

PERSON AND GIFT ACCORDING TO KAROL WOJTYLA

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Wojtyla's writings, both prior to and during his pontificate, provide us with an understanding of what he calls "The Law of the Gift," namely, that "Man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, can fully find himself only through a sincere gift of himself." In Section I of the paper I explain what it means that man is a creature "willed for itself." Then, I explain Wojtyla's justification of why it is that man "finds himself" only through a gift of himself, pointing to the Trinitarian dimension of his anthropology. Finally, in the third section, I attempt to explain what self-giving really involves on the human level, in particular, what it means to make a "sincere" gift of self. I argue that, according to Wojtyla, "sincerity" in the context of the Law amounts to respect of what he calls the Personalistic Norm. Furthermore, I address two possible inconsistencies in Wojtyla's account of self-giving, the first related to the idea of "fulfillment," and the second having to do with the "reciprocity" of self-giving.

Introduction

The writings of Karol Wojtyla are rife with allusions to what he calls "The Law of the Gift," namely, that "Man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, can fully find himself only through a sincere gift of himself."¹ He has stated that this Law is something "to which we must constantly return, from various points of view and in different contexts."² For, he thinks, it "presents a summary of the whole truth about man and woman."³

In this paper, I present an account of what the Law means according to Wojtyla. In Section I, I seek to explain the idea that man is a creature "willed for itself." Section II provides a justification of why the human person, who is "willed for itself," can only "find himself" through a gift of himself. There, I emphasize the Trinitarian element of Wojtyla's anthropology. Finally, in Section III, I attempt to explain what the gift of self really amounts to for human persons, paying special attention to the idea of "sincere" self-giving. I argue that the notion of "sincerity" expressed by the Law amounts to a respect of what Wojtyla, in *Love and Responsibility*, calls "The Personalistic Norm." "Insincere" giving, on the other hand, is giving that violates that Norm. Furthermore, I

address two possible inconsistencies in Wojtyla's account of self-giving, the first related to the idea of "fulfillment," and the second having to do with the "reciprocity" of self-giving.

I. "Willed For Itself:" Wojtyla's Personalistic Anthropology

What does it mean that man "is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself"? To understand this phrase, I examine, below, Wojtyla's account of personal dignity found in *The Theology of the Body*, which is a series of exegeses that employs, in Wojtyla's words, "the hermeneutics of the gift."⁴ Moreover, I will supplement this with the theory of self-determination found in Wojtyla's *The Acting Person* and related philosophical essays.⁵

In *The Theology of the Body*, Wojtyla describes the way in which man is set apart from other creatures in terms of "solitude." Referring to the second creation account of *Genesis*, he notes that man, prior to the creation of woman, is in "solitude." First, man is alone *numerically*: he is only one human being.⁶ Second, he is alone, Wojtyla observes, *as male*, since his physical design complements that of woman, who is not yet created. Man's solitude "as male," Wojtyla notes, "is based on masculinity and femininity."⁷ Now, man's "numerical" solitude and his solitude "as male" are overcome by the creation of woman and in his union with her.

However, man also possesses "human" solitude, that is, rationality, which is revealed by his ability to "till the earth" using his intellectual powers of foresight and deliberation.⁸ This type of solitude, Wojtyla notes, persists even in the union of man and woman. For each remain alone "as human," that is, apart from other beings as "individual substances of a *rational* nature," as beings possessing, through their essence, the spiritual faculties of intellect and will. Neither loses their human nature. We might say that man discovers that he is alone, in one sense, because of "what" he is.

The fourth type of solitude characteristic of man, and, again, one that is not lost in his union with woman, is what we might call "personal" solitude. Man discovers that he is alone, not only because he is a *part* of a species that is exalted above other species, but also because he is a *whole* being, so to speak. He is constituted in his own relationship to God, a relationship that is without intermediary and for which he alone is responsible.⁹ So, man is not only alone "as human," *qua* human being, but is alone "before God," *qua* person. We might say that, whereas man's "human" solitude points to his being set apart from other *animalia*, his "personal" solitude refers to the fact that he is set apart from other individual humans, by virtue of a unique interior life and transcendent vocation. Man discovers that he is alone because of "who" he is.

