with the founding of the UN in 1945. At the Conference that drafted the UN Charter in San Francisco, several representatives of International Catholic Organizations (ICOs) and US-based Catholic organizations were present. These organizations strongly lobbied the governments to add a provision that would formalize the UN’s relationship with them. Their efforts would prove successful with inclusion of Article 71 which calls upon the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to consult with NGOs.

Two years later, the UN admitted the first class of accredited NGOs to ECOSOC, which included two CNGOs: the International Union of Catholic Women's Leagues and the Catholic International Union for Social Service. By 1951, the number of accredited CNGOs would grow to five.

With the founding of the UN, the ICOs, which made up the Conference of Presidents, again saw the need for greater coordination. In 1946 these lay organizations met in Brussels and with the encouragement of Pope Pius XII, they re-founded the Conference of Presidents as the "Conférence des Organisations Internationales Catholiques" or the Conference of International Catholic Organizations (CICO). As part of the efforts of the CICO to help the ICOs working at the UN, the Conference established three Centers: Paris (1947), Geneva (1950) and New York (1977).

It is important to note that these ICOs would also play a central role in the promotion of the lay apostolate, especially in the years leading up to the Second Vatican Council. Their expertise and experience was recognized when the Holy See looked to their leadership to appoint the lay auditors of the Council.

In addition to accreditation with ECOSOC, Catholic NGOs were also granted status with specialized UN agencies including the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In 1968, the UN also created a different type of NGO status with the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) with the aim to help inform international and national NGOs about the UN. Many CNGOs, especially the ICOs also have status with the Council of Europe.

From the late 1940s to the 1980s, the growth of CNGOs followed the slow and stable growth of ECOSOC NGOs as a whole. In that time all the CNGOs with ECOSOC status were also recognized lay organizations (ICOs) by the Holy See.

In the 1990s, however, due to a change in the ECOSOC NGO requirements and the numerous high-level UN conferences, the number of NGOs accredited to the UN grew exponentially. A similar trend occurred among CNGOs. In 1989, for example, there were fewer than 30 Catholic ECOSOC NGOs. By 1999 the number had grown to 49. This was due in large part to the growth of Catholic religious orders receiving ECOSOC status.

Presently, out of the 2,531 ECOSOC NGOs, 63 identify themselves as Catholic. Twenty-five of them are recognized International Catholic Organizations (ICOs) with 11 others being either member organizations of an ICO or associated with the CICO. Sixteen are religious congregations or orders. In addition to the 63 CNGOs with ECOSOC status, an additional 25 hold status only with the UN Department of Public Information (DPI).

In 1965, fewer than ten Catholic NGOs had been granted accreditation to ECOSOC. At the time, all of these were ICOs. Since then, the number of CNGOs with a formal relationship to the UN has grown to more than 87, with a number of others seeking status.

II. The Impact of CNGOs

Although it is difficult to adequately measure the impact of any NGO in relation to the UN, the involvement of NGOs in the Community of Nations has not only transformed the global arena but has also transformed the individual lives of their members. In his 1979 visit to UN Headquarters, Pope John Paul II spoke of this important two-fold role: “It is the privileged task of the non governmental organizations to help bring these concerns into the communities and homes of the people, and to bring back to the established agencies the priorities and aspirations of the people.”

The most visible way in which, CNGOs can have an impact is by bringing to the UN the concerns and experiences of their members. While only governments make the decisions at the UN, ECOSOC NGOs can have a significant impact through oral interventions, written statements, and lobbying of government delegates. In his 1999 World Day of Peace Message, Pope John Paul II spoke of the important right of peoples “to share in the decisions which often profoundly modify their way of life.” The NGO status is one way in which this happens.

Through the vehicle of oral interventions and statements, the CNGOs can bring attention to important issues that are being overlooked by the governments and can give new and ethical perspectives to the existing issues on the agenda. In his 1979 address to ICOs working at UNESCO in Paris, Pope John Paul II pointed out how, in order for these contributions to be effective, they should be “based on the experiences and reflections” of the members of the ICOs.

One of the most active and perhaps most urgent forums for NGOs is the ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights. For more than 50 years, Catholic NGOs have been using that forum to raise attention to human rights violations against their members. For example, in recent years, the Dominicans for Justice and Peace have been drawing attention to the lack of religious freedom in Pakistan, where they have a number of Dominicans working.

Special arrangements have also been made to allow NGOs to make statements at major UN Conferences and the meetings leading up to them. CNGOs have played an active and visible role in most of the major UN conferences of recent years, including those dealing with racism, development, HIV/AIDS, and the environment.

In this role, most of the CNGOs have a strong and positive collaboration with the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See. As NGOs, the CNGOs can operate in ways in which the Holy See as an observer state cannot.

A second way in which CNGOs have significant impact is by bringing issues from the UN agenda out to their members. A few CNGOs have developed specific formation programs on the UN or on UN issues. For example, since 1999, more than 70 people from mostly Asia and Africa have participated in the Pax Romana internship programs at the Commission and Sub Commission on Human Rights. These two annual programs draw not only Pax Romana members but also Diocesan Justice and Peace promoters for a formation on Human Rights based in Catholic Social Teaching.

This role of bringing the issues out the people is not only limited to those with ECOSOC status, but is the primary function of those NGOs in relation with the UN DPI and is also carried out by many NGOs without any formal relations with the UN. Because of the growth of information technologies, more localized groups such as Diocesan Justice and Peace offices and schools can also play this important role.

One way in which many Catholic groups do this is with the celebration and commemoration of the various UN days and years, such as Human Rights Day (December 10). In 2004, Catholic NGOs led the efforts to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the International Year of the Family (1994). Many Catholic groups around the world took advantage of this year to celebrate the most “basic unit of society.” At the same time, eight Catholic NGOs working at UNESCO published a series of observations and proposals on the theme.

The third way in which CNGOs have an impact in the Community of Nations is by promoting Global Solidarity. By linking together millions of Catholics in virtually every country, CNGOs can help build the “virtue of solidarity” (SRS 38). Belonging to a global organization or movement with members in different parts of the world can help men and women, as Pope John Paul II writes, to feel “personally affected by the injustices and violations of human rights committed in distant countries which perhaps they will never visit” (SRS 38).

III. Theological Basis

Many Catholic organizations advocating at the UN see their work as a form of ministry. When asked about where they draw inspiration for their work, CNGOs point to three main sources.

Many of the CNGOs point to Scripture as a main source of inspiration, citing both Testaments. Directly across the street from the United Nations Headquarters is the Isaiah wall, which bears the quote from the second chapter of the Book of Isaiah: “They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; One nation shall not raise the sword against another, nor shall they train for war again.” For many of the CNGOs working with the UN, this is one of the basic biblical texts that inspire them in their work. Most CNGOs point to the example and teachings of Christ as a model, who in his public ministry reached out to the voiceless and the powerless.

A second source that many of the CNGOs mention is the rich tradition of Catholic Social Teaching. Most of the issues that CNGOs handle are covered in some way by the modern encyclicals. In *Pacem in terris*, John XII calls upon Catholics “to take an active part in public life, and to work together for the benefit of the whole human race” (146).

For many CNGOs, one of the key documents of Catholic Social Teaching that inspires them and their work is *Gaudium et spes*. The Second Vatican Council as a whole is a third source of inspiration for CNGOs, especially for the religious orders. For them, the Council, especially the Decree on the Renewal of Religious Life (*Perfectae caritatis*), led them to reexamine their mission and return to the spirit of their founders. For many, this process has led them to see the importance of working with the United Nations. And as a result, many religious

orders see their role not so much as bringing a Catholic voice into the UN, but bringing a voice in the spirit of their founder.

V. Challenges in the present context

In the past forty years since *Gaudium et spes*, the global situation has changed significantly with the end of the Cold War, the development of new technologies, and the new global conflicts arising after September 11, 2001. Sadly, however, many of the problems highlighted by *Gaudium et spes* are still present, even if they have taken on new forms, including extreme poverty accompanied by a growing gap between the rich and the poor (GS 63), war (GS 77-82) excessive individualism (GS 30) and a lack of respect for the dignity of the human person created in the image of God (GS 1).

In their day-to-day work with the Community of Nations to address these global issues, CNGOs face a number of other difficulties and challenges. When asked in an informal survey, many CNGOs listed four main challenges in their work.

For many, a big challenge is finding ways to educate and motivate people about international issues. Several respondents listed the difficulty of motivating the members in the United States and found the present negative policy of the US government toward the UN as a hindrance in this effort. Related to this is the challenge for CNGOs of building global solidarity among their members in an increasingly individualistic world.

A second challenge, identified by many of the CNGOs surveyed, was the challenge of finding the financial and human resources necessary to support their work at the UN. As the role of the NGO within the UN has increased, the need for more professional, full-time representatives has increased. At the UN Headquarters in New York several of the religious orders have been able to devote the financial and human resources necessary to operate full time offices, but only one ICO, Caritas, has been able to open a full time office there. In Geneva, the situation is slightly reversed, with the presence of several headquarters of ICOs in the city, but with only two religious orders, the Franciscans and the Dominicans operating full-time offices. The majority of the CNGOs working in NY, Geneva, Paris, Rome and Vienna rely mostly on retired volunteers who give their time, talent and treasure to their work. For these CNGOs especially, the services provided by the three ICO Centers are invaluable. Although, *Gaudium et spes* calls for greater support for the work of the ICOs, the financial support for their work has decreased in recent years. Stronger efforts should be made to help support the CNGOs, especially the lay organizations in their ministry at the UN.

A third challenge that a number of CNGOs pointed to was the need for better coordination with other NGOs. Among the Catholic NGOs, the CICO and its Centers have done a positive job in coordinating the efforts of ICOs. Unfortunately, the Conference has not been able to adequately respond to the recent presence of religious orders, especially in NY. As a Conference of lay organizations recognized by the Pontifical Council for the Laity, religious orders cannot join the CICO. The ICO Center in NY and the Center in Geneva have both made

substantial efforts to include the representatives of these orders. Recently, in NY, the religious NGOs meeting at the ICO Center created the Religious at the UN (RUN) network.

Among the larger NGO family, the CNGOs have found it useful to participate in the thematic committees of the Conference of NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC or CONGO. Several of these committees, such as the NGO Committee on Social Development in NY or the NGO Committee on Freedom of Religion in Geneva, are chaired by CNGOs. Unfortunately, both within the CNGO family and the NGO community as a whole, there exists a divide between those NGOs working in NY, with the active presence of religious orders, and those working in Europe, where ICOs are the most active.

Sadly, another divide exists between the Catholic NGOs working primarily to fight abortion and those working in other areas (poverty eradication, social development, etc.). This is especially evident in New York, where questions on abortion and birth control are raised. In this context, the call of *Gaudium et spes* for more coordination between the CNGOs is even more urgent and needs to be addressed in way that can include all the genuine CNGOs, whether lay or religious, European or American based.

A final challenge pointed to by the CNGOs is the basic challenge of obtaining status with ECOSOC. The process for obtaining status with ECOSOC is both costly and time-consuming for the NGO and the UN. One such CNGO is the Society of St. Vincent de Paul. The Society, which has status with UNESCO and which is a recognized ICO has been seeking ECOSOC status for several years. In 2002, seven congregations of religious sisters, recognizing the difficulty in being granted ECOSOC status, created a joint NGO, UNANIMA International, which is in the process of seeking NGO status. Presently, the UN is in the process of reforming the process of accreditation and the rights and responsibilities of NGOs working with the UN. The future of this process is unclear, but whatever decisions are made will significantly impact the ministry of CNGOs within the Community of Nations.

Conclusion

Catholic organizations working with the Community of Nations play an invaluable role in advocating for justice and peace, educating their members and building global solidarity. The call of *Gaudium et spes* for more coordination and support of these organizations is even more important 40 years after the Council, when globalization is the rule and many of the world's problems require the collective response of the whole human family.

International Governance between Participation and Legality

Nicoletta Parisi

1. Current practices in international relations register a **high tension between** two needs: **collective security** and the full respect and promotion of **human rights** or, more in general, the rule of law. Human rights and international legality are under attack because collective security is given priority even where this might cause violations to international legality. This tension is evident both in diplomatic statements ("Report Bassiouni", September 21, 2004, A/59/370; Amnesty International Report June 6, 2000, Nato/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "Collateral Damages of Unlawful Killings? Violation of the Law of War by Nato during Operation Allied Force"), and in domestic/international case law (Judgement of the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, December 14, 2004, Baha Mousa, [2004]EWC2911, admin.; Judgement of the Appeal Court, IX Cr.- San Francisco, December 18, 2003, *Rasul et al. v. Bush Pres. US, et al*, NO. 03-334; UN Human Rights Comm., Advisory opinion, 5/2003, E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.1).
2. It should be noted that this tension is not exclusively a result of the present situation; rather, it represents a **constant factor of the political and legal debate at the international level**. But nowadays, this tension is becoming more and more serious, due to transnational terrorism and to the threats relating to weapons of mass destruction.
3. My speech will not have a theological approach nor will be delivered from the viewpoint of a domestic or international operator. It will rather focus on a strictly **legal approach**.
My speech has **four aims**:
 - first, to point out the **international legal regime** needed to face situations that cause or may give rise to the use of force in order to maintain international peace and security: the ground is the *ius ad bellum* topics;
 - second, to look into how the legal regime is evolving in order to secure a **minimum standard of treatment for all individuals** involved in an international or non-international conflict; the ground is the *ius in bello* topics;
 - third, **to compare** the legal situation with the **Social Doctrine of the Church**, in order to investigate how the latter faces these crucial problems. This will be done in two ways: re-reading *Gaudium and Spes* and the Pope's statements and addresses relating to these issues; and, by analyzing the Church's attitude *in practice*;
 - fourth, to ask ourselves if there is a **dialogue between the two levels (the legal one and the Social Doctrine one)** in domestic and international behaviour. To put it differently: how does the Christian view shed light on the understanding of legal challenges the world is currently facing at the international level?
4. The normative and institutional international legal regime established to defend and promote international peace and security is organized around **two pillars**:
 - the duty of each *subject* of the international Community to find a peaceful settlement to international disputes;
 - the parallel duty of each *actor* on the international arena to respect human dignity.

Both these duties are guaranteed by international rules of *jus cogens*, which may not be derogated.

5. The link between these two distinct (yet strictly related) rules derives from the current attitude of the international collective security system, oriented towards a **positive notion of peace**. Peace is thus not defined any more as the lack of conflict, but rather as a number of situations able, all together, to contribute to the building of those conditions that should secure harmony among Nations.
6. This perspective is very different from the original United Nations' approach; this is becoming clearer and clearer through recent Security Council praxis. This body now understands **grave and massive breaches of human rights as situations able to undermine international peace and security**.
(In this way the Security Council regarded the «human tragedy» in Somalia, the «humanitarian crisis» in Rwanda, the «ethnic minorities repression» in Iraqi; and so on).

Finally, notwithstanding the fact that maintaining peace is the first concern of the United Nations Security Council (even when this it means choosing between this one and the protection of human rights and freedom), human rights are starting to be considered a benchmark in the evaluation of whether a threat to peace exists. In other words, the idea of peace must be seen today also in the light of the respect of human rights; violations of human rights might «determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach to the peace or acts of aggression» (art. 39 UN).

7. Where is this tension visible? There are many dichotomies **in international law**, some apparent, some less so:
 - territorial integrity of a State (i.e. inviolability of domestic frontiers) v. humanitarian intervention;
 - territorial sovereignty of a State v. the principle of self-determination of peoples;
 - domestic jurisdiction (i.e. non intervention in internal affairs) v. international norms on the treatment of individuals;
 - the prohibition of the use of force v. the duty to settle peacefully international disputes;
 - the prohibition of the threat or use of force v. the encouragement to codify the rules regarding the warfare;
 - the individual and collective right of self-defence for State v. primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the collective security system;
 - the power of the Security Council to impose sanctions on the basis of art. 41 UN v. the protection of human rights.
8. Legal issues have been highlighted and discussed in situations where the threat or the use of force and massive violations of human rights were concerned. In such situations, the common feature appeared to be widespread illegality in the **behaviour of both States and individuals**. Illegality characterizes both the **decision to use force** and the conduct of **warfare**.

9. This illegality is accompanied by the explicit attempt to **modify both the rules and the institutions** governing peacekeeping and the respect of human rights in international relations. These modifications try to:
- widen the limits of the States' international responsibility, acting on its objective requisite (i.e.: broadening the notion of armed aggression also to non conventional attacks) and on the subjective one (i.e.: finding a link between the activity of an individual - or of a group of individuals - and a State in a less rigorous way, even in the absence of a formal relationship between the two);
 - widen the perimeter of the right of self-defence. This is shown by the attempt to act both on its chronological requisites (i.e. assuming the right to act in prevention or in pre-emption) and its substantial requisites (i.e.: lowering the test of necessity and proportionality);
 - suggest new ways of legalizing the use of force even if in cases where no aggression was launched, but rather to protect different interests (such as the values of democracy and peoples' individual rights through humanitarian intervention). It is important to note that there is no internationally accepted definition of aggression, notwithstanding General Assembly Res. 3314(XXIX).

10. Moreover, international norms on the use of armed force and the respect of human dignity are part and parcel of (and should be justified on) an institutional framework, represented - at the world level - by the United Nations Organizations.

The primary role of the UN is the maintenance of peace through:

- a centralized system of peaceful settlement of international disputes;
- the incentive to codify the international law on the use of force (i.e.: humanitarian law and the legal regime of individual criminal responsibility) as well as international human rights' law

Thus, all the attempts towards suggesting that the existing institutional framework and its laws are obsolete or towards their radical modification in the above mentioned direction (see No. 9), often betray the will to abandon a multilateral approach and to embrace unilateral solutions. It is evident that widespread unilateral approach to international affairs [is taking hold?].

11. The **role of "critical awareness"** pertains to doctrine. Scholars have the task of accompanying the evolutions of the praxis, suggesting progressive developments of international laws (following art. 13 UN) in the direction of the respect of international legality and, at the same time, in adherence with the needs of the international community, which has changed dramatically since the end of the Second World War.

The Doctrine of the Church affirms:

- **the primacy of person's dignity:** it is the "only criterion for judgements and decisions" (Pope Address to the International Organizations, Sept. 12, 1983, 3; *Gaudium et spes*, 25, 27 and 41; *Pacem in terris*, 158), the basis of all human rights (Pope Addr. to the Governor-Gen. of Canada, 19 Sept. 1984, 7) and for the building up a society in peace and in justice (Pope Addr. to the Governor-Gen. Of Canada, September 19, 1984, 7)

- *This dignity pertains to individuals, nations, peoples* (on the principle of self-determination see Pope Addr. to the Diplomatic Corps, January 9, 1988, 7-8; id., January 16, 1982, 7; id., January 1, 1992, n. 3; id., January 13, 1996, 8)
- *Men' equality dignity transcends strict justice* (*Gaudium et spes*, 78)
- *Human rights have an indivisible and universal character* (*Gaudium et spes*, 26; *Pacem in terris*, I, 1c)
- *Human rights need protection and guarantees also at the international level* (Pope Message to the Eur. Court for Hum. Rights, October 14, 1985, 3; (Pope Message for the 30th Adniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 2, 1978, 2), even in a time of war (Pope Message to the Institute of Humanitarian Law, May 18, 1982, 2)
- **The right to the peace it is, at the same time, also a duty** (Pope Message for the World Day of the Peace, 1974)
 - *it has to be accepted in a positive approach* (*Gaudium et spes*, 78; *Centesimus annus*, 51)
- **The respect for the dignity of men and for human rights is considered a condition for peace:** unconditional and effective respect for each one's [imprescriptible and] inalienable rights is the necessary condition in order that peace reigns in a society: *Pacem in terris*, 11; (Pope Message for the World Day of the Peace, 1982, 9); "peace comes down to respect for man's inviolable rights": *Redemptor hominis*, 17)
- **The condemnation of war** (*Gaudium et spes*, 77 and 80)
 - *war is not a solution to international disputes* (Meeting with the Official of Rome Vicariat, January 17, 1991; Pope Address to the Arabic Region's Bishops, October 1, 1990, 4)
 - *if inevitable, not all means are legal* (*Gaudium et spes*, 79): the respect of humanitarian law is a priority
 - *sometimes terrorism is similar to an act of war* (*Gaudium et spes*, 79)
- **Necessity of, and limits to, humanitarian intervention** (Pope Addr. to Diplomatic Corps, January 16, 1993;. to the Ambassador of India, December 13, 2002, 4; to the 27th Conference FAO, November 11, 1993, 5)
 - *UN responsibility*, basis for the right of intervention in order to protect people (Pope Mess. to the Secretary-General of the UN, March 1st, 1993, 2)
- **Multilateralism to deal with international issues and to solve international disputes: irreplaceable role of the United Nations Organizations** (*Gaudium et spes*, 25: UN "can ensure that the human person is always the focus and the end of all social institutions")

12. Finally: one can record situations where the individual is reduced to an instrument: both through terrorism (in asserting antagonist political ideologies), and through inhumane and degrading practices used while opposing terrorism.

In these situations the **Church's doctrine** and **scholars of international law** seem to accept almost the **same principles and tasks** in abstract; but is the bulk of these principles, their content, really the same?

13. I think that an answer to this question should be answered by analyzing the concept of **democracy**. **This is so for** two different sets of reasons:

- democracy is a value stressed by both international institutions and the Catholic Church (Second Vatican Ecumenical Council; *Gaudium et spes*, 78);
- democracy is the instrument to implement both peace and human dignity (*supra*, para. 4).

To engage the concept of democracy allows tentatively to give an answer for addressing dichotomies on the two conflicting needs (collective security/human rights).

Democracy has **three different meanings**:

- it is an amount of values, as stressed by the Catholic Church (the respect for the person is a condition of democracy) and by democratic legal regimes;
- it is a governance method which gives rise to an institutional framework;
- it has a normative dimension.

Could we say that the perspectives of the Church and of those international legal scholars are different? and, if so, can we reconcile them?

In a very simplified perspective, one might argue that:

- pursuant to the Social Doctrine of the Church, democracy stems from the civil society: it depends on the concept of the centrality of the person; the State is the first grantor of the respect for human rights (Addr. to the Institute of Humanitarian Law, May 18, 1982, 2). A **democratic domestic system** is based upon the premise that the law is at the service of human beings: "in reality, what justifies the existence of any political activity is service to man" (Pope Addr. to the UN, October 1, 1976, 6; Pope Addr. to the Ambassador of Costa Rica, February 24th, 1976);

- **international law**, on the contrary, is a network of relationships existing primarily, if not exclusively, among States (and among entities possessing the characteristic of authority-sovereignty both in the domestic and in the international legal order). Thus, the international legal system is *horizontal*, recognizing no authority over these entities. International law only exists as among States (or analogous entities): it is an intergovernmental framework. Individuals do not create the law (i.e.: they cannot assert values and rights): the law essentially exists for the coexistence of sovereigns. Only in very recent times non-state entities (such as individuals, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations) were entitled to the benefits of international law, even sometimes being able to act directly at the international level (i.e.: individual recourse to international Courts; etc.). This is happening as a consequence of the enlargement of the range of topics covered by international law, "no longer exclusively concerned with issues relating to the territory or jurisdictions of States narrowly understood, but (...) beginning to take into account the specialised problems of contemporary society" (Shaw, p. 47).

The two approaches seem to be irreconcilable. Is it true?

14. In attempting to answer this question, I suggest to re-consider the two current conflicting needs (collective security and human rights) in the light of one of the most worrying situation for both international law and Social Doctrine: war.

Facing renewed claims of "just war", a solution would be to replace this concept, rooted in religious doctrine, with the concept of "legal war", having regard both to the "jus ad bellum" and to the "jus in bello".

In doing so, the indicated dichotomies (see No. 7) tend to disappear.

15. The issue then shifts to the determination of criteria for evaluating the legality of a war, both substantial (i.e.: what is the basis and the justifications for a just war?) and procedural (i.e.: who is entitled to decide? How?).

That is why the concept of democracy plays a key rôle: the matter is to find modalities to re-legitimate the only institutional multilateral context presently existing in international relations, in order to assure **democratic governance** at the **international level**.

Following both the Social doctrine of the Church and the aspirations of the international civil society, efforts to democratize international relations could succeed by means of strengthening the United Nations Organization. This organization is the potential framework for democratizing international relationships: the intergovernmental activity inside the Organization is expressed in the normative, operational and jurisdictional level; it also affects political, economic, social, legal topics.

How could the UN regain credibility?

- increasing the consideration of “inter-individual” (as opposed to merely “inter-state”) needs (through, for example: the participation of non-governmental organizations in intergovernmental bodies; the codification of human rights law, humanitarian law, internal and external self-determination of peoples as well as individual criminal responsibility);
- reforming the institutional framework, reconsidering *inter alia* the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly;
- strengthening the relationship between regional intergovernmental bodies and the United Nations;
- creating the conditions for substantial (as opposed to merely formal) equality of States.

16. Moreover, it appears of fundamental importance to start "thinking democratic" **on a global scale**.

Grave breaches of human rights within domestic legal systems may be of "international concern" because it may affect international peace and security (par. 6), which is an indivisible good, to which everybody all over the world has a stake.

What could international law and Church do to **implement democracy at the domestic level**?

Efforts inside the UN and the OSCE for:

- stressing human rights protection within States (arts 1.3 and 55 UN) through, inter alia, ratification of the international treaties (on human rights, humanitarian law, international responsibility for criminal acts, etc.)
- helping in restoring democracy (monitoring elections, etc.)
- mantaining/building/keeping peace.

**Artisans of a New Humanity, Defenders of Nature:
Catholic Social Teaching on the Environment, Food and Agriculture in the
Context of Globalization**

Brother David Andrews, CSC

The National Catholic Rural Life Conference has for over 80 years, been the lead voice for the United States Catholic Bishops on food, farm, environmental and agricultural policy. In 2003 the Bishops approved unanimously a new statement of policy entitled: "For I Was Hungry and You Gave Me Food." It was published in January of 2004. This statement repeated past policies of support for family farm agriculture, of concern for corporate control and concentration of land ownership, of support for conservation of the air, land and water for the well being of rural communities. The bishops of the United States developed new policy positions on agricultural trade and genetically modified organisms. They called for targets in support of small and medium sized farms in the United States and special and differential approaches to developing countries in the global arena and adopted the precautionary principle in the use of genetic engineering in food. In many ways the new official policy of the United States Catholic Bishops draws upon its own long history of reflection on Catholic Social Teaching and its application to the rural world, now understood as part of a global and integrated dynamic. Many conferences of Catholic bishops around the world such as the South African Bishops', Philippine Bishops, Latin Americans, the United Kingdom's Bishops have articulated recent positions on Catholic Social Teaching on globalization, agricultural trade, on the environment and on the consumers right to food.... Always there is a concern for the impact of large-scale, globalizing economic forces on communities, the environment and the dignity of the human person. In addition, adding to its previous work on the social doctrine of the Church, the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace recently published a "Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church." That publication provides perspective on my theme since it treats extensively of food, agriculture and the environment in the context of globalization. *Gaudium et spes* is a primary source for the Compendium. Seminal perspectives from *Gaudium et spes* are utilized as well in "From Stockholm to Johannesburg" published also by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. The World Food Summits, the meetings of the World Trade Organization, the World Summit on Sustainable Development have been occasions for the articulation of Catholic statements on the right to food, support for small farmers, a preference for integral development and environmental matters.

From the publication "From Stockholm to Johannesburg" (2002) we read that the Dogmatic Constitution *Lumen gentium* made reference to a series of biblical texts concerning the redemption not only of the human person but also of all creation.

LG. No.48: Acts 3: 21; Eph 1: 10; Col 1: 20; 2 Pt 3:10-13, See also LG No. 36; Rm 8:21; 1 Cor 15:27-28.

It also clearly stated the value of all creation in its own right.

LG No. 36

The human person was, moreover, to order creation to the praise of God through work that would contribute to the bettering not only of society but also of the whole of creation.

LG No. 41

While the goods of the earth were to be used rationally, there was also an urgent need to assure their better distribution. LG No. 36

The Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et spes* also stressed that created things had their own laws and values, adding that the human person must learn them. All persons bear the heavy responsibility of completing the work of creation. Believers, no matter what their religion, have moreover "always recognized the voice and revelation of God in the language of creatures."

CF. GS No.36 as well as GS No.34 and 69.

Finally the thought of *Lumen gentium* and *Gaudium et spes* reiterated that God had destined the goods of the earth for all, and that they must be distributed in a way 'regulated by justice and accompanied by charity.'" GS No.69

But care for the earth goes still further. The human person can, and indeed must, love the goods of God's creation. "It is as a flowing from God's hand that he looks upon them and reveres them" and uses them in a spirit of poverty and freedom.

GS No. 37, 3

These short but highly significant references constituted a solid theological framework for the Church as it started more consciously and consistently to address the growing environmental crisis and to relate the environment to human culture, to the role of agriculture, food production, distribution and consumption and a concern for the poor.

The Apostolic Constitution on High Education promulgated as *Ex Corde Ecclesia* has a significant mandate concerning ecological concerns: #37 calls for programs in defense of nature, development, and cultural understanding:

"In its service to society, a Catholic university will relate especially to the academic, cultural and scientific world of the region in which it is located. Original forms of dialogue and collaboration are to be encouraged between the Catholic universities and other universities of a nation on behalf of development, of understanding between cultures and of the defense of nature in accordance with an awareness of the international ecological situation."

Gaudium et spes sees the earth as the object of God's love and the human response to be love as well, of the earth and of God. That love in our time calls for not only care for creation, but also a defense of nature. Such a posture in the United States has resulted in a call by the United States Catholic Conference of Bishops a policy of supporting small and medium sized farmers and agriculture, which is sustainable. Sustainable agriculture is one, which is ecological, just, profitable, and humane. Sustainability is a vision that invites us to think not only of ourselves but also of generations yet to come. As the statement: "For I Was Hungry And You Gave Me Food" argues that farmers need to work in a sustainable manner, protecting the air, land and water in their farming practices. The rural persons are called to be, with others, artisans of a new humanity and defenders of nature.

The United States bishops agree with the Holy Father and Patriarch Bartholomew when they called for a new culture, including what we believe is a new culture in agriculture: "" A new

approach and a new culture are needed, based on the centrality of the human person within creation and inspired by environmentally ethical behavior stemming from our triple relationship to God, to self, and to creation. Such an ethic fosters interdependence and stresses the principles of universal solidarity, social justice and responsibility, in order to promote a true culture of life." P. 150, Common Declaration of Pope John Paul II and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, Rome - Venice, 10 June 2002"

In his encyclical, *Popularum progressio*, Paul VI articulated a vision of development, which he called integral development that was directed at the whole person. That focus on the whole person challenged limited, incomplete and inadequate perspectives on human anthropology. *Popularum progressio* called for an integral scale of values, a theme, which is repeated in the Compendium. Theologian Bernard F. J. Lonergan speaks of this integral scale of values as being in a hierarchy: Lonergan has articulated an integral hierarchy of values: vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious. The harmonious unfolding of the scale of values result in the opposite of the social surd: a civilization of love, structures of the common good. But the alternative are structures of sin: As the Compendium states: "The consequences of sin perpetuate the structures of sin. These are rooted in personal sin and, therefore, are always connected to concrete acts of the individuals who commit them, consolidate them and make it difficult to remove them. It is thus that they grow stronger, spread and become sources of other sins, conditioning human conduct. These are obstacles and conditioning that go well beyond the actions and brief life span of the individual and interfere also in the process of the development of peoples, the delay and slow pace of which must be judged in this light. The actions and attitudes opposed to the will of God and the good of neighbor, as well as the structures arising from such behavior, appear to fall into two categories today: "on the one hand, the all-consuming desire for profit, and on the other, the thirst for power, with the intention of imposing one's will upon others. In order to characterize better each of these attitudes, one can add the expression: 'at any price.'"

The structures of sin in the analysis of the United States bishops are capsulized in the dynamic of concentration in agriculture, in the analysis of other church leaders around the world in the problematic activity of multinational corporations, in the movement toward a greater industrialization of agriculture. To assist in the analysis of food, agriculture and the environment, consistent with Catholic Social Teaching, I have developed a typology of cultures of agriculture. The sustainability of agricultural production as related to protection of the land's, the economic and social viability of a community is a matter of culture. A culture can be described as "the meaning and value of a way of life". I have developed a typology of four cultures of agriculture: subsistence, entrepreneurial, investment and sustainable. I am claiming that the integral scale of values calls for a new culture of agriculture, what we can call sustainable agriculture.

Subsistence or Peasant Agriculture

Subsistence agriculture is focused on the family and local community. In this culture, cooperation prevails over competition. The family members each cooperate with each other. Parents and children each have their respective roles and domains of labor and recreation, with a lot of interrelatedness. If one neighbor needs help, the others are there to assist. Whether one speaks of harvesting or home building, share enlivens the community. The Compendium rightly argues the need to protect and preserve the way of life of indigenous persons: "These peoples

offer an example of a life lived in harmony with the environment that they have come to know well and to preserve. Their extraordinary experience, which is an irreplaceable resource for all humanity, runs the risk of being lost altogether with the environment from which they originate."