"Human" solitude corresponds to what Wojtyla, in one essay, has called a "cosmological" perspective on man; that is, it perceives him in terms of his specific definition, and so reduces him to the world. On the other hand, "personal" solitude

corresponds to a “personalistic” understanding of man, one which “pauses at the irreducible,” focussing on man’s subjectivity or lived experience.¹⁰

Yet another way of describing “human” and “personal” solitude is to say that the former refers to the human being seen “from the outside,” from a third-person point of view, whereas the latter focuses on him “from the inside,” from a first-person point of view. In his account of Wojtyla’s philosophical project, Peter Simpson notes that it explores “what it is like” to be a person; through phenomenology, Wojtyla attempts to access the person “from the inside, from the lived consciousness of the ‘I.’”¹¹

Lastly, we could describe “human” solitude and “personal” solitude as, respectively, the “objective” and “subjective” aspects of the human being—taking care to note that, here, “object” means that man is a concrete “somebody,” not “something.” Man’s being is objective but not to be objectified, that is, used as a means to an end.¹² That man is a “subject” means, among other things, that he is capable of interiority, of having an inner life which “revolves around truth and goodness.”¹³

However, though we have distinguished “human” solitude and “personal” solitude, there is a clear connection between them. Indeed, the latter depends upon the former. Wojtyla writes: “Man is alone. This means that he, through his own humanity, through *what* he is, is constituted at the same time in a unique, exclusive, unrepeatable relationship with God himself.”¹⁴ In another place, Wojtyla states that

the faculties that express and actualize the soul’s spirituality, and thus the human being’s spirituality, are reason and free will. They are also the principal means, so to speak, whereby the human *person* is actualized; based on their activity, the whole psychological and moral personality takes shape.¹⁵

So, an individual man’s rationality, which he holds in common with every human being, renders him, at the same time, separate and distinct from all other humans. For with rationality comes the power of consciousness, which, in its “reflexive” function, gives a person an intimate awareness of himself that attends all of his actions, both interior and exterior. In other words, due to consciousness, each human being is capable of having a *lived experience* of rationality.¹⁶ Thus, Wojtyla is in agreement with St. Thomas that self-consciousness, upon which subjective, interior experience depends, is itself “something derivative, a kind of fruit of the rational nature that subsists in the person... The person acts consciously because the person is rational.”¹⁷

Let us examine, however, the particular aspects of “personal” solitude as it arises from rationality, from “human” solitude. We have already noted that a characteristic of the person’s interior life is his *self-consciousness*. Due to his intellect, a human being is able to be aware, not only of exterior events and happenings, but of himself as acting and as being happened to. He has an experience of himself as an object, an “I.”

However, according to Wojtyla, *self-determination*, which has its source, not in the intellect, but in the will, is most proper to personhood. In *The Theology of the Body*, Wojtyla writes: “God-Yahweh gave [the] first man...the order that concerned all the trees that grew in the Garden of Eden, especially the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This adds to the features of man...the moment of choice and self-determination, that is, of free will. In this way, the image of man, *as a person endowed with a subjectivity of his own*, appears before us...”¹⁸ In another place, he states that “The will is so to say the final authority in ourselves, without whose participation no experience has full personal value or the gravity appropriate to the experiences of the human person.”¹⁹

In *The Acting Person*, Wojtyla arrives at the concept of self-determination through a phenomenological description of action. In that description, Wojtyla notes that action is characterized by the experience of “efficacy.” Efficacy refers to the awareness of oneself as the cause of some outer change, as well as the cause of a simultaneous *inner* change; that is, every action that proceeds from the self also, in a sense, returns to the self, by solidifying some disposition, reinforcing a habit.²⁰ Through action, one not only changes the world, but also changes himself, he either fulfills himself or experiences a lack of fulfillment, that is, he becomes either a virtuous or a vicious person, morally perfected or morally imperfect.²¹

Thus, from this description of efficacy, Wojtyla infers that the person is self-determining, both in the sense that his *self* determines this or that, and in the sense that, in action, his self *is determined*. The experience of self-determination, then, provides a radical awareness of one’s responsibility for his actions. For, in that experience, the person is not merely being “happened to,” not merely reacting to internal impulses or external stimuli, but acting from himself. Peter Simpson writes, “There is something inviolable about both you and me in [the experience of self-determination]. I can try to persuade you to choose this rather than that, but I cannot perform your act of choice for you; nor can you perform my act of choice for me.”²² It is because a person is self-determining that he is an “end in himself.” As we shall see in Section III, it is respect for a person’s self-determination that limits and guides self-giving.