Entrepreneurial Agriculture

Entrepreneurial agriculture is related to the influence of the small-town business methods onto the rural life-style. Entrepreneurial agriculture arises in situation in which family boundaries are extended in networks of association such as business societies, fraternal orders or women's associations. The cultural hope is expressed in "climbing the agricultural ladder". This meant that if one did not inherit a farm one might aspire to own one by moving up the ladder from sharecropper to tenant farmer and from tenant farmer to owner-operator. Rather than family and local community, the culture fosters strong self-reliance and individualism. Co-operative activity is encouraged in order to increase the opportunities for profit of the producers.

Investment Agriculture

This form of agriculture seeks to systematically incorporate all individual and discretely distinct economic and productive activity into a larger whole for a globalized market. Profit is the goal. The temporal horizon has shrunk from generations, to annual accounts, to now a focus on quarterly or monthly stock reports. It is a culture driven by globalization of capital

This type of agriculture brings with it a concentration of land ownership, economic control, and consolidation of power.

Sustainable Agriculture

It attempts to restore a lost connectedness between the earth and the human community. Proponents foster the encouragement of intentional communities and smaller human-scale operations in agriculture. The farmers explore microenterprise development and value-added activities like local processing, local marketing, local distribution networks.. They have sought to develop organic food opportunities and are moving toward more local and regional food systems as a organizational strategies with certification processes by third parties that brand them as healthy, or natural, or produced with a farmer's face. They place a priority on people and the earth rather than on profit. But profit is necessary to stay alive. In this culture, we see greater efforts at cooperation among members seeking a new system. There are as well correlative efforts at the formation of credit systems, mediating structures of counseling, information sharing, and crisis intervention, new marketing, processing and distribution systems are being developed, sometimes under the aegis of "fair trade" products.

Cultural Trends in Agriculture

What kind of futures can we envisage with the cultures of agriculture? The first cultural trend we see is the growth of investment agriculture, the control by a few companies of the world's food system.

A second cultural trend for the future might be described as the declining mixed middle ground. This will be made up of traditional peasant and entrepreneurial family farms trying to compete or to hold their own in an increasing investment culture. A common characteristic of these farmers might be uncertainty about their future in agriculture. The question many of these

farmers will face is: do I take the leap? do I become bigger? or, do I get out now? The older farmers may be hoping to ride out the remaining years of their farming by holding out until retirement.

A third direction will found by sustainable agriculture. It has a historical grounding in the peasant culture around the world and in the history of farming in the United States -- with its agrarian, Jeffersonian ethos. The culture promoted by civic republicanism was most at home on the farm in local community. Not Locke, Hobbes or Adam Smith, but the Greek Polis and Humanism were the philosophical roots of this agrarianism. Around the world it has support in the slow food movement, the organic food movement, and in efforts to develop a more decentralized or localized food system.

What will lead the voice of agriculture? Will the forces leading to industrialization pose a treat to our ability to protect a dispersed land ownership system, broad participation in farming, active, local democratic processes, stewardship of the land and of local communities - a sense of responsibility to future generations? What legal policies will promote sustainability?

Catholic Social Teaching and Sustainable Agriculture

John Paul II has given us a good standard by which to examine our own performance. In his 1987 encyclical, *Sollicitudo rei socialis*, he named three considerations for close examination:

First, development must recognize the nature of each being and its mutual connection with everything else in an ordered world. Animals, for example, should not be used simply for economic gain. They have their own place in the cosmos and as the Catholic Catechism say, "deserve respect and dignity".

Second, natural resources are limited, we have a responsibility to our own and to future generations to care for them in a responsible stewardship.

Third, local people deserve respect and a healthy, wholesome quality of life.

When applied to the culture of agriculture, these perspectives give us valuable guidance in appraising the direction of future economic and social dynamics.

In closing I will articulate a spirituality for sustainability as a call for new artisans for humanity and defenders of nature, consistent with the call of *Gaudium et spes*.

International Aspects of Sustainable Development: A New Challenge to the Catholic Social Thought

Ignazio Musu

The Social Doctrine of the Church has definitely recognized the importance of economic and social development and of its balanced diffusion all over the world as a condition for a true realization of the human person within the society. The Encyclical Letter *Populorum progressio* of Pope Paul VI represents a cornerstone in this perspective. Recently there has been a growing awareness that a true social and economic development cannot be realized without paying due attention to the ecological aspect.

Nature occupies a central place in the Old Testament since the biblical message of Genesis 2,15 where it is clearly stated that God entrusts the care of the earth to the humankind, and the concept of stewardship with reference to the natural world is introduced. That the nature has an intrinsic role in the religious practice of the Israel people is confirmed by some institutions of the deuteronomic tradition, such as the practice of Sabbath when even the animals rest and that of the Jubilee when the land is refreshed by lying fallow.

Early Christian and medieval theology dealt in an integrated way with both humanity and natural world; both were considered as creation in harmonic relation with God. Starting with the Enlightenment period, Christian theology focused on the relation between man and God, leaving the natural world to the side. Nature becomes merely useful, at disposal of the ruling power of man.

By opening Christianity toward dialogue with other religions and with the modern world, the Second Vatican Council marked a turning point. Although nature and the environment are not at the center of the Council's documents, the perspective of *Gaudium et spes* is clearly the right one for the introduction of the ecological aspect into the Social Doctrine of the Church. Working in this perspective the teaching of Pope John Paul II has considered this aspect with particular attention, and produced essential statements for the future of the Church's Social Doctrine.

The two basic principles of this teaching are the concept of stewardship, which can be conceived as responsibility of man and humankind towards nature, and the concept of universal destination of goods, which is a practical application of the idea of solidarity.

When the individual person considers her relation with nature, she should not only be concerned with the individual aspect of this relation but should consider the implication for any other person both in the present and in the future generations.

This attitude is required by the intrinsic feature of nature and the environment that are available in a non exclusive way to all persons. By this it is meant that when someone degrades the environment by his use, he also damaging other human beings; and when a person contributes to preserving and even improving the environment, she also benefits a lot of many other persons, perhaps living very far away. Moreover, when somebody in the present generation

destroys a limited stock of natural assets, she automatically reduces the stock available for a choice by the future generation.

For these reasons, the appropriate perspective in which to place the ecological aspect of the Social Doctrine of the Church seems that of sustainable development. This perspective introduces in the issue of development, as it was traditionally addressed even by the Social Doctrine of the Church, two new dimensions. The first is that of the quality of life of the development process and the second is that of the limit due to the existence of environmental and natural resources.

From the first point of view, the Social Doctrine of the Church has always insisted on the qualitative nature of the development process. Economic development should not only aim at increasing and diffusing the material well being, but it should point to increase human welfare in a wide sense, including the full realization of the human person.

Non exclusivity in the use of the environment signals that human persons are in a relation of reciprocal interdependence when facing environmental problems. What one person does, affects the others, and vice versa. This, by the way, is one of the basic reasons why the market mechanism does not satisfactorily work in allocating in a socially efficient way the environmental resources. Thus environmental policies are inevitably required to promote this socially efficient allocation.

In organizing and implementing such policies it must be taken into account that preserving and improving environmental quality is costly. The costs must be compared with the costs of environmental degradation. An effort must be done to minimize the sum of these two types of social costs. The needs of the future generations must be taken in due consideration, by giving an adequate weight to future environmental costs (by using a rate of discount of these future costs which must not be too high) when comparing it with the benefits of a current use of the nature.

The second aspect of sustainable development is the need of considering that natural and environmental resources are limited. Some natural resources are only exhaustible (such as oil and coal). The problem with these exhaustible resources is to deplete them in a socially efficient way, so as to leave future generations the time and opportunity to replace them with renewable one at reasonable costs.

But most natural resources, once exploited, can be regenerated through natural cycles. Animal and vegetable populations have this limited biological possibility to regenerate once their existing stock is reduced by human intervention; the same is true for environmental resources such as the air, water and soil quality. For these resources it is in principle possible to keep them provided that their flow of exploitation is matched by the natural regeneration capacity.

A sustainable process of economic development should be concerned with the right of future generations to not being deprived of the possibility of using natural resources. From this point of view, there is an intergenerational equity issue embodied in the concept of sustainable development. In order for this objective to be achieved the condition must be imposed by society

that the rate of exploitation of environmental resources must not exceed their capacity of natural regeneration. The aim of this is to maintain the stock of the natural resources for future use, to sustain a constant stock of these resources.

This constraint poses a problem to sustainable development once we consider economic growth. How is it possible at the same time for the national product to grow and for the stock of the natural resources to be kept constant? There seems to be an inherent contradiction: to keep the stock of natural resources constant we require a constant flow of services from these stocks to be used for economic reasons. How can we have both a constant flow of economic services from the environment and a growing output from those services?

There have been pessimistic answers to this question; these are the positions of those claiming that the objective of economic growth should be simply abandoned and replaced by the objective of steady state. A more optimistic answer comes from noting that economic growth could be made compatible with the constant flow of economic services from the environment, if the pressure of economic activity on the environment is continuously declining. In more technical terms it is required that the use of economic services from the environment per unit of total produced output is continuously declining.

There noting automatic in this result. It requires a type of technological progress continuously improving the productivity of the economic services from the environment; in other terms the ecological efficiency of the economic system both in production and in consumption activities must be continuously improved.

There is no reason why the spontaneous working of the market mechanism leads automatically to this ecological efficient technological progress. Appropriate instruments and incentives of environmental policy are required. A strong support both to the market's action and to public policy's action comes from a system of consumers' preferences oriented towards goods and production processes which are ecologically efficient. This is where individual and social behavior become important, and where values orienting this behavior become important. Hence this is where we can find an active role for the indications of the Social Doctrine of the Church.

Sustainable development is a meaningless concept if it does not apply on a global basis.

There is a first reason why the issue of sustainable development must be addressed from an international point of view. The first reason is that presently much of the environmental degradation in developing countries is a consequence of the economic activity in developed countries, through international trade relations. The issue of sustainable development is therefore strictly linked to the problems of resource flows between developed and developing countries.

The need of re-orienting the structure of the economic system and the path of technological progress towards the objective of sustainable development is not only a concern in advanced economies, but also in developing countries. Unfortunately the practice has been prevailing in advanced countries to achieve the objective of sustainable development by delocalizing the most polluting technologies and production methods in developing countries, by exploiting their legitimate desire to increase their economic growth.

This practice is clearly inconsistent with an objective of international fairness in economic development. The Social Doctrine of the Church has denounced it from this perspective. Moreover, in developing countries ecological awareness is rapidly increasing. They want their economic growth to continue as a part of a strategy of sustainable development. They have made many mistakes in the recent past, sacrificing economic growth to the objective of environmental quality preservation. But they are quickly realizing that these were serious mistakes, and they are doing a lot to modify their economic development strategy towards sustainable development. China and India are important examples in this direction.

The second reason for the need of dealing with international sustainable development is that some of the most relevant and worrying environmental problems of our time are global (climatic change, biodiversity loss). Therefore they affect all countries. They must be dealt with through some kind of environmental agreement.

Advanced economies have been following a very inconsistent and incoherent practice. They have been “exporting sustainability”. Old, non environment friendly technologies used in developing countries are creating negative spill over environmental effects precisely in developed countries: for example through excessive emissions of greenhouse gases, or by reducing the rich stock of biodiversity in developing countries and in this way depriving world future generations (including those of the today advanced countries) of many opportunities of food and health applications.

The idea of “interdependence” widely used by Pope John Paul II in his Encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis*, must be adjusted to the international environmental aspect of sustainable development. One of the reasons of the difficulty of the present projects of international environmental agreements is precisely that they are very narrow and too specifically focused on one environmental objective (reducing greenhouse emissions, maintaining biodiversity). There is an increasing demand to use international environmental agreements and the instruments available within these agreements in the direction of an international sustainable development.

Sustainable development not only of the advanced countries, but also of the developing countries must be part of the objectives of any international environmental agreement. This would help to reveal the mutual benefits for any participating country, a necessary condition for the agreement to be accepted and to remain stable; it would also widen the scope for resource transfers for the gaining to the losing countries so that eventually every participating country will turn out to get a net benefit. This will also be very useful in practically enforcing the agreement.

One example is the CDM mechanism within the Kyoto protocol for controlling global climate change. Through this mechanism advanced environmental technologies can be transferred from developed to developing countries to address the issue of their contribution to climatic change in harmony with sustainable development. It is a mechanism that constrains the transfer of financial means to a sustainable development utilization of these means.

A very important issue is that of avoiding a technological colonization of developing countries. These should be encouraged to develop a technological contribution to the solution of a global environmental problem according to their specific tradition. This aspect is very much stressed in the Convention on Biological Diversity that focuses on the need to avoid biopiracy and to encourage developing countries that own the genetic resources to participate in research by using the traditional knowledge of their populations, and to participate in the benefits of biotechnological innovations, both in terms of a participation in the returns from the innovation (allowed by intellectual property rights on it) and in terms of the use of the innovation itself for the necessities of their development.

International sustainable development poses a number of new challenges for adjusting the Social Doctrine of the Church. A lot has been done, as it is certified by the recent chapter ten of the Compendium of Social Doctrine of the Church, entirely devoted to the environmental safeguard. After all, most of the recent results of international conventions and conferences on sustainable development and on global environmental problems at the world level are in substantial agreement of the implications of the principles of the Catholic Social Tradition. However it cannot be denied that there are increasing difficulties in implementing international environmental agreements because of the reluctance of the individual governments, some of them so important that their absence risks to make the agreement unenforceable (see the case of Kyoto Protocol and Biodiversity Convention).

A more active role of the Social Doctrine of the Church in the field of international environmental cooperation would be extremely important; integration of a perspective of sustainable development into the way international environmental cooperation is being organized should be the main guideline of the Church's contribution. In doing this a lot of the traditional teaching of the Church on development and social justice should be recovered and adapted to the new global challenges.

The Social Doctrine of the Church should also be concerned with providing individual persons guidelines for contributing to sustainable development practices in their specific reality. These guidelines should touch individual and household motivations and lifestyles, but also the criteria that should inspire public policy in order to be consistent with the objective of a sustainable development not limited to the reality which is under the responsibility of the policy, but open to an international perspective of sustainable development.

Clarifying “The Common Good”

Margaret Atkins

Introduction

The term ‘common good’ can both benefit the clarity of moral and political analysis and do greater justice to experience; its use in Catholic Social Teaching has an enormous potential contribution to make to wider debate. However, it has been used with a wide variety of reference, and very often without explanation or definition. This risks depriving it of its explanatory power: if it is unclear in what sense a good is common, then it will be unclear, for example, why it should be in any individual’s interest to assist in promoting or protecting that good.

The ‘common good’ in Catholic Social Teaching

The nearest that the social encyclicals come to defining the common good is when in *GS* it is described as embracing ‘the sum of those conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve their own fulfilment in a relatively thorough and ready way’ (74, cf. *PT* 58). Earlier, *QA* had equated ‘the requirements of the common good’ with ‘the norm of social justice’ (110). *PP* appears to identify ‘the common good of all humanity’ with the ‘spiritual and human development of all’ (cf. *SRS* 10). *MM* 37 says that ‘governments should seek the economic good of all peoples’.

Other passages suggest specific elements that should be included within the common good: just distribution of wealth (*QA* 57), the work of traders, labourers and farmers (*RN* 27, *MM* 147), full employment (*MM* 79), ‘public order, peace and tranquillity’ (*QA* 74), ‘acknowledgement of the moral order’ (*PT* 85), ‘ethnic characteristics’ (*PT* 55), ‘personal rights and duties’ (*PT* 63), roads, water supply, public health and recreational facilities (*PT* 64), ‘material goods’ (*MM* 20), ‘the natural and human environments’ (*CA* 40), effective aid to underdeveloped nations (*MM* 80).

Often, the content of the common good is identified by contrasting it with its opposite, in particular with the interests of private individuals or sectors of society. Rulers should not favour particular groups, and, some texts add, precisely for this reason should be particularly concerned with the poor (e.g. *PT* 56).

The documents frequently refer to the common good in a vague or indirect way, saying what it embraces (*GS* 74) or involves (*CA* 47) or demands (*CG* 81) or requires (*MM* 37) or is connected with (*PT* 136), but not what it actually is. The cumulative effect is somewhat opaque. In particular, one might ask what exactly is *common* about the ‘common good’ and how it differs from the sum of the goods of individuals or groups (if that idea itself is coherent). For if it is no more than the sum of individual goods, it is not obvious that it is itself good for each of those individuals. What, if anything, do the various specific elements - spiritual and moral, social and juridical, or material - actually share, and how do they relate to one another, if they do?

A second concern: earlier documents, such as *Rerum Novarum*, seem to assume that the community which shares the good in question is the nation-state; later documents are clearly concerned with an international and even global sense of common good, but without ever explicitly integrating the earlier understanding with these.

We might also note a contrast with the emphases of the medieval debate. There the term *bonum commune* was normally reserved for God, for beatitude and for virtue. Material and organisational goods were seen as instrumental and usually included under *utilitas communis* (see M.S. Kempshall *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (OUP 1999)). The modern shift is partly for political and rhetorical reasons, but there is a danger that in sidelining what was once the fundamental usage, we may no longer be able to articulate the connections between other uses of the term.