For Wojtyla, then, the idea that man is willed “for itself” means that he is “alone” as a person, an end in himself. Man, by virtue of his consciousness (and so, ultimately, by virtue of his rationality) possesses a unique, irreducible interior life, including, most importantly, the experience of self-determination.

II. “Finding Oneself” Through a “Gift of Self:” Wojtyla’s Trinitarian Anthropology

We have seen that, according to Wojtyla, the most important characteristic of personhood is self-determination, that “structure” whereby a person acts freely, and, in so doing, fulfills himself. However, the Law clearly states that it is the action of *self-giving* that, most of all, brings a person fulfillment. Likewise, Wojtyla himself writes, “a personal gift of this nature does not impoverish but enriches the giver. Personal development takes

place through the disinterested gift of self...”²³ In another place, he states, “Neither [self-possession nor self-governance]...implies being closed in on oneself. On the contrary, both self-possession and self-governance imply a special disposition to make a ‘gift of oneself...’”²⁴

What reasoning leads Wojtyla to his claim that self-giving is the natural *telos* of self-possession, its supreme goal? Why is it that man, who is “*for himself*,” should be fulfilled only in being “for another”?

If we consider Wojtyla’s anthropology more closely, looking to its theological as well as its philosophical aspect, we see that what we have explained in the previous section as personal “solitude,” is, according to Wojtyla, the *imago dei*. For Wojtyla considers the image of God to consist, not *only* in rationality, but also, and perhaps *primarily*, in *personhood*. It is not man’s “human” solitude that manifests the image of God most fully, but his “personal” solitude. Again, the first type of solitude depends upon the second, however, in Wojtyla’s thought, there is a definite emphasis on the first. Although rationality and personhood are always found together--only rational beings are persons, and so every person is rational--Wojtyla tends to focus on personhood as the fullest manifestation of the *imago dei*.²⁵ Thus, he states, “To say that man is created in the image and likeness of God means that man is called to exist ‘for’ others, to become a gift.”²⁶

However, if we understand the *imago dei* to consist primarily in personhood, the idea that the most fulfilling activity for a human being is self-giving follows easily. For the Persons of the Trinity are engaged eternally in the act of self-giving, and that activity, paradoxically, is the source of subsistence and incommunicability for each. The divine nature is communicated among those Persons and shared equally by them, but that act of communication secures the Persons in their opposed distinctions: thus, the Holy Spirit is “spirated,” the Son “begotten.” As St. Thomas writes, “‘divine Person’ signifies *relation as something subsisting*.”²⁷ Unlike Aristotle’s Prime Mover, which is locked in solitary contemplation of itself, the Christian God, through His contemplation of Himself, begets another Person, and in turn, the love of the Father for His Begotten is hypostasized. We might say that, in general, God’s activity is not only “for himself” but “towards another” or “for another.” The divine persons “find themselves,” albeit eternally, through an act of self-giving.

Thus, if we think of “personal” solitude as that which manifests the image of God most fully, it follows that personhood for human beings is oriented, as it is for the divine Persons, towards self-giving. It is in recognizing that Wojtyla’s anthropology is theological, in particular, that it is *Trinitarian*, that we see how self-giving is the highest activity that persons, both divine and human, could accomplish. Thus, in *Sources of Renewal*, Wojtyla expounds upon the Law by stating that “Man’s resemblance to God finds its basis, as it were, in the mystery of the most holy Trinity. Man resembles God not only because of the spiritual nature of his immortal soul [i.e., his solitude “as human”] but also by reason of his social nature, if by this we understand the fact that he ‘cannot fully realize himself except in an act of pure self-giving.’”²⁸

Above, we have explained the importance of the Trinitarian element in Wojtyla's anthropology. However, we should also note its profoundly *Christological* aspect. Christ, Wojtyla points out, elevates human nature to its highest perfection, and so exemplifies in what the task of personal existence consists, on the human level. By giving himself for the salvation of humanity, Christ shows that, indeed, the image of God in human beings is manifested most fully in self-giving. In a way, he verifies the idea that the image of God in man is Trinitarian: "Christ himself suggests to us this resemblance, or metaphysical analogy...between God as Person and community...on the one hand and, on the other, man as a person and his vocation towards the community 'in truth and charity'—a community founded on the right to realize himself through self-giving."²⁹

However, what exactly does it mean for human persons to give themselves? Certainly, human persons cannot give themselves as completely and transparently as the divine Persons; relation is not the very principle of our individuation but only an accidental feature. We are to give ourselves, but this gift *is not* our very being as persons. In other words, since self-giving in human persons is only an analogue of the self-giving of the Trinity, we must discern in a somewhat different manner what it means for embodied persons to give themselves: what, in the concrete, the gift of self consists in.