The meanings of ‘common good’

I) For a good to be common, it must be shared by a *community*, which might range in scale from a pair of friends to all beings living and dead. Papal encyclicals tend to assume that the relevant community is either the nation-state or the global political community of human beings, but it is important not to forget the many different levels and variety of community through which we provide and enjoy shared goods. A key question should always be: are we trying to defend or promote this good at the right level? (For example, should the good of virtue be promoted nationally or by the small communities of family, school and workplace? Should the good of healthcare be provided nationally or locally? How do we cooperate to prevent the pollution and depletion of the oceans? Should the good of shared prayer be limited to the living?)

II) Within a given community, some goods are called common because they are *provided* in common.

A few goods can be acquired by individuals or small groups without cooperating with wider society, but most cannot. Of those that cannot, some are available to any of us but need to be cooperatively *protected*, because they are liable to be overused, saturated or damaged. These include material goods that are abundant or replenishable, such as rainwater or clean beaches; arguably they include moral goods such as an environment free from pornography. Others need to be cooperatively *produced*, adapted or channeled for our use, for example, theatrical performances or bridges or tertiary education.

We should distinguish the question of the common provision of goods from that of their common enjoyment. For example, where free milk is available to schoolchildren there is common provision of goods enjoyed by individuals; conversely, where a millionaire who turns his art collection into a public gathering there is private provision of a good enjoyed in common. Note, however, that the *protection* of goods cannot be a merely private exercise: it requires all members of the community to refrain from harming the good in question.

III) A good that is *enjoyed* in common might be described as common in at least the following cases:

A1a) When the good enjoyed by individuals is one and the same good, and this good can be enjoyed fully by each without affecting the degree to which it can be enjoyed by others (in other words, those who enjoy it are not in competition for access to it). Examples include the presence of God, the enjoyment of a musical performance, the understanding of a scientific explanation. These goods are spiritual, moral or intellectual, and might be termed *indivisible common goods*. In theory, and in some cases in practice, they might be enjoyed by an individual alone.

A1b) When the goods enjoyed by individuals are part of a whole such that the parts can be available (or in good condition) for the individuals to enjoy only if the whole is available (or in good condition). Examples include clean air, efficient systems of transport, public woodland. These goods are material, and might be termed *common resources*. In theory, and in some cases in practice, they might be enjoyed by an individual alone.

A2a) When the members of a community are seen as parts of a whole, and there are goods that belong to them by virtue of their being its parts. In other words, the good is constituted by the relationship among the members. Examples include friendship, being part of a football crowd, being subject to a just legal system. These goods are social and might be termed *relational common goods*. They cannot by their nature be enjoyed by an individual alone.

A2b) When the members of a community share in the benefit of another individual's having acquired a good. Examples include parents' enjoyment of their son's graduation, pride in the success of a local sports team, pleasure at the recovery from illness of a colleague at work, the protection from disease enjoyed by those who have healthy neighbours. These might be termed *overflowing goods*. They are not constituted by the relationship between members of a community, but they depend upon it. Again, they cannot by their nature be enjoyed by an individual alone.

B) When the community is thought of as something separate from (and usually greater than) the sum of its members, and as having a good that is characterisable independently of the individual goods of its members. These might be termed *goods of the community*. One might contrast B with A2 by contrasting two different reasons for being willing to die for one's country. Fred, who thinks that he would be better off dead than living under unjust rule, might be willing to risk his life for the sake of just government, thinking of it as an A2-type good: he can only share in this good if it is there for everyone. Joe may simply count the good of his country as a higher good than his own life, a B-type good, and be willing to die for it irrespective of his own good.

The common good can be distinguished from the sum of individual goods as follows. A-type common goods share the characteristic that the individual member possesses or has access to the common good as an individual if and only if all the other members of the community possess it or have access to it. Therefore an individual who wants that good by definition wants the common good, but may be indifferent to the sum of individual goods of fellow-members of society. Those who value B-type goods value them independently of their own and others' individual goods.

Some conclusions

(i) The common good understood as a whole, as it has been discussed in Catholic Social Teaching, comprises at least the following types of common goods: commonly provided, but privately enjoyed; indivisible (A1a); common resources (A1b); and relational (A2a). Identifying such goods (e.g. peace, a just legal system) *as* A-type common goods, rather than, say, rights, explains why they are also automatically goods for each individual.

(ii) In addition, the encyclicals sometimes imply that the good of the state, or even of the whole world, is a good of the community (B). It is crucial to make clear whether or not this claim is basic to this tradition of thought, because the reasons why it may persuade people (within or outside the Church) to want the common good are distinct from the reasons that might persuade them to want A-type common goods. Furthermore, the claim that the good of the community is *thereby* my good as a member of that community may be more plausible for some levels of community than for others.

(iii) Environmental resources such as clean air are common resources. These are often also goods that need to be communally *protected* rather than *provided*. For these reasons it is more illuminating to use the language of common goods rather than, say, of rights, to defend such resources, as it identifies more precisely why and how they matter to us, and how we need to protect them.

(iv) The most interesting, and neglected category may be that of overflowing goods (A2b). A dominant concern of Catholic Social Teaching has been to argue that it is in the true interests of the rich and powerful to protect the interests of the poor and weak. One of the most persuasive arguments for this might be that the general well-being of other members of my community indirectly benefits me. The possible reasons for this are manifold, including sympathy, a proper patriotism, personal security. (The response to the tsunami might provoke thought here.)

(v) My suspicion is that the different types of common good can be fully defended and plausibly interrelated only through a positive anthropology, and possibly theology, very close to that assumed by Catholic teaching. For example, if it is true that the rich would be no worse off a little poorer, then it is more plausible that a more equal distribution of wealth is in their real interest. Again, if the world has been created so as to satisfy our genuine needs if we live according to its laws it is more likely that we need not be in competition for basic goods. Finally, A2-type goods depend upon our relationships with one another; A1-type goods are often in practice enjoyed communally rather than individually. This is to be expected if it is the case that we are by nature social and relational beings.

It is important to be clear about the extent to which the concept of common good either depends on or implies a particular anthropology, or even theology.

Civil Society, Popular Political Culture, and the Church

Patrick Riordan SJ

Forty years after *Gaudium et spes* it is appropriate to review the way in which the Church understands its relationship to the world of politics. Recent developments within political philosophy have facilitated the emergence of new attitudes towards religion, replacing the antagonism rooted in the Enlightenment with an appreciation of religion's positive contributions to political order. In particular, the discussion of religion as an element of civil society seems to offer a positive account of religion, with which citizens of faith might be satisfied. A new concept of civil society is emerging. Much of the newness is driven by the experiences of people involved in non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which play an increasingly important role in national and international affairs. The new emphasis on civil society poses questions for traditional understandings of both politics and religion. I argue that while there are attractive possibilities arising from the interest in civil society, there are also serious disadvantages, and that John Rawls's analysis of public reason and political culture might be more useful.

The Problem: Religion and Politics

The relationship between religion and politics is complex, and cannot be comprehended with a simple intellectual tool. Attempts to do so have proved unsatisfactory. The liberal tradition of confining religion to the realm of the private while considering politics to be concerned with public matters has foundered on the refusal of religion to be excluded from public life.

An adequate conceptual accommodation must satisfy views from two perspectives. It must allow for an understanding of the role of religion from the perspective of the political community, and it must allow citizens of faith to understand their participation in the political community in a manner consistent with their self-understanding as members of the Church. They must be able to combine their theological self-understanding with their understanding of themselves as participants in the political community.

The relationship in the past has often been seen as one of mutual antagonism. Despite this history there has also been a process of learning and adjustment on both sides. In the case of the Catholic Church, *Gaudium et spes* represented a revision of the Church's understanding of its role in the world. While not abandoning its sense of mission to proclaim the gospel to all and to effect a sanctification of all of human life, the Church acknowledged that it could not and ought not rely on the power of the state to achieve its mission. Within political philosophy, on the other hand, there is evidence of a more positive view of the role of religion in the political culture, and of the contribution which the Church can make to sustaining the democratic polity. An example is an important late essay by John Rawls in which he acknowledges the development in the Catholic Church's attitude to politics.

The liberal maintains that the governing of human societies must be with the consent of the governed. For the liberal, theocracy must always be suspect, because of the fear that the will of God (as interpreted by the powers that be) will be **imposed** on those who do not accept it. This fear is warranted historically, and John Rawls, for instance, makes a great deal of the history of

religious persecution, and the turmoil caused by the wars of religion in Europe as the background to his political liberalism.

Liberal regimes are wary of religious fanatics achieving political power and imposing their view of the world and of social order on everyone, and take steps to prevent that happening. Given this subtle antagonism, what options do religiously committed people have in liberal democracies within pluralist societies when they wish to contribute (reasonably, not violently) to political and public affairs on the basis of their faith convictions?

On the face of it, submission to the liberal rules for participation in public life seems promising. The Christian can also enjoy the protection of the personal and civil liberties of speech, conscience, religion, association and movement which is provided for all citizens. The Christian can take advantage of the means of public communication and debate in order to make her case. The structures of representative government provide also the opportunities for lobbying and campaigning on relevant issues. But there is an abiding sense that one is on probation. The constant vigilance against religious domination at the heart of the liberal world-view provokes an apologetic attitude in the religiously motivated engaged citizen. Placed on the defensive, the believer is particularly reluctant to invoke religious convictions in public debate, for fear that the conclusions drawn will be rejected, without ever being seriously considered on their merits.

Civil Society

The revival of interest in the notion of civil society provides a new context for considering the place of the Church within the polity. Two major developments have precipitated the renewed interest in the topic of civil society. First, the process of the collapse of the Soviet block, and second, the process of globalisation. In the first of these processes, the notion of civil society has played a double role. Civil society is used to label and reflect on the agents of change nurtured by Church groups and dissidents and others such as the Solidarity trade union. At the same time, the difficulties experienced in the attempt to implement free markets and liberal democratic systems were accounted for as due to the lack of civil society. The absence of certain practices and habits among the population, the lack of a moral order in which expectations are sustained by social sanction, and the impoverished relationships and networks comprising social capital have revealed that the functioning of markets and democratic processes is not to be presupposed simply because the formal structures are in place. Hence the renewed attention paid to the old notion of civil society.

The second dynamic drawing attention to civil society is globalisation (economic, cultural, military, diplomatic). The worldwide impact of economic activity and markets reveals an absence of state, while at the same time a market based shared order emerges. There is a search for forms of global governance. In this context a third sector apart from multi-national corporations (MNCs) and state based bodies (such as the IMF) seems desirable, and is already functioning through international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). This is spoken of as global civil society.

Civil Society: From a Dyad to a Triad

The new contexts and discussions are generating a new notion of civil society, which differs considerably from the traditional understanding. Where traditionally civil society was one of a pair of concepts, it is now located in a triad. The traditional pairing was of civil society and the state. In early forms of its usage, civil society was used to identify society under government and law. This usage is found in Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke, for instance. Civil society is paired with the state, on which it depends for its existence.

The international dimension whereby global civil society is a counterbalancing power to that of economic forces is leading to a clarification whereby civil society is distinguished from the economy. In more recent usage, civil society is seen as one factor in a triad of factors, making one point of a triangle along with the state and the economy.

Civil Society: Filling a Vacuum?

The role of NGOs in many developing countries has grown and their importance in protecting the rights and interests of people, especially the poor has been considerable. Several of these are now so well established, that as international non governmental organizations (INGOs) they provide a great service where there is still a lack of international government. Amnesty International, the Red Cross (Red Crescent) and Greenpeace, are examples. The role of NGOs and INGOs, especially in relation to the interests of the developing world, is now so well established that organised civil society and global civil society are specified in these terms. All of these bring their efforts to bear so as to ensure that there are countervailing pressures balancing the power of states as well as the vested interests of business corporations who are effective in mobilizing their governments to represent them.

Where formerly, civil society was seen as paired with the institutions of government and law, and these were held in a dialectical tension with one another, the new model sees a triad of the state, the economy, and civil society. The dialectical tension of mutual dependence along with autonomy has been replaced by antagonism. Civil society is antagonistic towards the economic powers, and also towards the state insofar as it fails to distance itself critically from the interests of the market.

Religion in Civil Society

Far from the process of modernization making religion obsolete, there is now a new visibility of religion in the public space and in the issues demanding attention. So the Churches and religious bodies are spoken of as belonging to civil society, as the realm of socially organized activity and participation. This is the recent usage of civil society, which is one corner of a triangle. Among the valued contributions of civil society on this view is the creation and maintenance of social capital.

A new respect for the dimension of civil society is expressed from the perspectives of both politics and economics. The political culture appreciates the contribution of civil society in

facilitating the formation and education of citizens, the habituating of people, in the capacities to engage in argument and to accept conciliation in conflict.

The literature recognises the contribution of the Churches in particular societies in fostering the constituent elements of democratic culture. Religion is acknowledged to have contributed to the development of civil society in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in providing an institutional space, a wealth of symbols, metaphors and stories, an international dimension, and an intellectual heritage.

Disadvantages of Civil Society as Locus for Religion

If its self-understanding as a corporate citizen in a liberal democratic polity is primarily in terms of civil society in one corner of the triangle, the Church is likely to find itself restricted in definition and constrained when it comes to action. There are three principal strands of limitation: assumption of particularity of interest, confinement to an advocacy stance, and exclusion from politics and the market.

Among the organizations belonging to civil society are vested interest groups whose perspectives are not universal and general, but are particular and local. Accordingly, there is a danger that the Church, by association, can appear to represent particular and special interests. This would undermine its ability to proclaim its message which is universal and not restricted to any race, class, culture or aspect of human existence.

Because of its involvement in education, health care and the provision of supports for the poor, the Church and Church organizations have often engaged in advocacy on behalf of groups which have been neglected by the market or by governments. The danger is that its contributions to political culture and to public debate be seen exclusively as advocacy. While this is an appropriate and important role for the Church, it does not exhaust its mission, which requires of it to speak of the unrestricted common good of all humanity, and to challenge everyone, whether rich or poor, to revise their priorities.

Within the triad of state, market, and civil society, the identification of civil society as the proper social location for the Church brings with it the danger of being excluded from participation in the discourses about politics and the economy. The Church sees it as its mission to address its concerns appropriately to these aspects also of social and political existence, and the tradition of social teaching and comment has developed this strand. Its politically recognized entitlement to contribute to the public debate as a corporate citizen might be jeopardized by a too hasty relegation to civil society, thereby excluding the Church from consideration of the market or the state. Were it to accept a description of its role confining it to civil society, it would risk colluding in its own exclusion from a large part of political and economic life.

The Church seeks a positive understanding of its self-limitation as a corporate citizen within the liberal polity. But this requires that it be able also to remain consistent with its understanding of itself and its mission in a theological context. These limitations of the civil society category pose a problem for this requirement. The mission which has led Pope John Paul II to speak out against injustice, violence, oppression and poverty on his international visits and

which has inspired Bishops of many local churches to address questions of the economy, politics, peace and justice is not to be comprehended within the category of civil society alone. Of course, in these contributions to public discourse, the Church renounces any reliance on coercion or implementation of the power of the state, but seeks to convince solely through the strength of its message.

Rawls on Political Culture

An alternative to the notion of civil society for locating the church's self-description is provided by Rawls's discussion of public reason. Rawls has relied on it in his writings, and revisited the term in his last years. Rawls's basic concern throughout his career had been to find a way in which people could agree to regulate their common life despite their radical disagreements about what they would like to achieve in that common life. He introduced the notions of several reasonable comprehensive doctrines coexisting in a liberal, pluralist polity, each with its view of the good life and with notions of justice and truth. The polity is only possible, however, because each of the adherents of a comprehensive doctrine exercises restraint, not insisting on her view of the true and the good, but willing to accept the content of the overlapping consensus between the reasonable doctrines as a basis for regulating the common life. Each one will have her own reasons for seeing this content as true and good, based on her comprehensive doctrine. But the grounds for arguing in favour of this content with representatives of other reasonable comprehensive doctrines will not appeal to these reasons, but only to public reason

This two-tiered model seemed to require considerable restraint on the part of the religiously committed citizen. Only what could belong in the overlapping consensus might be part of the public discourse between a representative of a Christian world-view and a defender of liberal individualism.

However in his 1997 essay, Rawls presents a more elaborate model which reveals a more complex structure than the two-tiered one, echoing the distinction of private and public. His driving question is: 'Is it possible for citizens of faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society who endorse society's intrinsic political ideals and values and do not simply acquiesce in the balance of political and social forces?'

Now his model is more complex, comprising three different layers: (1) The background culture of civil society; (2) Public, political culture; (3) Public reason.

None of the three elements is simple. Rawls takes a 'wide' view of public, political culture, suggesting a narrow view is also possible. Into the public political culture, understood in the wide sense, it is permissible 'to introduce into political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious (secular), provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support'. This condition he terms the proviso. The value of having the content of reasonable comprehensive doctrines introduced into political discourse is that citizens will grow in mutual knowledge of their religious and nonreligious doctrines. Such knowledge Rawls thinks will

strengthen the capacity to find an overlapping consensus, since proposals must be acceptable to each citizen on the basis of her own comprehensive world-view.

The background culture is said to be the culture of civil society. This has available to it many forms of non-public reason and various media through which communication and information flow take place. Rawls endorses the need for as open and free a communication as possible in this background culture. But also within the public political culture he acknowledges that the Catholic tradition of reflection in terms of the common good and solidarity provides a possible political conception which might be presented to citizens of other traditions for consideration as part of the overlapping consensus. Here he cites authors such as Aquinas, Maritain, Finnis and Hollenbach.

The narrowness of the notion of public reason underlines also the importance of this recognition of the presence of religious comprehensive doctrines in the wide public political culture. Public reason narrowly conceived applies *ONLY* to discussions in the public political forum: ‘...the discourse of judges in their decisions, and especially of the judges of a supreme court; the discourse of public officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and finally, the discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers, especially in their public oratory, party platforms, / and political statements.’

Citizens of faith do not have to remain hidden, apologetic, or defensive. They can participate in the public discourse so long as they abide by the norms of argument as reasonable: ‘Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception of political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms.’

This three-tiered model seems more amenable to the Church’s own self description in post Vat. II documents and position papers than the civil society model as currently used.

Conclusion

The voices expressing appreciation of the contribution of the Church within civil society facilitate a new self-confidence of Catholics in the public life of liberal democratic polities. However, there is a hidden danger in accepting the allocated public role of the Church as belonging within civil society, if civil society is understood as distinguished from the political and the economic. The danger is of a restriction which would prevent the Church from fully exercising its appropriate mission. Granted the need to abide by a principle of restraint whenever engaging in public debate concerned with constraining the liberties of citizens, the Catholic Church would wish to have the kind of liberty which would allow it address relevant issues without restriction. Rawls’s later model of public reason, within broad political culture (public reason in the broad sense) against the background of the culture of civil society, is perhaps a better tool to allow for the Church’s continuing dialogue with politics and economics as well as having a role in advocacy.

Changing the Subject: *Gaudium et spes* and the Mystery of the Person

Gil Baile

Man's social nature makes it evident that the progress of the human person and the advance of society itself hinge on one another. (Gaudium et spes, 25)

The evil of our times consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person. This evil is even more of the metaphysical order than of the moral order. To this disintegration planned at times by atheistic ideologies we must oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of "recapitulation" of the inviolable mystery of the person. – Karl Wojtyła

The Fathers of the Second Vatican Council wrote glowingly of “a new age of human history,” one which seemed to presage “the perfection and further extension of culture.” In retrospect, such enthusiasms can be seen as insufficiently tempered by Christ’s forewarnings about the persistent perils the Church would face in history. The authors of *Gaudium et spes* nevertheless looked forward to “a more universal form of human culture, which better promotes and expresses the unity of the human race” and to “a mounting increase in the sense of autonomy as well as of responsibility,” insisting on the “paramount importance” of this autonomy for “the spiritual and moral maturity of the human race,” not hesitating to see these things as harbingers of “a new humanism.” These are, of course, the very tropes most conspicuously impregnated with the assumptions peculiar to late modernity, to the naïveté of which contemporary observers allude in their postmortems of modernity. The sobering developments subsequent to the Council were unforeseen, but those who inherit the important promise of the last Council can ill afford to ignore the ominous “signs of the time” and their attendant challenges.

Evidence of the sometimes naïve optimism of the Council fathers simply underscores the Council’s implicit call for what John Paul II has called “an adequate anthropology.” The formulation of such an anthropology, in fact, would be the best way for the Church of the twenty-first century to revive the hope for which the optimism of the 1960s was a poor substitute. However chastened that hope might necessarily be in today’s world, it is by no means a wan hope. On the contrary, there is warrant for even greater hopes than those the Council expressed, for the anthropological resources for assessing both the present predicament and its evangelical, apologetic, catechetical and sacramental promise are now available. With these resources at hand, it is our privilege and responsibility to awaken hopes more resilient than the optimistic arias now being drowned out by the cacophonous din of the engulfing crisis.

The dollop of worldly optimism that both surcharged the Council’s theological virtue of hope and diluted it obscured the fact that beneath the surface of historical and cultural changes that were attracting the council’s attention, the moral touchstone for conciliar solicitude – the person – was reeling from the accumulated consequences of a long-standing anthropological miscalculation about the nature of personhood. For many of the disturbing moral, political, cultural problems now looming are traceable to a growing incidence of what Henri de Lubac called the diminution of “ontological density,” a spiritual distress that Hans Urs von Balthasar characterized as the “loss of ontological moorings.” Even though Vatican II emphasized the centrality of the person in Catholic social teaching and its supreme importance for the Church’s

engagement with contemporary culture, the anthropological preparation for the defense of that position was presupposed rather than actually accomplished.

The symbiotic relationship between the human person and human society to which *Gaudium et spes* refers suggests that distresses in one of these spheres will be accompanied by distresses in the other, and that, whatever their short-term practical advantages, attempts to remedy distresses in one sphere which reinforce the distresses in the other exacerbate and prolong the crisis common to them both. Appeal to the Enlightenment era and modernist principle of “individual rights” is a case in point. As urgent as this appeal is in some cases, it rests upon the anthropological misconceptions that are at the heart of the larger crisis. “The notion of rights, which was launched into the world in 1789,” wrote Simone Weil, “has proved unable, because of its intrinsic inadequacy, to fulfill the role assigned to it.”

In my contribution to this conference, I will only indirectly be concerned with the conference’s objective – the fulfillment of the *Gaudium et spes* call for justice. Rather, I will raise questions about the ultimate *subject* of the Council’s solicitude – namely, the human person. I will argue that whatever efforts must be made in striving for the just treatment of the human person, the efficacy of these efforts will be greatly diminished in the short-term and likely nullified in the long-term if they inadvertently reinforce a conspicuously erroneous set of anthropological assumptions about the nature of the person. Further, I will try to show that the task of clarifying the true nature of the person falls to Catholic Christianity precisely because it has the resources to clarify it. These include: the Trinitarian insights of the Nicaean Council, the Christological formulas of Chalcedon, the Second Vatican Council’s invitation to harvest at last the anthropological ramifications of the earlier Councils, and the hermeneutical tools for performing this task now available thanks to the lifework of René Girard.

At the heart of Girard’s intellectual achievement is the anthropology of the Cross – his is a Paschal anthropology – and his legacy in this regard will be indispensable to the twenty-first century Church. But Girard’s insights into the mimetic structure of human subjectivity will be no less crucial in addressing a looming crisis within the Christian West: the spiritual, moral, psychological, and ontological crisis whose symptoms have been mounting for decades, but whose underlying dynamics have yet to be widely comprehended.

As the Fathers of Vatican II insisted, the mystery of the human person is the bedrock mystery and *Gaudium et spes* calls for fresh new assimilation of this mystery – one that is both anthropologically and Christologically coherent – in order to show the world that it is “only in the mystery of the Word made flesh that the mystery of man truly becomes clear,” and that Jesus Christ “reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling.”

If the ultimate object of the concern for justice is the human person, and if the individual as “self,” and as currently construed, is anthropologically untenable, then there awaits a preliminary task, namely, in the words of Karl Wojtyła, “a kind of ‘recapitulation’ of the inviolable mystery of the person.” To that end it is appropriate to look to the Christian origins of the concept of the person and to the genealogical declension of the concept that has led by twists and turns to the crisis of the postmodern self, the self which, fashioned according to Cartesian presuppositions which vastly inflated its capacity for social autonomy, is reeling from distresses

intrinsic to the anthropological fallacies upon which it was premised. No response to the political, cultural, and moral confusions of our time will succeed if it does not address this growing spiritual crisis.

The word “person” assumed its prominence in the vocabulary of Western culture only after Christian theologians, in speaking of the three Persons of the Trinity, gave the Latin word *persona* – via the Greek *hupostasis* and its corollary *prosopon* – a philosophical profundity never before associated with it. Patristic theologians forged a strikingly original understanding of human subjectivity. Even during the centuries when its broader anthropological ramifications lay dormant, their extraordinary achievement altered those cultures exposed to it. As Cardinal Christoph Schönborn expressed it, in these cultures “the particular individual, and the unique reality of this singular human being, moves to the center of interest.” Cardinal Schönborn:

This gradual growth in emphasis centered on the individual person is a profound process of transformation involving all cultural areas, changing the conception of the arts as well as of history. What triggered and motivated this process was without doubt the awareness, gained within the context of Judeo-Christian revelation, that each man is unique.

It is hardly a coincidence that the mystery of the person was discovered by those trying to understand the mystery of Christ – the mystery-of-the-person in-Person, a mystery largely lost on the key pioneers of modern psychology, as they grappled with the psychological symptoms of the anthropological blunder which their own theories perpetuated. Wedded to the reigning notion of autonomous individuality (for which the fathers of the Second Vatican Council showed too few misgivings), and convinced that biblical anthropology was intellectually passé, modern psychological theorists worked to alleviate the distresses of the modern self, mistakenly assuming the “self” to be a conceptually adequate tool for reckoning with these distresses.

The concept of the person, writes Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “grew in the first place out of the interplay between human thought and the data of Christian faith,” entering thereby into the intellectual history most especially of those cultures that fell under Christian influence. In bringing about this theological revolution, the theologians of the patristic age laid the groundwork for a revolution in human self-understanding which has languished for lack of adequate anthropological elaboration. It is surely the special responsibility and unique privilege of twenty-first century Christianity to undertake this elaboration. Facing this task and fulfilling its promise are essential to the completion of the work of the Second Vatican Council.

At the heart of Christianity, writes the theologian J. B. Metz, is a “revolutionary formation process for a new subjectivity,” a new subjectivity that it is especially important to understand today as the spiritually bereft post-modern self turns to increasingly desperate and despairing antics of self-redemption. Girard’s work now makes it possible for us to realize that what Karl Rahner said about non-biblical religions – namely that they are “christologies in search of a subject” – is true as well of the increasingly unstable late-modern self. While it is unquestionably true that the sacramental understanding of the person is born of Christian experience, rooted in Christian scripture, and fostered by the sacramental life of the Church, Girard’s insights into the mimetic nature of human subjectivity now make it possible for us to give an anthropologically intelligible defense of Tertullian’s second century intuition that “the soul is naturally Christian.”

The mystery of the person as embedded in Trinitarian and Christological thought was regarded as revelatory only of the Persons of the Trinity and of the unique person of Christ. Christ was, in the words of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, regarded “as the simply unique ontological exception, which must be treated as such.” The larger anthropological implications of the patristic revolution were therefore not explored. To put this issue in perspective, Cardinal Ratzinger redeploys a metaphor used in another context by Teilhard de Chardin: the discovery of radium. “How could one understand the new element?” Teilhard asks: “As an anomaly, an aberrant form of matter? ... As a curiosity or as the beginning for a new physics?” Teilhard argues that had radium been regarded as an aberration – as, so to speak, an “ontological exception” – modern physics would not have been discovered, and Cardinal Ratzinger makes an analogous point about the true construal of personhood as revealed by the person of Christ.

Christ is indeed in a category of one, but as the Council insisted, he reveals the “new subjectivity” to which Metz and others allude – the true form of personhood, precisely the anthropological template for lack of which the specious forms of selfhood were able to flourish. What is startlingly unique about Christian personhood is summed up in the words of Paul: “I live, now no longer I, but Christ lives in me” (Gal 2:20), even though it is at the same time the grace-awakened fulfillment of our natural human ordination as mimetic beings, creatures made in the image and likeness of the God of inter-Trinitarian relationality: perichoretic beings.

The longer paper will contain an abbreviated genealogy of the postmodern self and its besetting distresses, including reflections on the role played by Augustine (inadvertently), William of Ockham, Descartes, Rousseau, Freud and Nietzsche – the usual suspects – with mention (as below) of the postmodern effort to put the best face on the resulting crisis. The purpose of this exercise is not excoriation but exemplification: to show a persistent antipathy throughout the process toward evidence of the mimetic nature of human subjectivity, evidence which nevertheless grew irrefutable, and on which René Girard finally performed the long-awaited reconnaissance. Here, however, I will omit the genealogy and move to a summary of its conclusion. Whereas the modern self was adapted to and fostered by the majoritarian voluntarism of a democratic polity, the disaggregated and privatized postmodern self is adapted to and shaped by the consumptive voluntarism most congenial to the now all-encompassing market and ever at the mercy of the political and moral edicts that emanate from it.

The spiritual, psychological, and increasingly ontological predicament in which many – especially the young – are today living has been disturbingly captured by Kenneth Gergen and made all the more distressing by his effort to remain sanguine in the face of it. The lived experience of the postmodern self, Gergen seems happy to announce, is *multiphrenia*. He writes:

As one casts out to sea in the contemporary world, modernist moorings are slowly left behind. It becomes increasingly difficult to recall precisely to what core essence one must remain true. The ideal of authenticity frays about the edges; the meaning of sincerity slowly lapses into indeterminacy. And with this sea change, the guilt of self-violation also recedes. As the guilt and sense of superficiality recede from view, one is simultaneously readied for the emergence of a pastiche personality. The pastiche personality is a social chameleon, constantly borrowing bits and pieces of identity from whatever sources are available and constructing them as useful or desirable in a given situation.

Like so many postmodern apologists, Mr. Gergen – having diagnosed a self-dissolution that coincides with the loss of Christian sources of hope – must try as best he can to remain cheerful. “If one’s identity is properly managed, the rewards can be substantial,” he strains to assure his readers, “the devotion of one’s intimates, happy children, professional success, the achievement of community goals, personal popularity, and so on.” All this is possible, he imagines, if – and this is the big “if” – “if one avoids looking back to locate a true and enduring self, and simply acts to full potential in the moment at hand.” Avoiding this glance backward – the glance that might awaken that blissfully dormant “guilt of self-violation” and its accompanying “sense of superficiality” – is what another postmodern apologist, the indefatigable Norman O. Brown, calls “improvising a raft after shipwreck,” the shoring up of fragments against one’s ruin.

Professor Brown’s penchant for incomprehensible rhetorical flourishes notwithstanding, *Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis* is one of the strangest and most candid paeans to the postmodern spiritual catastrophe extant. He starts with a definition of psychological identification that might have been written by René Girard and adopted for use by the Church in the now urgent task of recovering a reinvigorated hagiographic catechesis. Psychological identity, Brown writes, is the “psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides.” But all he can do with this immensely fruitful insight is to turn it into just another rough beast slouching toward the local mall or web browser to be squandered. He writes:

“...It is by means of a series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified.” Trying to stay alive: it is always an emergency operation; “emergency after emergency of swift transformations.”

As *Gaudium et spes* insists, Christ “reveals man to himself,” but the postmodern self is lost in an ocean of mimetic stimulation vastly more mesmerizing than anything humans have ever known in the past, an incessant mimetic bombardment which erodes the subject’s psychological ballast and “ontological density.” This amounts to a spiritual invasion, against which the individual has little immunity. “From the one who has not, even what he seems to have will be taken away” (Luke 8:18). Many of the tools and procedures once thought most practicable for protecting the modern individual from political or economic injustice are based on presuppositions that can subtly function to separate the person from the ontological moorings on which his or her personhood ultimately depends.

“We are called,” writes Kenneth Schmitz, “to transmute the metal of self by a kind of spiritual alchemy into the gold of personhood,” and it has never been more true. “Can such a call to spiritual personhood be made today in such a way that it might be heard?” Schmitz asks. The answer is yes, and the way to make this call intelligible is to show how anthropologically sound – and how spiritually and psychologically gratifying – is the uniquely Christian understanding of the person: the one in whom an innate desire to imitate the God in whose image and likeness he or she was made has found a human exemplification – whether it be the ultimate exemplification – “the icon of God’s very being” (Heb. 1:3) – or one of the cloud of witnesses in whom Christ is seen, as it were, in silhouette: a saint. For the role of the saint in the life of the Church is to awaken in others the desire to live the Christ-like life that is the ultimate fulfillment of the human vocation as such. Thus the saint is, in the words of David Hart, “an opening upon or

interpretation of Christ,” and who, as such, draws “the gaze of the one who looks on into another radiance, another ambit of vision, a different aesthetic of being, in which one finds some measure of liberation from the self and its baser impulses...”