III. "Sincere" Self-Giving: The Personalistic Norm

In the previous section, we attempted to explain Wojtyla's justification of the Law by drawing on his Trinitarian anthropology. This led us to the conclusion that self-determination, indeed the entire interior life of the person, is ultimately oriented towards self-giving, that freedom is "completed" in transcendence toward the other. Now, we must seek out the implications of the Law for human life--literally, for personal life in the concrete.

In order to see what the gift of self really is, it will profit us to consider, first, what it is *not*. Wojtyla observes that the gift of self cannot achieve what is metaphysically impossible: to give oneself cannot mean that one's own personhood, his subsistent being, is communicated to another. For this would amount to a communication of the incommunicable, which is an obvious contradiction. I cannot "have" or receive another person in this way, as I receive warmth from a flame or knowledge from an instructor. Persons are metaphysically "un-shareable." In Aristotelian terms, we could say that no primary substance inheres in or is predicable of anything else. We may say that "Socrates is warm" or "Socrates is knowledgeable," but not "Socrates is Callias." I cannot *be* you in the deepest metaphysical sense.³⁰

But what, then, is the gift of self? Recall that the Law has two parts. The first part expresses the human person's dignity as an end in himself, an intrinsic good. It tells us about the *kind* of being he is and his mode of existence: "Man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself..." We discussed the details of this clause in Section I. However, the second half of the Law does not regard the act of existence itself, but the *moral* order. It says something about man's actions: he "can fully find himself only

through a sincere gift of himself.” Self-giving, it seems, must be accomplished in the sphere of “second” act.

Moreover, the “gift of self,” which is accomplished in the realm of action, must be a gift “in truth and charity.”³¹ It must, as the Law states, be a “sincere” gift of self. That is, it must not only be metaphysically feasible but also *morally good*. In what follows, I will argue that, according to Wojtyla, the “sincerity” or moral goodness of self-giving consists in respect for what he calls the “Personalistic Norm,” namely, that “The person is a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love.”³² To give the gift of self “sincerely” is to give with an attitude of love.

Obviously, it is imperative for us to understand what “love” means in the context of the Norm. In *Love and Responsibility*, where we find the clearest exposition of the Norm, Wojtyla states that love is the opposite of “use.” Indeed, perhaps the main concern of that work is to distinguish these two attitudes. Thus, Wojtyla writes that the Norm “in its negative aspect, states that the person is the kind of good which does not admit of *use* and cannot be treated as an object of use and as such the means to an end.”³³ Elsewhere, he states, “Anyone who treats a person as the means to an end does violence to the very essence of the other, to what constitutes its natural right.”³⁴

Positively speaking, love amounts to a respect for personal dignity. In particular, it is characterized by respect for the self-determination of persons, whether one’s own self-determination or that of another: “For a person is a thinking subject, capable of making decisions: these, most notably, we find in the inner self of a person. This being so, each person is capable of determining his or her aims.”³⁵ Elsewhere, Wojtyla states that “the incommunicable, the *inalienable*, in a person is intrinsic to that person’s inner self, to the power of self-determination, free will. *No one else can want for me*. No one can substitute his act of will for mine.”³⁶ To give a “sincere” gift of self, then, one must uphold and preserve his self-determination, the most dignified aspect of his personhood. As Wojtyla notes, self-giving “can have its full value only when it involves and is the work of the will.”³⁷

In fact, Wojtyla argues that the act of will necessary for love is “goodwill” (*benevolentia*). Goodwill, he explains, is a pure longing for the good of the other.³⁸ It could also be described as “disinterest,” that is, focussing upon the other without care for one’s own satisfaction.³⁹ Wojtyla also explains goodwill as a “transcendence” of the ego: in *Centessimus Annus*, he writes that the gift “is made possible by the human person’s essential ‘capacity for transcendence’... a man is alienated if he refuses to transcend himself and to live the experience of self-giving.”⁴⁰

Moreover, love requires *mutual* goodwill, what Wojtyla calls “reciprocity.” Reciprocity refers to the naturally interpersonal, communal nature of love, the fact that it is accomplished jointly, by two or more persons. Thus, he writes that love “makes for unification through the reciprocal gift of self,”⁴¹ and that “Love in its objective aspect is always an interpersonal fact, is reciprocity...”⁴² It is because of reciprocity that love forms a *communio* (*communio*) between and among persons. Thus, Wojtyla states that

the Church “possesses the nature of a communion in which, by means of *mutual* services... ‘that sincere giving of himself’ takes place in which man can fully discover his true self.”⁴³

However, reciprocity requires the commitment of each person’s will to a good external to both. That is, each loves the other *through* commitment to a *common good*. In this way, the freedom of each person to obey his conscience is preserved: each person’s love for the other is also an experience of self-determination.⁴⁴ Thus, commenting on *Love and Responsibility*, Buttiglione writes, “love implies the freedom of the other and turns toward his good, through the discovery of an agreement or even identity between *the other’s good* and *one’s own good*...both are involved in a movement toward a common objective good.”⁴⁵

In the case of any Christian relationship, whether a Christian marriage, family, political association, or the Church as a whole, the “common good” would be (very generally) reverence for Christ. Here, I am extrapolating from what Wojtyla observes concerning the common good of marriage. Regarding the question of “submission” in *Ephesians* 5:21-33, he writes: “Here it is a question of a relationship of a double dimension or degree: reciprocal and communitarian. One clarifies and characterizes the other. The mutual relations of husband and wife should flow from their common relationship with Christ.”⁴⁶

Furthermore, since love is by its very nature reciprocal, it also requires that a person welcome the other *as* a person, in Wojtyla’s words, that he “accept” the other.⁴⁷ Thus, characterizing self-giving as a “skill” or virtue, Wojtya observes that it is also a skill of receiving: “*he who knows how to receive also knows how to give.*”⁴⁸ The “*communio*” of love, then, refers to “*a mode of being and acting in mutual relation to one another...such that through this being and acting [persons] mutually confirm and affirm one another as persons.*”⁴⁹

To this point, we have attempted to explain what it means to give the gift of self “sincerely.” We have argued that, according to Wojtyla, “sincerity” in the context of the Law amounts to a respect of the Personalistic Norm; that is, to give the gift of self sincerely is to give with an attitude of love. Love, in turn, involves the *will*. Essential to love, in fact, is *goodwill*, desiring the good of the other for his own sake. However, love is also by its nature *reciprocal* or mutual; therefore, one who truly loves also respects the dignity of the other as well as his own dignity, that is, he *accepts* the other. In order for the gift of self to be morally good, it must meet all of the above conditions.

However, we should look more carefully at the notion of goodwill in Wojtyla’s account of love. Evidently, by arguing that goodwill is essential to love, Wojtyla proposes a kind of *altruism*. Indeed, in *Love and Responsibility* he describes “love as goodwill” as altruism, stating that altruism is “a concern for the true good of the person.”⁵⁰ For him, love, and so self-giving, essentially involves a desire for the other’s good. In suggesting an altruistic ethical principle, as opposed to a kind of egotism, Wojtyla, characteristically,

integrates a modern dichotomy into his fundamentally Aristotelian-Thomistic vision of reality.

However, what *kind* of altruism does Wojtyla really suggest? Should we interpret the notion of “love” found in the Personalistic Norm as a call to be *perfectly* disinterested, without any investment in one’s self at all? That is, should we understand “love” (and so self-giving) to involve a complete denial of the ego? I believe that such an interpretation of the Norm would be faulty, for the idea that one should deny one’s own desires and wants altogether is incoherent. Here, I will mention only a few obvious difficulties it presents. First, one espousing altruism or enjoining others to do so is concerned with their own (and others’) moral improvement; and so, their motivation for acting is not entirely selfless. On an even more basic level, any action satisfies some desire on the part of the self to so act; one acts to satisfy the self, to quell that desire. Evidently, the Norm cannot be interpreted as commanding *absolute* altruism.⁵¹

However, more plausibly, could the Norm be interpreted as enjoining a kind of “Kantian” altruism? Kant identifies moral goodness simply with a good will, that is, a will that acts out of respect for the moral law. On Kant’s view, action is *most* praiseworthy when it opposes self-interested inclinations, is done purely for the sake of duty.⁵² Kant states, “the universal wish of every rational being must be...to be wholly free from [inclinations].”⁵³ So, Kantian ethics is altruistic in the sense that it excludes ego-directed desires as legitimate ethical motivations.