While she shares with other cultural institutions her commitment to political and economic justice, the Church’s sacramental obligations are uniquely her own. These obligations must never be subordinated, therefore, to more worldly responsibilities, however legitimate these may be. As urgent as it is to provide political protection and economic security to those suffering from injustice, and as practicable to this purpose as the vocabulary of autonomy and individual rights might be, the justice the Church seeks begins with the person rightly understood. The new humanity the Church has been commissioned to foster involves a new form of subjectivity, that which was fully enfolded in Christ and limned in the lives of the saints which the Church raises up as models of the Christ-likeness that fulfills the deepest longing of every human heart. The Church alone has the tools – ancient and recently acquired – for the recapitulation of the human person for which John Paul II called in his early writings. With these tools at her disposal, the Church can offer an account of the mystery of the person that is both anthropologically sound and Christologically grounded. There is hardly a more urgent task, nor one more faithful to the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, nor more worthy of the joy and hope with which *Gaudium et spes* is suffused.

Gaudium et spes: Atheism, Culture and Christian Faith Gregory J. Coulter

Gaudium et spes is an unusual document, for although the authors insist that it concerned with a “new stage in history”, the core pre-occupation of the entirety of *Gaudium et spes* focuses on a problem with ancient roots—the problem of the human condition. Is there a more timeless question than the meaning of human life? The only way to make sense of this is to try to understand that the human condition is plagued by new conditions that create an odd and deeply troubling paradox. Whereas modern humankind has produced remarkable changes, for example, changes in the scale and range of technological power, humans suffer more than ever from a loss of freedom, of political and social recognition and control over their lives. Rapid and mass communication that would seem to promise better understanding and greater unity among the world’s peoples seems instead to confuse and to divide humanity. Communication often fails to illumine and inform but instead propagandizes and promotes ideological divides. Unparalleled wealth and resources which would seem to offer the opportunity to end or reduce poverty, disease, hunger and homelessness instead seem only to increase the gap between the relative few who enjoy an abundance of wealth and power and those many who remain fixed in lives of suffering and despair. Even the advances in knowledge of the human person, of the human mind and body which hold so much promise for bettering the social and psychological circumstances of human life seem incapable of helping to discern the way to improve things. Why are not the advances so prevalent in the modern world not solving the problems for which they were designed? Why have they produced such drastic “imbalances”? (GS, 8)

The answer lies in part in the fact that these disturbing conditions are symptomatic of a more basic problem with modernity in that it “is modern in practical matters but whose theoretical system of thought...can neither master the sum total of its ideas, nor arrange them adequately into a synthesis.”(GS, 8) In essence it is not capable of answering fundamental questions such as: *What is this sense of sorrow, of evil, of death, which continues to exist despite so much progress?...What follows this earthly life?* (GS, 10) The ultimate realities of human existence, suffering and death, remain for many a mystery. No amount of power, pleasure or wealth, not even incessant consumption can distract us from the weight and horror of our own mortality or of what awaits after death. Advances in medicine and technology cannot protect us from suffering. They remove pain for a time, but this is little consolation for life’s sorrows. To try to remove suffering by hastening death is to be conquered by it rather than to overcome it. To think that modernity has addressed these ultimate questions is to deny that we are human. Those who do not recognize the profound and far reaching imbalances of the modern world suffer from spiritual blindness. The Council fathers talks some who, “infected with a practical materialism are blinded against any sharp insight into this kind of dramatic situation; or else, weighed down by unhappiness they are prevented from giving the matter any thought.”(GS 10)

The identification of these troubling phenomena drives the document into a thematic terrain, but it is in the second part of the document that the fathers turn to an examination of the *causes* of such ills. One is reminded of the Aristotelian notion that to understand something, even something practical or moral, one must know its causes—where one moves beyond mere description to understanding. One will remedy a problem only if one knows first its causes.

So, according to the Council fathers what are the causes responsible for the many modern “imbalances”? Here one can think of the various economic and social analyses that attempt to explain and remedy the problems of poverty and of underdevelopment in terms of material resources alone, that is, in terms of technology, food, health care and the like. Surely shortages of resources as well as sociological and political factors are partly responsible for the world’s current difficulties, so such an account must be included as part of a complete explanation. Some physical realities are products of causes beyond human control and are in the hands of nature. These too constitute a very real part of the causal situation in which we find ourselves. But these are only penultimate causes.

The explanation offered by the Council fathers relies on a more radical type of causality. Underlying the many social, economic, political and ideological ills of modernity there is a layer of intellectual and moral turmoil—both at the personal and communal level. We are advised to see the causes of the modern imbalances as rooted in something deeply personal—as symptomatic of a “more basic imbalance, which is rooted in the heart of man.” (GS, 10) What is responsible for the world’s injustices is a spiritual deformity: human sinfulness. It renders us “practically sightless”. (GS, 17) Sin also causes a weakness in the heart making it unwilling to submit to the guiding principles that promote authentic forms of freedom. As a consequence, “the modern world shows itself at once powerful and weak, capable of the noblest deeds or the foulest; before it lies the path to freedom or to slavery, to progress or retreat, to brotherhood or hatred.” (GS, 9)

The solution to the problems of modernity then, must come at the spiritual level. Not surprisingly, the Council fathers turn to a discussion of God as the source of illumination of the mind and of healing the heart. We can overcome our own inability to understand and act for genuine remedies only by relying on the Cause of all truth and goodness. It is against this background that the fathers claim that the absence or loss of religious faith, and most centrally atheism, are prime causes of our deep personal and social imbalances. In effect atheism closes off the full causal explanation of the many problems of modernity and also prevents us from finding effective solutions. If God is the only path, then atheism forms a block to human liberation. In summary then, one can see the Council fathers arguing in this way:

1. One can identify and remedy the many ills that plague modernity only if one correctly understands their ultimate causes and chooses the correct path to change them.
2. Yet it is possible to grasp these ultimate causes and achieve sufficient moral strength only by acknowledging one’s sinfulness and by receiving God’s grace, which illumines the mind and purifies the heart.
3. But atheism closes one off from grasping these truths or from receiving such graces.
4. Hence, atheism prevents one from seeing and remedying the many moral and intellectual ills that plague modernity.

Given this concern about ultimate causes one might ask, is there a cause of atheism? The Council fathers insist that, “atheism is not a spontaneous development but stems from a variety of causes” (GS, 19). What might these causes be? The fathers offer a startling and disturbing explanation. Although they acknowledge that the experience of suffering and death sometimes gives rise to atheism, they also note that a critical reaction against religious belief, and in some instances against the “Christian religion in particular” is also responsible for atheism. (GS, 19) This is perhaps one of the most significant and compelling insights of the entire document—the claim that although Christianity can offer a path out of the spiritual darkness of atheism, paradoxically it often causes the darkness and moral enslavement it claims to remedy. In this way some Christians become complicit in blocking the way to the source of spiritual strength needed for overcoming the many modern imbalances. In such cases, then, non-believers are not fully culpable for their non-belief and spiritual blindness. Instead, it is Christians who sometimes bear the guilt of provoking atheistic reactions either by promulgating false teachings about God, Christ and the Church—paradoxically here evangelization becomes a cause of atheism—or by their hypocrisy. In the words of the Council fathers, when Christians “deficient in their religious, moral or social life, they must be said to conceal rather than reveal the authentic face of God and religion.”(GS, 19)

By acknowledging some level of responsibility by Christians, the Council fathers refuse to co-operate, not even by their silence, with the evils for which the Church itself may have some responsibility. That they refuse to hide, rationalize or ignore the problems within the Catholic community is therefore itself a profound evangelical sign and it forms a key to the rest of the document. To our argument we might add;

5. But in some cases Christians cause atheism either by promulgating falsehoods about God and Christ or by repudiating the teachings of Christ in their actions.

6. Hence, in some cases Christians prevent some from seeing and remedying the many moral and intellectual ills that plague modernity.

The Council fathers do not develop an account of hypocrisy or its ill effects. Here we benefit from Cardinal Newman’s reflections on hypocrisy and how it fosters anti-religious sentiments. In his view it consists in a pre-occupation with worldly standards and fear of the world’s disapproval. He alleges that the Pharisees “shape their actions by the world’s rule rather than God’s will.” Christians are guilty of hypocrisy when they seek to conform to the world’s standards long before their “Christian principles have time to act”, and by prizing the virtues that the world applauds and ignoring those that it despises. Given this view, it is not surprising that Newman thought that hypocrisy is quite common. This is why Christ cautioned the apostles about being on their guard against it. There is a kind of self-deception that accompanies and contributes to hypocrisy that enables one to claim holiness while acting in vicious ways. Newman writes though, that the “...world sees through him, detects, and triumphs in detecting, his low motives and secular plans and artifices, while he is but faintly sensible of them himself, much less has a notion that others clearly see them.” Hypocrisy creates a leaven of evil that poisons the entire character. No wonder that it causes skepticism and unbelief in others.

The harms caused by an inauthentic and false religious faith can be seen to form the basis for the remainder of the encyclical. Having exposed atheism as a block to the way to knowing God, the ultimate cause and purpose of human existence, atheism can be overcome only by the re-evangelization or re-catechizing of Christians. Modernity has infected not only the secular order, but the Christian community as well. Given the two-fold nature of the cause of atheism, the remedy must also be two-fold. So, the fathers propose that the solution “is to be sought in a proper presentation of the Church's teaching as well as in the integral life of the Church and her members.” (GS, 21) The only corrective is a faith “purified and perfected by the power of Christ's cross and resurrection.” (GS, 37)

Seen in this light, the document is itself an instrument of the very re-evangelization of Christians called for by the Council fathers. The “remedy” consists in a teaching meant to overcome not only the non-belief of the atheist but also the distorted and culturally conditioned belief of the Christian. (GS, 21)

The Council fathers restrict themselves to the promulgation of “some of the more basic truths”(GS, 23). The first I will address is the claim that all humans are children of God, each equally imaging the divine—especially as this applies to women. All humans belong to one family in a universal brotherhood and sisterhood under God (GS, 24). This conclusion is based on the premise that all possess a rational soul and so are not only all in God's likeness, but are also “redeemed by Christ and share the same calling, destiny and equality” (GS, 29).

What falsehoods is this doctrine specifically designed to correct? In general, it is the error of thinking of some humans as somehow superior to others and thus deserving special rights and opportunities or of enjoying special regard from God. In this context, the fathers mention the injustices of discrimination based on “sex, race, color, social condition, language or religion”. These injustices are “to be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God's intent.” (GS, 29) They address the plight of women who have been denied various fundamental rights because of their gender, such as the right to choose a husband freely, to freely embrace a “state of life”, to an education and cultural benefits equal to men. (GS, 26) There are many terrible harms imposed on women—slavery, honor killings, prostitution and so on. It is also a harm to believe that women are inferior to men—that they are incapable of understanding as men can, or lack the moral capacity to act for authentic goods, as if they are moral children and so need to be controlled or managed by men. This is a grievous violation of these daughters of God. It may be what lurks behind many of the more egregious forms of injustice inflicted on women. This view has been used to deny women social or political recognition.

Are Christians guilty of such injustices against women? When the Council fathers insist that women must be able to freely choose a husband or state of life, they also condemn customs and attitudes which promote or tolerate the attempts by fathers, husbands, brothers, or even other women, who try to coerce women into specific vocations or forms of work or which bar them from education and other opportunities for personal development. Christians must sometimes bear responsibility when they think of women as lesser humans than men. Diminishing the importance of motherhood by regarding it as an impoverished and antiquated role for women, for example, is another significant way that women as such are violated. Surely they are when they use Scripture to defend the view that women are to be subservient to men in marriage and family

life, under the pretext that they suffer from natural deficiencies, either lacking in moral maturity or intellectual ability to share equally in spousal rights and parental authority. This is especially egregious when the falsehood is justified by some putative command of God. How can it be that all humans, as rational, are equal images of God, but that God chooses some to rule others on no other basis than gender? There are other ways as well, for example when the spiritual lives of women are regarded as inferior to that of priests and male religious. How does this not strike one as either a very serious confusion or hypocrisy? *Gaudium et spes* proclaimed a proper and true understanding of women, at least in its seminal form, when it insisted on the equal dignity of women and men, yet acknowledge the profound differences that exist between them—differences that do not cause an inequality, but different roles.

Another of the “basic teachings” corrects an instrumentalist view of humans. The Council fathers insist that there is simply no genuine advance of anyone or of any human culture, without the concrete and systematic pursuit of everyone’s betterment. No project, no system, no set of correctives can possibly work if they victimize any human. This view is contrasted with various forms of consequentialism, which propose the advancement of some part of humanity at the cost of the well-being of others. Dignity belongs to humans in virtue of their humanity, not in virtue of their wealth, power, social standing, race, gender or even religious convictions. Hence, all humans must have an equal share of rights under the law and in social or economic policies. More specifically, the Council fathers cite the duty to supply everything necessary for living a truly human life to those in need. We are obliged by negative precepts, which prohibit harms to humans such as euthanasia abortion, sterilization and genocide. But, in addition, there is also a duty of “solidarity” where we are obliged to perform act that might appear to involve supererogatory goodness, but are duties in justice. These include such acts as providing education, food, health care, and the means to found a family and to choose from among various states of life. (GS, 27) In this context, the Council fathers refer to the parable of Lazarus and the rich man. Not carrying out our duties to the poor still makes us blameworthy in a most serious way, even if our failure is through inattentiveness, even if there is no special maliciousness.

The Council fathers suggest that Christians are blameworthy of such transgressions in some interesting ways. In one way, it happens when Christians use Scripture, such as where Christ claims that the poor will be with us always, to avoid taking steps to address poverty and underdevelopment. Convinced of the transience of this life, some Christians rely on Christ’s words to do little for the poor and instead dedicate their moral energy to spiritual acts—of glorifying God, and direct their wealth to the construction of buildings and the making of art that creates “appropriate” places for God. The Council fathers denunciate this mentality, reminding Christians that they “...are mistaken who, knowing that we have here no abiding city but seek one which is to come, (13) think that they may therefore shirk their earthly responsibilities. For they are forgetting that by the faith itself they are more obliged than ever to measure up to these duties, each according to his proper vocation. (14)...The Christian who neglects his temporal duties, neglects his duties toward his neighbor and even God, and jeopardizes his eternal salvation.” (GS, 39)

We have a duty to work in the world and to subdue the earth not for material gain or power, but for justice and holiness. The world is a gift from God given to all brothers and sisters of Christ—even those whose religious convictions are different from ours. But all do not possess it. It is the duty of all, including the Catholic community, to embrace this work.

The Impact of *Gaudium et spes* on the Social Mission of the Church in Asia with Particular Reference to Catholic Studies and Workers Movements

Dr. Bernard D' Sami

The Catholic Church in Asia responded to the teachings of *Gaudium et spes* in a positive manner particularly the Catholic Action Movements such as the International Movement of the Catholic Students [IMCS] and the International Young Christian Workers [IYCW].

“**signs of the times**” Sixties were a turbulent period for Asia as the events in and outside Asia affected the movements such as the Vietnam war, the US supported right wing governments in Latin America, de-colonization process in Africa with much bloodshed, accepted validity of Marxism in the academic and intellectual circles, Paulo Freire’s cultural action for freedom and the conscientization method, the post Franco and Salazar reign. The other events that were taking place include the Prague spring and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the student and the worker uprisings of ‘May 1968’ in France and elsewhere; the massacre of students by the military in Tlateloico Plaza in Mexico city in October and the hardening of the military dictatorship in Brazil. The above were the “signs of the times” (# 4*Gaudium et spes*) in Asia to which the Student, Workers and Intellectual Movement of the Catholic Church responded. The primary reality of Asia during the 60’s was poverty and most of the countries were reeling under dictatorships such as Philippines where Ferdinand Marcos assumed power in 1965 heralding a undemocratic government for nearly 20years. In South Korea there was a military coup in 1961 and there was another coup in Indonesia in 1966 that replaced the democratically elected President Sukarno. Pakistan witnessed the seizing of power by a military General Ayub Khan in 1958. In 1969, the Cultural Revolution in Maoist China reached its climax; the Viet Cong and North Vietnam had stolen the initiative in the Vietnam War from the Americans and the South Vietnam following the Tet offensive of early 1968. India’s war with Pakistan that resulted in the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. A brutally suppressed youth insurgency took place in Sri Lanka giving rise to a Sinhala militant movement known as JVP. Repressive regimes were the order of the day in several countries. In short Asia was divided by colonialism, history and culture and ‘united’ in terms of poverty, injustice and foreign domination.

Vatican II and the Catholic student and Workers Movement.

During the Second Vatican Council, IMCS and ICMICA (Pax Romana) played a key role. Secretary General of Pax Romana Ramon Sugranyes de Franch was chosen as one of the 12 lay Auditors of the Council. A former IMCS chaplain a Jesuit Father John Courtney Murray assisted by former IMCS President Ed. Kirchner played a key role in the writing of the Declaration of Religious Freedom.