The Norm, indeed, bears a certain likeness to the second formulation of Kant’s Categorical “Imperative,” which states, “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.”⁵⁴ Nonetheless, Wojtyla is critical of the anthropology underlying Kantian moral theory. For Kant, what constitutes personhood is not the “phenomenal” man of everyday experience, but autonomous reason alone. Thus, in a strictly *a priori* fashion, Kant appeals to the notion of universalizability to support the Imperative.⁵⁵ Wojtyla, on the other hand, uses phenomenology as a means of arriving at his Norm. This method, he thinks, since it is open to the whole of “lived experience,” provides the most adequate account personhood and morality, an account which includes the positive aspects of embodiment.⁵⁶

Thus, Wojtyla’s conception of love, while it involves the will *primarily*, also involves faculties connected more or less closely to the body. In fact, we might say that Wojtyla’s notion of love is “analogous.” While directed towards one, primary notion of love, which involves the will, it is also found in more primitive forms related to appetite and emotion.⁵⁷ In fact, in *Love and Responsibility* Wojtyla distinguishes various types of love, corresponding to these two faculties. For example, love as “sensuality” is desire for the sexual attributes of a person.⁵⁸ On the other hand, love as “sentiment” and love as “sympathy” have their source in emotion, the former being an emotional response to a person of the opposite sex, and the latter being a kind of participation in the emotion of another.⁵⁹ Wojtyla also points to a kind of love he calls simply “desire.” This type of love perceives the other as a means of satisfying one’s own wishes. It is distinct from

“sensuality,” since the other is seen as a *person* and as an intrinsic good. However, desire sees the other as a good “*for me*.”⁶⁰

Now, all these various types of “love,” Wojtyla thinks, are not to be *eliminated* from moral life altogether, but properly ordered, *harmonized* with goodwill. Thus, in contrast with a Kantian interpretation of the gift, which would not involve anything *but* the will, Wojtyla offers an account of self-giving characterized by what we might call “soft” altruism.⁶¹ He states,

Clearly, if we are to speak of choosing a person, the value of the person must itself be the primary reason for choice. Primary reason does not mean *sole* reason. A formulation in which it seemed to mean this would not satisfy the criteria of healthy empiricism, and would bear the imprint of an apriorism reminiscent of Kant’s formalistic personalism.⁶²

Wojtyla’s “soft” altruism encourages an integration of pure goodwill with other types of love that do not involve the will. Thus, regarding “sensuality,” Wojtyla writes, “Love...the essence of which is expressed by the act of affirming the person for its own sake, does not preclude the combination of this affirmation with a desire for the profoundest possible union [i.e., physical union] with the person thus affirmed.”⁶³ Likewise, regarding “sentiment” and “sympathy,” he states, “It would be absurd to want love to be ‘free of emotion,’ as the Stoics and Kant did.”⁶⁴ As for “desire,” one must only “see to it that desire does not dominate, does not overwhelm all else that love comprises,” for “if desire is predominant it can deform love between man and woman and rob them both of it.”⁶⁵

That the Norm proposes only a “soft” altruism resolves an apparent difficulty in Wojtyla’s account of self-giving: for the objection might arise that desiring “fulfillment” through self-giving violates the Norm. That is, desiring to be a virtuous, fully actualized person, through self-giving, seems to evidence egoism.

Thus, in *Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness*,⁶⁶ Jean-Luc Marion suggests that the pure phenomenon of giving must involve total “forgetfulness” on the part of the recipient, and, ideally, on the part of the giver. That is, the recipient should not be aware that a gift has been given, and the giver should not seek recognition of his gift. If the giver cannot “forget,” he has only feigned transcendence, has not truly dislocated himself from the gravity of his own ego. Marion describes the effect of giving with such an attitude:

In exchange for my unrecognized gift, I receive—from myself?—*the certain consciousness of my generosity*. In losing it [i.e., the gift], I give my gift to myself, or rather, I get myself in exchange for my lost gift. The loss becomes the gain *par excellence*—the best possible outcome, since I in fact win infinitely more than I lost: myself over and against a gift that is worth far less than me.⁶⁷