During the first session of the Vatican Council II, founder of the Young Christian Workers movement Fr. Cardijn participated as an auditor, then once he had become a bishop and Cardinal he became a full council member. Mr. Bartolo Perez, who was President of the IYCW at that time, also participated as a lay auditor, a position that enabled him to make contact with Bishops from many dioceses where the YCW existed and with a number of former YCW

chaplains who had become bishops. With Cardijn, they attempted to insert the principles of the YCW into the decree on the lay apostolate.

Response of the International Young Catholic Workers

The IYCW in Asia inspired by the outcome of the Vatican II in the form of *Gaudium et spes* started involving in several activities particularly highlighting the issues related to workers such as unemployment, temporary casual labour, apprentice system and the need for a trade union. Pioneering work in the trade union for the unorganized workers was started in many countries in Asia. Young catholic workers went through formation and exchange programmes. Many of them were involved in militant action for example the chaplain of the Vietnam YCW Fr. Phan Khac Tu who was imprisoned in 1972-73 in South Vietnam as a result of their support for workers and justice issues. The YCW organized workers in the factories, plantations, unemployed, sales people, teachers, tricycle drivers, domestic workers etc. The teachings of the *Gaudium et spes* that human labour is superior to other elements of economic life; economic activity detrimental to the workers is wrong and inhuman. [#67] workers should participate in running an enterprise [# 67] It was an on going struggle for the young worker to reconcile between 'truth of reality vs. truth of faith'. [Cardijn's principle]

Many YCW leaders (who were also workers) especially in the countries of India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Singapore were active in Trade Unions, which in the main were controlled by the Communist party or 'Socialist' political parties. This became an issue when conservative elements in these countries began to question and dispute the role of the YCW in Trade Unions. The position of the YCW was that it is not a trade union but it had the responsibility to encourage and support its workers leaders and the young workers to join and be active in Trade unions in order to enhance and improve working conditions. This position was not always understood nor accepted in 'Church' circles. Indeed even in the trade union movement this caused confusion and created difficulties and the majority of YCW worker leaders continued their involvement in Trade Unions. The sixties were a period of expansion and strengthening of YCW in Asia. This meant reaching out to different categories of workers. It also involved young workers of other faiths.

The YCW sought to organize young workers in various 'categories' such as factories and plantations as well as the unemployed. In many places the parish-based units/organizations were abandoned leading to conflicts over the movement's direction. It was also during this period (late sixties and seventies) the girls and boys YCW's in many countries merged together in mixed movements. The international dimension was sharpened by solidarity action and the first and widespread being action in favour of the imprisoned Vietnamese YCWers.

Response of the IMCS

The IMCS played a key role after the 1960's in organizing the University students. The *Gaudium et spes* had a great impact on the students, particularly the realization that 'option for the poor' is not a choice but a historical compulsion. The events that followed demonstrated the student activism against the undeclared war in the Vietnam, dictatorial governments in the Asian countries, National security laws and in general they condemned the human rights violations.

The titles of the Plenary Assemblies such as ‘The student movement as a creative agent of social change’ and ‘the students in the struggle for the Church of the poor in Asia’ are clear indication of the impact of Vatican II particularly the document *Gaudium et spes* on the students

The second Vatican Council confronted with these same realities and following up on many efforts by Christians involved in this long process, influenced the rapid development of IMCS, emphasizing the importance of “temporal involvement” of Christians in society. The most dynamic federations of IMCS seriously welcomed Christian responsibility in the socio-political field. This contributed to their presence in the life of the student movement, which was mostly concerned with the problems of inside the University, and afterwards by the overall situation of the society. Theological reflection carried out in the Church and in the movement influenced the form of involvement, which would go from a kind of “Christian Democracy” to the involvement of Christians in non-confessional socio-political action, respecting the autonomy of temporal or of the society.

The key question that was raised by students in the 1971 Inter-Federal Assembly was “Liberation how?” This question was a signal that IMCS was in the midst of a profound search that had been provoked by all these tensions in the milieu and in the society by all these changes in the church. The affirmed desire to “want to be present in the process of liberation”, which is to say, be present in the history of people, their struggles signified the deep questioning which the movement was doing in respect to its own reason for existence and for its own identity.

It was this movement, which introduced for the first time the ‘immersion programme’ [Exposure programme], any workshop of the Catholic students started with an exposure followed by an analysis, theological reflection, planning and evaluation. This methodology of IMCS has become almost a standard methodology for almost all the workshops today in Asia for the students. The seventies and eighties witnessed the movements another great contribution namely the social/structural analysis of the society. The tool used by the students became the tool for analyzing the society for the activists and civil society groups.

The Impact of Vatican II on the two Movements

The activities following the Vatican II in some countries by the worker and student movements made the governments of some of the Asian countries to look at the church with suspicion. In Singapore, the government arrested some of the lay leaders like Mr. Vincent Cheng under the internal security law; there were many others who underwent such difficulties in Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore. The office of the IMCS Asia Pacific was raided in Thailand and Fr. Pelegre, Chaplain/adviser to the movement had to flee.

Many of those students and workers from ‘middle class’ were victimized and arbitrarily detained by the Malaysian and Singaporean governments for posing a threat to the powers. A significant number of them were also church workers and committed Christians who were deemed “enemies of the State” under the draconian Internal Security Act (ISA) of these two countries.

There was a general pattern of repression of grassroots organizations and Christian social activists were emerging in Asia particularly in the ASEAN countries. First time student and worker activists were charged under the ISA and detained without a trial. The committed student and worker activists faced opposition not only from the government but also from the church. Very often the Church and the State viewed themselves as two separate entities.

The Catholic Action Movements have given enlightened laity to the Church in Asia. The movement was inspired by the *Gaudium et spes*. The Worker and student movement were greatly inspired by the social thought of the Church as observed by the document in the following words, “Joys and hopes, sorrows and anxieties” of the people of the world are the concerns of the people of God [# 1] The concrete outcome of the document and its impact can very well be seen to-day in Asia in terms of struggles against injustice in the form of human rights violations and the human rights movement in which many catholic laity have played and continue to play a key role.

***Gaudium et spes* - its Validity and its Implementation**
Contribution of the Conference of International Catholic Organisations
Ernest König

How can or should we respond to the signs of this, our time will be the focus of this contribution. The intention is not to cover the whole specter but rather to identify key-issues.

Gaudium et spes encompasses paramount principles which are as valid today as they have been forty years ago. To spread joy and hope:

- we all together in the church bear responsibility not only for ourselves but also for our world
- solidarity of the Church with the whole human family and
- we have the grace to draw our vigor, energy and confidence from the altar.

Herewith the church - that's we – signaled a promising breakthrough to the world. Meanwhile the world has changed dramatically; these changes have to be taken into account, the new problems have to be identified and consequences have to be made operational.

Many of these changes and challenges have been foreseen in the document *Gaudium et spes*, but not always in their speed, their density and their dimension, for instance related to threat, brutality and war.

Three **major changes** should be mentioned.

On top it is the technological explosion in literally all fields, especially in the domain of information- and data-processing respectively -transfer and bio-ethics with the assumed capability to “create life”; while philosophy and ethics leave the impression to be more or less stagnating or in a phase of being bewildered. It will be decisive whether this dynamic process will be based on a set of predominantly Christian values or on internal- , external- and world wide power projection, not answering the question whether this will be a action or a reaction.

The threat of a symmetric, even total war between blocks and the intentions to hedge wars generally has been superseded by asymmetric wars in societies, between ethnic groups, everywhere - also in societies with a relatively high standard of living - and with limited chances of control.

At the other hand an increased awareness for security can be identified especially in the just mentioned countries and regions, people may have to lose something!

Significant is the overwhelming predominance of profit, aggregation of power and influence as well as an inclination of “commercialization” of everything including common goods and human life from its origin till its end. The financial markets overrule the production of goods respectively services and both govern the value or worthlessness of labor which again is decisive for the destiny of individuals and families.

It is opposed by an increasingly spreading suspicion because of these developments and because of a tendency to codify rights, especially human rights in rather complex legal systems. But money and force are quite often decisive. In such a system responsibility of the conscience before a higher authority refers to non-pragmatic idealists.

The list of **challenges** would be numerous, but will be limited again to three. No ranking is intended, they are rather interlocked with the changes and with themselves.

For instance a less or more aggressive, sometimes irrational reaction against the so called neo-liberal way with its tendency to commercialize literarily all fields of life between birth and death, is obvious. This may not be the origin for radical fundamentalist movements, but is for sure a hotbed. It happens not only between different cultures but also within societies. Winners and losers are countries, regions and continents but mainly people. Also in “winning” regions you will find groups, human beings, on the loser side.

Additionally a change in attitude of individual people, groups and societies closely related to this “commercialization” must be observed quite frequently; to consume is marketed as happiness, a traditional family is a burden, the individual person is claimed to be in the centre. This leads to the next issue: A mental secularization is increasing. Life begins with birth, not earlier, and ends with the death, maybe pre-described and legally defined and nothing afterwards. Our ancestors’ life was maybe thirty years plus eternity, today we may have short ninety years, which have to be maximized in wellness, events, adventure and happiness, because this is all and definitely the end. Not surprisingly this way of thinking is a manmade product, often a result of marketing strategies, and does not match with the inner longing of the majority of people for something else - faith, religion? Also we Christians with few exceptions are inevitably influenced, even infected by this environment and common superimposed thinking.

Last but not least in consequence human beings may become objects of the system, in the world of economy as cheap labor at disposal. In a world of bio-ethics, directed by agnostic masters of life, who could decide over the beginning and end of life and in a digitized world of transparent human beings “of glass”, the circle to the world of economy and efficiency may be closed faster as expected, always being explained as progress for mankind.

Phenomena in world wide dimensions as unequal distribution of ample wealth or poverty, in consequence the desperate refuge in mega cities, accelerating other tendencies like terrorism, environmental damage, dissolution of the family or the manmade human person have to be evaluated in their interdependency. They should be evaluated in the context of changes and challenges in order to end up with feasible strategies, the aim of vivid symmetries and before all in a change of mentality. Awe before life demanded Albert Schweitzer, make human society more humane are well-known key phrases, but how should they be implemented?

It is a truism that decisions in the international frame, taken today, will shape the global society of tomorrow - without or with taking into account our Christian Catholic values. It is up to us. The **Conference of International Catholic Organisations (CICO)** is one potential force multiplier to promote Christian inputs in these processes. Founded almost eighty years ago in

Belgium it has developed to a global dimension. After the Vatican Council II, its Charter was based on the documents *Gaudium et spes* and *Christi fideles laici*.

Based on the strength of our believe the **aims** are to know and to learn from each other, co-ordinated presence in International Organisations and co-operation within and beyond this community in order to be heard and accepted.

The **method** includes deriving key issues in an analytical process, deciding together with all International Catholic Organizations (ICOs) on the most important ones which may change the world and starting projects including up to a dozen concerned ICOs in network-type groups, utilising their status in international bodies to be heard and recognised.

Key issues and ongoing main **projects** of today are:

“Economy and Solidarity” working on a common manifest as base for future actions,
Bio-Ethics – initiatives for Euthanasia are the issue,

“Family” used the UN Year of the Family plus 10 to position the Christian view in all four global conferences,

“Youth” is preparing a paper declaring the willingness to take responsibility for the world of tomorrow already today,

“Violence against Women” also in a Civil War environment sets initiatives and

“Education and Building Peace” is connected with the demand for an Ecumenical/ Inter religious Dialog; activities are foreseen in Sarajevo and in Jerusalem.

The **organisation**: The Conference embraces 40 ICOs from Boy-Scouts over farmers to teachers, women and Caritas or 12 youth-, 12 profession-, 6 education/ communication-, 4 female/male- and 8 functional organisations and could represent far beyond a Hundred Million faithful. More than 80 times they are accredited as advisors or consultants to international organisations. Besides some steering structures three International Catholic Competence Centres at the location of the UN in Paris, Geneva and New York and one Network are the bodies of the Conference. Regional networks exist in Asia, Latin America and to some extent also in Europe. It is a loose flat structure, a network of networks, depending on the willingness of its members - and a huge potential of our church in the world, ready to be used.

In **conclusion** it seems realistic that the Vatican Council II with its key documents was overdue forty years ago. The fundamental direction is still valid. *Ora et Labora* was the motto of Benedict in Medieval times. Today it is called spirituality and active solidarity in charity. It is the conviction to have the better answers, derived from the Sermon of the Mount and the Commandment focussing on love and governing all other Commandments, the result of thousands of years of human experience and the bridge to other religions - for a more humane society with the individual person in its centre understood as HIS image. Three hundred years ago Baruch Spinoza came to the conclusion that our religion is also a reasonable one, because it paves the path for viable solutions. The chance to contribute to a better world in case we have faith, dedication and initiative is realistic, also today and tomorrow.

Neither the consume-oriented, so called neo-liberal western way of life nor the different aggressive fundamentalist approaches can provide solutions. In a globalized environment they may become even more dangerous

Complete immersion at the one hand, a tendency to relativism respectively resignation of the Christian Community at the other would be the wrong answers.

But it has to be taken into account that technological changes, sometimes called progress, were less in the more than sixteen hundred years from the Council of Nicea till the Vatican Council II as compared to the forty years till today. In all probability this had and has an impact on this important document.

Therefore this Conference reflecting on *Gaudium et spes* might not only serve as a highly intellectual anniversary but could be a starting point for an evaluation triggering a promising process, regaining the momentum – but only together!

Gaudium et spes: A Council in Dialogue with the World
What is the Real Legacy of This Document?
Mathijs Lamberigts

INTRODUCTION

For many today, the Second Vatican Council is, in many senses, the beginning of the “decline” of Roman Catholicism in the northern hemisphere. They refer then to empty seminaries, people leaving the priesthood, decline of church attendance, decline of ecclesiastical marriages, etc. The pre-Vatican II period is described as a period of ecclesiastical, spiritual and theological prosperity, a period they want to return to. However, these people seem to forget that the Council aimed at an *aggiornamento*. In other words, the pope, when convoking the Council, already thought of the Roman Catholic Church as a Church in crisis. In this paper, I want to show that a topic such as the dialogue with the world was, at the time of the Second Vatican Council, not evident within the Roman Catholic Church. I will hold a plea in favour of a *reappreciation* of *Gaudium et spes* as a result of an *historical event*. It is only within the context of Vatican II as an event that one can really appreciate the intuitions of *Gaudium et spes* and thus its relevance for today.

POPE JOHN’S *AGGIORNAMENTO* AND THE *VOTA* OF THE BISHOPS

In order to prepare the coming council in an appropriate way, a large consultation was held, not on the basis of a carefully prepared questionnaire, but in the form of an open letter. From July 1959 to the Summer of 1960, more than 2000 answers were sent to Rome as an answer to the letter of Cardinal Tardini, who had asked for concrete items to be discussed⁶. The evaluation of the answers’ quality is point of discussion, mainly because of the criteria used. The evaluation by those who are supporting the Conciliar developments, is rather negative. But when one considers these *Vota* as expressions of that time, the judgement will be much more nuanced.

Although it is very difficult to find some line in these *Vota*, Etienne Fouilloux has attempted to do this. According to him, there are three main points of interest: the request for a better articulation of the role of the bishop; the desire to accelerate the process of liturgical renewal; the restoration of the permanent diaconate. Three main interests, three *ad intra-interests*. The reading of the signs of the time was not an hot item: the growing poverty in Latin America was not yet a point of concern for most of the bishops from Latin America. I do not think that the following *Vota* belong to the group of the spectacular signs of the bishops’ longing for renewal: more appreciation for the place of Josef in the Church, new titles for Mary, condemnation of protestantism, communism (since 1945, a real threat), existentialism, and situation ethics.

The study of the *Vota* (and much work still needs to be done) makes clear that, generally speaking *aggiornamento*, at least in the year ’60, was not yet very much developed. It also makes

⁶ These *Vota antepreparatoria* have been published by Msgr. V. Carbone in *ADA*. See his article *Genesi e criteri della pubblicazione degli atti del Concilio Vaticano II*, in *Lateranum* 44 (1978) 579-594.

clear that a visionary pope like John XXIII, a transition pope, was more aware of the problems the Church was, is, and shall be confronted with, than most of his bishops.

JOHN XXIII'S OPENING SPEECH AND THE FIRST ACT OF DESOBEDIENCE

Gaudium et spes is the result of a growing awareness of the bishops, present at the Council. The document is the result of a learning process. Its style is unique, when compared to documents from before the Council. It is written in an open style, taking into account that dialogue with the world requires openness and also taking into account the many problems the word is confronted with. One of the major concerns of the Fathers *during the Council* will be the reading of the signs of the times. The bishops will discover the challenges of a dialogue with the world. *Gaudium et spes* was not only intended for the Catholics, but was also directed at all people of good will. As such, the document is a continuation of what was already present in the encyclical *Pacem in terris*. In other words, in *Gaudium et spes*, John XXIII's basic intuitions will find a further elaboration, and that this happened, is not quite evident.