However, as we noted above in our critique of “absolute” altruism, anyone attempting to achieve moral goodness will *desire* such goodness; this desire will motivate them, to some extent, in all of their actions regarding other persons. Indeed, achieving moral goodness is what it means to “find” oneself (a point also noted above, in Section II). Wojtyla, I think, would suggest that the issue is only one of properly *integrating* the desire for fulfillment with love of the other for his own sake. Though the one who gives himself will, to some degree, expect fulfillment from his gift, he need not be focused *primarily* on the virtue he gains through giving, he need not be occupied, so to speak, by “love as desire.” So, it is an “un-integrated” desire for fulfillment that is, I think, the object of Marion’s criticism in *Being Given*. Understood in this way, Marion’s critique does not pose a threat to Wojtyla’s account of self-giving.⁶⁸

However, a second objection faces Wojtyla’s account, as presented above. Whereas the first objection regarded the apparent incompatibility of altruism and the desire for fulfillment, this objection regards the apparent incompatibility of altruism and “reciprocal” self-giving. For, *prima facie*, it seems as if the desire for a *returned* gift of self cancels out the benevolence associated with giving. Isn’t the desire for reciprocity inherently utilitarian, since the giver, in a way, “uses” the other in desiring a returned gift? Does it not transform giving into a kind of contractual bargaining, an “economy”?

I believe that Wojtyla anticipates this objection in *Love and Responsibility*. There, he argues that love is *by its very nature* something “between” persons; it is something objective, in addition to its existing *in* each subject of love. Thus, love between persons is, in a way, the subject of its own activity: it is said that “we’ will X.” Wojtyla states, “The structure of Love is that of an interpersonal communion.”⁶⁹ As the love between the Father and the Son is hypostasized, so is the love between human persons, in its own limited way, a “third thing.” As we noted at the beginning of this Section, Wojtyla suggests that love is irreducible to two distinct individuals. But it is reciprocity, a mutuality of self-giving, that makes the communion of love possible. Thus, reciprocity, far from contradicting love, provides a necessary foundation for it.

All that the giver expects from the other, then, in giving with an attitude of love, is the other’s willingness to be a “co-creator” of that love.⁷⁰ He views the other, not as a thing to be used, but as a person capable of committing his will to a common good. In other words, to seek “requited” love is merely to seek *love*; it is the desire for a returned gift, not as something “for me,” but primarily as something “for love.” The giver’s expectation that his gift will be reciprocated is not based on a contract that guarantees his *right* to a return. Rather, it arises from love itself, an awareness of the necessary conditions of *communio*.⁷¹ Thus, if there is any egoism in seeking a response from the other, it is a *trivial* egoism, something found in any relationship of love. As Wojtyla explains,

The desire for reciprocity does not cancel out the disinterested character of love. Indeed, requited love can be thoroughly disinterested, although that element in the love between man and woman which we call love as desire

finds its full satisfaction in it. Reciprocity brings with it a synthesis, as it were, of love as desire and love as goodwill.⁷²

With this correct interpretation of Wojtyła's account of self-giving in mind, we should turn to a consideration of how self-giving could be interpreted so as to *violate* the Personalistic Norm. Recall that the opposite of love, according to Wojtyła, is *use*. Thus, if in giving the gift of self, a person is treated as a means to an end, his dignity is violated at the deepest level.⁷³ In general, the gift of self is not "sincere" when one allows himself to be used. Nor is there a "sincere" gift of self when one uses *another*; in such a case, one does not give, but rather "takes."

It seems that self-giving takes on a utilitarian attitude, and so violates the Norm, when it isolates one or more aspects of "love" from love "as goodwill," thereby disrespecting the personhood of both giver and receiver. In every such case, some kind of "false" or inauthentic reciprocity inevitably arises, what Wojtyła calls a "harmonization of egos."⁷⁴ For, since 'the 'skill' of self-giving is also a skill of receiving,' the "vice" of self-giving is also a "vice" of receiving. When goodwill is absent, the other is not truly "accepted," desired as a co-creator of love, but is viewed as a "thing."