In his opening speech, *Gaudet Mater Ecclesia*, the pope reminded his listeners his primary motivation for summoning the Council: he desired that the attention it would generate be used to bear witness to the truth of the Gospel in the contemporary world. The pope's opening speech, delivered on October 11, 1962, made clear the framework within which he expected the Council to perform its duties. In the pope's view, *aggiornamento* meant moving beyond fear and distrust and openly and purposely embracing the contemporary world as the place the Church has to act. The pope made clear that instead of a defensive and condemnatory attitude, this gathering should be known, both inside and outside the church, for being genuinely open and for being ready, wherever necessary, to dialogue with the world⁷. The results of the elections for the Conciliar commissions, for many outsiders a surprise, were, partly, the result of Pope John's plea for openness. Many bishops and especially theologians, during the previous decades suspected because of their openness, now were encouraged to think of a Church of the future.

IV. TOWARDS GAUDIUM ET SPES

It is well known that a considerable amount of time passed before the Pastoral Constitution was approved on December 7, 1965. It took seven versions⁸. It must be repeated time and again, that *Gaudium et spes* has been the result of the Council as such. When Cardinal Suenens introduced the distinction *Ecclesia ad intra-Ecclesia ad extra*, the bishops were confronted with an enormous problem: while most of the about 70 schemata were dealing with the Church as such, only a few texts could be regarded as dealing with the relation between the Church and the world. Moreover, these few texts were written from a very catholic perspective, with the world still as *saeculum* with all its negative connotations. The idea of the Church as a

⁷ See A. RICCARDI, *The Tumultuous Opening Days of the Council*, in G. ALBERIGO & J.A. KOMONCHAK (eds.), *History of Vatican II. Volume II. The Formation of the Council's Identity. First Period and Intersession (October 1962-September 1963)*, Maryknoll-Leuven, 1997, pp. 14-18.

⁸ For a careful analysis, see, G. TURBANTI, *Un Concilio per il mondo moderno. La redazione della costituzione pastorale <<Gaudium et spes>> del Vaticano II* (Istituto per le scienze religiose – Bologna : Testi e ricerche di scienze religiose, N.S. 24), Bologna, 2000.

societas perfecta was still present and this perfect society was considered to be an autonomous society, a society in its own right.

This explains why the drafting of Schema XVII (later XIII) was such a painful exercise. In January of 1963, schema XVIII was the last on the list of the Central Commission's agenda. It had, at the time, no title! All attempts to give the schema a name, failed during the first intersession. In this regard, J. Grootaers rightly stated: "This uncertainty reflects how unready this vast project was, something that the opponents of this second preparation for Vatican II would not fail to criticize and on occasion exploit. No other conciliar text was so lacking in coherent preparatory work, and no other conciliar commission was so late in becoming aware of the extent of the connected problems."

At the end of the second session, a decision was taken by the Central Commission that a new text should be written, on the basis of a new consultation. In other words, the Council's presidency still did not have a clear idea about a Church in the world.

In further discussions about the text, some really thought that the work had to be completely redone from the beginning. *Others suggested that the schema on the Church in contemporary society was unworthy of an ecumenical council.* It is really interesting that some fathers requested a clear definition of what was meant by Church and world. Further, the fathers asked for a clarification about the purpose of the schema. They wanted to know to whom the schema was addressed.

During the debate about the schema as a whole, two issues were often discussed:

-how to describe in an appropriate way the relation between our vocation in this life and our eschatological calling (in traditional terms: how do the natural and the supernatural relate to one another)?

-the second important issue had to do with the tension between doctrine (Christian teaching; deductive approach) and the signs of the times (inductive approach). Advocates of the first approach underlined the role of the Magisterium, criticized the lack of theological foundation, stipulated that the laity had to obey the hierarchy, to mention only a few of their views. Those who promoted a reading of the signs of the times pleaded for a dialogue with the world, called this dialogue a necessity. Quite often, promoters of the reading of the signs of the times added that the schema needed a better integration of evangelical perspectives.

Given the fact that the topic was a new one for most of the bishops, it was quite evident that they insisted on further discussion and wider consultation. Indeed, the recognition of this need was one of the major reasons why a fourth session of the Council would be necessary. Topics brought forward during the debates were the need for a serious dialogue with scientists (with implicit and explicit references to Teilhard de Chardin and Galileo), for more poverty and simplicity in the Church as a prerequisite for a fruitful dialogue with the world, for a simplification of precepts (some bishops said it was ridiculous to teach that eternal damnation would follow eating meat on a Friday, as if this were as serious as adultery or murder), and for a preference for a loving Church over a legalist Church. Further, during the discussion on human dignity, topics such as poverty, race, origin, education, freedom, only to mention a few, were focussed on. Attention was paid to all kinds of racial and other forms of discrimination, or, to

quote O'Boyle (Washington), speaking in the name of the bishops of the United States, "racial discrimination is not just a social, cultural or political problem: above all it is a moral and religious problem of immense magnitude". Vehement criticism was formulated with regard to the position of women in the world and the Church. Within the context of the time, it is quite understandable that the bishops hoped that unmarried women might be in a position to enjoy all positions and ministries in civil society and in the Church.

It is fascinating to see that the Council needed a large debate on the concept culture in order to understand that culture could be used in many different ways. without saying that such optimistic approaches were counterbalanced by more pessimistic interventions, not necessarily formulated by conservative bishops. A large number of poor people cannot participate in cultural life, many educated people do not assume their responsibility in society, illiteracy and hunger are everywhere, basic education is not yet a right for all human beings, diversity of cultures does not necessary lead to respect for cultures in their diversity, there is an overemphasis on technical sciences in comparison to the moral sciences, etc.

It is evident, I think, that such debate was not a "normal" debate. But it was a debate with an effect: it would greatly influence the eventual outcome of *Gaudium et spes*. It was also a debate in which all the continents actively participated.

That a *Constitutio pastoralis de ecclesia in mundo huius temporis* was something new, is proven by the fact that a substantial footnote was needed in order to explain what it was. The constitution was termed "pastoral" because, while dependent on principles of doctrine, its aim is to express the relationship between the church and the world of today. The first part of the constitution is considered to be doctrinal but with attention to the pastoral aspect, the second part concentrates on several aspects of modern living and human society, and specifically on questions and problems which seemed particularly urgent. As a result, the second part comprises material (...) which contains both permanent and *transient* features. In other words, the bishops were well aware of the fact that this document, this reading of the signs of the time, was a contingent reading. Therefore, in its conclusion, the Patres explicitly stated in nr. 91: "Although (the document) expresses the received doctrine of the Church, yet, dealing as it often does with matters in a constant state of evolution, it must be pursued and expounded further." In other words, this document does not just need a "static" receipt but, according to the wish of the drafters, invites to a dynamic receipt, a receipt one can also characterize as action. In the same line, nr. 92 invites to establish a dialogue and the text underlines that the Catholic Church's invitation is directed to all, believers and non-believers, Christians and non-Christians. One can speak here of a shift from a Church versus world situation to a Church as part of the world situation: the Church is called upon "to work together without violence and deceit, and in true peace to build the world".

THE LEGACY OF *GAUDIUM ET SPES*

I am well aware of the many critiques, formulated after the Council with regard to this document. I only mention a few: the document's perception of society was not a balanced one. The text lacks a balanced view of human freedom and autonomy. The relation between the more doctrinal part one and the more pastoral part two is not really developed. In part two, the

coherence is rather weak because it treats specific items without respecting their inner relation (cf. marriage and family are also connected with culture, society, politics, peace, etc.). Some accused the text of “einer gewissen Fortschrittsseuphorie”, for the text “atmet somit den Geist seiner Entstehungszeit, der sechziger Jahre des vergangenen Jahrhunderts”. The text was mostly written from a Western perspective. Especially this last critique is a valid one: during the Council, a group of bishops and theologians, coming together in an unofficial workgroup, l’Eglise des pauvres, constantly paid attention to the drama of poverty, but, in the long run, did not really influence the Constitution. Later promoters such as Helder Camara were, at the time of the Council, auxiliary bishops, in his case in Rio de Janeiro. At the same time, and I consider this as part of an active reception, the Synod of 1985, would take up this item, explicitly stating that the Church must be at the service of the poor, the oppressed and those living at the margin of society. While this statement evidently proves a positive development of what was meant by *Gaudium et spes*, one must also admit, that for other items, such as sexuality, no space was left.

In any case, it is a pity that the distinction *Ecclesia ad intra-Ecclesia ad extra* could not be corrected during a fifth session. Important as the distinction was in order to “introduce” the Church into the world, that fifth session could have corrected it in light of a real commitment to the world.

At least the following points deserve to be collected under the item *Legacy*:

1. Following John XXIII’s intuition of openness to the world, *Gaudium et spes*, with all its limits with regard to its social and cultural analysis of the times to come, wanted to make clear that the Church has to *offer* a message to human beings who as free human beings deserve respect: “Eine Kirche, die sich so von den Menschen entfremdet hat, darf sich nicht wundern, wenn sich die Menschen ihrerseits von der Kirche entfremden”⁹.

2. All Catholics and especially theologians should read time and again the last paragraph of the first footnote of *Gaudium et spes*: “Interpretanda est igitur Constitutio iuxta normas generales theologicae interpretationis, et quidem ratione habita, praesertim in secunda eius parte, adiunctorum mutabilium cum quibus res de quibus agitur natura sua connectuntur.” A Church that wants to take the dialogue with the world seriously must take into account the naturally changing circumstances of the matters treated.

3. *Gaudium et spes* is the document par excellence where, in an open and inviting style, the Church’s leaders are willing (and wholeheartedly willing) to discuss all issues, whether they be of social, economical, historical or religious nature.

4. With *Gaudium et spes* the Council recognized the validity of the inductive method. With due respect to the Church’s doctrine, the Church, by its vocation, must listen to the needs and the hopes, the fears and the challenges of the world, not as a distant spectator but as a brotherly co-player.

5. With *Gaudium et spes* the Catholic Church explicitly recognized that the Church itself is characterized as provisional in its doctrine and action. If the Church honestly wants to be a Church in the world, it must accept that its own history is, like all history, provisional. The Church does not know the answer to all problems and

⁹ Cf. N. METTE, *Die pastorale Konstitution über die Kirche in der Welt von Heute Gaudium et Spes*, p. 280.

challenges, at least if it wants to be a Church at the service of humanity. In this regard, the text speaks of a duty of examining the signs of the times, an awareness and understanding of the world in which we live, together with its expectations, its desires and its frequently dramatic character (cf. nr. 4).

6. Much is written about the signs of the times. It might be helpful to relate this concept to the Encyclical *Pacem in terris*, where John XXIII, speaking of these signs, mentioned the following aspects: the economic and social emancipation of the workers, the emancipation of women, the just desire of colonies for their autonomy and right to self-determination, human rights, critique of the arms race.

To conclude, if people want to do justice to the intuitions of *Gaudium et spes*, they must read the document as a *starting point* for further development, as an *invitation to start* the dialogue with the world, more than as a document that can serve as a *doctrinal* basis for reflection on the dialogue with the world.

Reading the signs of the times and structures of sin

Mathias Nebel

Abstract

Introduction

The paper proposes a theological reading of the activity famously described by *Gaudium et spes* as “reading the signs of the times”. We will argue that such discernment is fundamentally *sharing in Christ’s* unique judgement over the *totality of history recapitulated in him*. Consequently, the discernment has to be understood as essentially and graciously shared by God with human beings. To discern would then mean to participate in and enter God’s judgement of history. It is, therefore, a discernment based on the victory of Christ over the “sin of the world”, a victory by which he is established Lord and Judge of History.

Theo-drama

The paper starts from Aristotle’s definition of “drama” as “ruptures within alliances”. Von Balthasar has extensively used the concept in the second part of his Trilogie, to uncover the dynamic dimension of redemption. The “Theo-drama” investigates the discrete, almost secret realization of the Kingdom, within human interactions and history. What forms this history into drama is sin; conceived as the anti-history of the Kingdom; as human failure and as destruction of the humanity of our world.

We will focus on the social dimension of the “Theo-drama”, that is, on the tensions and struggles existing between structures of sin and realization of the Kingdom. One of the most baffling characteristics of that struggle is that it is extremely visible and at the same time – oddly enough – quite difficult to perceive: the brutality of extreme poverty is matched only by the wall of indifference built around it; another example would be the social justifications fielded by the apartheid system to calm the conscience of the white minority. The challenge presented by structures of sin is that we have to discern and object which persistently manages to escape our perception (moral blindness; evil’s irrationality). The paper argues that such a discernment is indeed a judgement; to discern is to assess the part played by human interaction according to the Theodramatic.

Karl Jaspers

An interesting precedent of such a judgement can be found in Karl Jaspers’ essay on German responsibility after the Second World War. He makes a distinction between four different forms of responsibility: criminal, political, personal and metaphysical. The first three refer to the different forms our affiliation with an organised community can take. The last form refers to what constitutes the unity of humanity beyond any particular society. “Between human beings there exists, by the mere fact of their humanness, a solidarity by virtue of which each finds himself co-responsible for all injustice and all evil committed in the world (...) Somewhere, in the depth of human relationships, an absolute requirement turns out to be an imperative: in cases of criminal attack, or of living conditions threatening our physical integrity, the agreement that either all shall live or that none shall live at all.” (Die Schuldfrage, 47). Here, Karl Jaspers not only speaks here as a philosopher, he speaks out of his own experience under the Nazi regime (his wife was Jewish).

That duty of solidarity is constitutive of our humanity: “It makes up the very substance of the human soul” says Jaspers. It belongs, therefore, to the nature of human beings, in the sense of something given as the very condition of our life as men and women in the world. And that strange solidarity emerges as a requirement, a moral obligation: everywhere where that solidarity has been hurt, I have been hurt in what makes me human.

Although already given and expressed in our “living together”, such a requirement can be achieved only through human action. Solidarity is the horizon of meaning on to which human actions and interactions are projected. However, only God is able to assume and comply with the duty which dwells in the human relationships; hence, it is a metaphysical responsibility.

Solidarity and the living Christ

Indeed, the responsibility arising from such a requirement cannot be conceived independently of the mystery of the incarnated Logos. Dostoyevsky’s well known assertion - “I’m responsible for all, everywhere” - is unbearable unless you understand it in Christ. By assuming human nature, the Logos also leads it – in his person – to its full achievement (Rom. 5, 14). It is thus in Jesus of Nazareth, in that *particular individual* and through his *particular action* that the duty of solidarity dwelling in the human nature has been accomplished. Yet such an accomplishment passes through his free submission to the power of sin, his death and his resurrection. So the universalization of salvation requires the universalization of the transfigured humanity of Christ. Indeed, the duty of solidarity identified by Jaspers would crush the person had it not have been referred to its fulfilment by the incarnated Logos. Such a duty is thus proposed to human beings but is only achieved in Christ.

Eschaton and Judgment

The fulfilment of the duty of solidarity in Christ can not be separated from another aspect: namely that of Christ being established Lord and Master of History through the reconciliation of humanity with the Father in his person. Because all things have been recapitulated in him, He is the one by whom they will be judged.

Yet the judgement appears in the New Testament in two metaphors: 1) The presence of Christ in history, which forces upon us a choice and therefore a judgement, and 2) Through the image of an eschatological court of justice. By urging a choice, the presence of Christ in history introduces a *krisis*, and forces upon us a decision: to agree to or refuse the requirement of his love. Whereas the image of an eschatological court implies that there will be a judgement pronounced over History, where Christ is, simultaneously, the Judge and the criterion of the judgment. In fact, Christ takes the figure of fellow man so that our relationship to our fellow men becomes the criterion which will show our love of God (Mth 25). The ultimate meaning of History is thus revealed: each will be judged according to love, that is, according to the fulfilment of that duty of solidarity dwelling in human relationships. Nevertheless, it is a judgement pronounced over the totality of History, from the end of History, by the only One who has accomplished and fulfilled History. It belongs to God alone.

Participation in God’s judgment

How do we participate in that judgment? From the hidden growth of the Kingdom, the fulfilment of which remains invisible to men and women, we can not extrapolate anything onto

the final judgment. Still, the presence of the risen Christ in history allows us to have some share in that judgement over History. Indeed, the gift of the Holy Spirit to the community of believers allows such a sharing, in the form of a capacity to discern throughout our times what belongs to God and what does not belong to Him.

Traditionally, that discernment has been associated with 1) the nature of the Church: eschatological sign of salvation and judgment; and 2) the prophetic mission of every believer. Still, it is not enough to denounce, even prophetically. What we are looking for is a judgment of the fulfilment of humanity in the person of Christ within history. To judge is here irremediably linked to taking a stance, a position against or in favour of the reality we are judging. Discerning the signs of the times is to be committed and, in fact, committing oneself within the theo-drama. Discerning the signs is, therefore, inseparable from a commitment to justice and solidarity in our history.