For instance, there is a false kind of self-giving that results from an isolation of love "as desire." Desire treats the other as an object of "use" in the broad sense, as a good "for me." We offered an example of this attitude above, namely, the one who gives only or primarily for the sake of his own fulfillment. Wojtyła observes that, where a person gives *only* for his (the giver's) selfish desires, he does not seek a response to love but merely an "appeasement of desire,"⁷⁵ and so objectifies the other. Here, the "vice" of self-giving is evident because the giver does not treat himself or the other as a "co-creator" of love. He does not give with a commitment of his will, and disregards the other's capacity for such commitment. In this case, as in any case where goodwill lacks supremacy, there is only a "false" reciprocity. Such a relationship ultimately reduces to two egoisms: nothing is held "in common."⁷⁶

Or, the attitude of the giver could be characterized only (or primarily) by "love as sensuality." Sensuality "in itself has a 'consumer orientation'—it is directed primarily and immediately towards a 'body:' it touches the person only indirectly, and tends to avoid direct contact."⁷⁷ So, a person is not giving himself to the other in the most profound sense when he is *merely* offering himself as something to be used for gratification. "Giving oneself" only physically transgresses a person's dignity since one is not giving himself through his will, and so is allowing himself to be used. Likewise, when one "receives" another in this way, the other is not truly accepted.⁷⁸

Nor, Wojtyła states, should the gift of self be reduced to an *emotional* experience of self-giving, a psychological sense of surrender. Such giving amounts to love "as sentiment" or "love as sympathy." Mutuality of feeling, Wojtyła observes, is achieved only with difficulty, and so psychological "giving" would likely amount to a unilateral surrender, the domination of one person, who "feels" surrender intensely, by another who does not experience surrender as poignantly.⁷⁹ At any rate, "giving oneself" only emotionally does

not express the full dignity of the giver, since the gift in this case does not pass through the sanctuary of the person: his power of self-determination or free will. Nor is it likely to respect the other—to “accept” him fully, since emotion tends to distort the truth about personal dignity.⁸⁰

Now, the characteristics of love mentioned in our discussion so far (viz., goodwill and acceptance) are the *minimal* conditions of love. That is, for self-giving simply to “respect” the norm, the giver’s attitude must conform to those conditions. However, the Norm is something to be *achieved*, not merely respected: one must *aspire* to the Norm. For Wojtyla, the object of this aspiration—“love” in its fullest sense—is a commitment of wills that he calls “betrothed” love. In addition to goodwill, reciprocity, and acceptance, which qualities characterize any authentic relationship of love,⁸¹ betrothed love involves an *unconditional* commitment of the will to another *chosen* person.⁸² It is that in which love, and so self-giving, finds its highest expression. Thus, Wojtyla states that other forms of love, such as “desire” and “goodwill,” are “ways in which one person goes out towards another, but none of them can take him as far in his quest for the good of the other as does betrothed love.”⁸³

Now, the ultimate experience of betrothed love, for the human person, is found in the beatific vision, his union with God after the death of the body. There, each person gives himself completely to God, and receives the gift of God’s self.⁸⁴ Only then, Wojtyla emphasizes, will the desire to be given to another and to receive another, in the sense of a mutual and permanent commitment of the will, really be satisfied: “In this union the objective development of the human person reaches its highest point.”⁸⁵

In this life, however, the religious vocation approximates as closely as possible the mutual self-giving of beatitude: “Spiritual virginity, the self-giving of a human person wedded to God Himself, expressly anticipates [the] eternal union with God and points the way towards it.”⁸⁶ The person vowed to a celibate life may make, as it were, an “easier transition” from earthly life to beatitude, since, even now, he seeks with all his powers the One to Whom he will ultimately be joined, in Whom he will find his supreme happiness.⁸⁷

Marriage also goes some way in fulfilling man’s need for self-giving, that is, for betrothed love, albeit “only on the terrestrial and temporal scale” and in a way especially appropriate to embodied beings.⁸⁸ Married persons commit themselves to each other, in a love that is exclusive and unconditional, for the duration of their earthly lives. Neither spouse must reserve any aspect of him or herself, or fail to accept the other wholly: physically, spiritually, and emotionally. Also unique to the marriage vocation is the experience of procreation, which, in its own way, reveals the truth of the Law. Parents see “that human life is a gift received in order then to be given as a gift.”⁸⁹

Conclusions

In this paper, I have attempted to unravel the apparent paradox of the “Law of the Gift” by recourse to the writings of Karol Wojtyla. We have seen that, for Wojtyla, human

beings are made in the image of God primarily because they are persons oriented towards community; the end of their “personal” solitude, that to which interior life aspires, is self-giving love, the good of another. Indeed, self-giving must aspire to what Wojtyla calls “betrothed” love.

Thus, though the idea of self-determination or free will being ultimately for the sake of *another* might seem contradictory, Wojtyla thinks that self-giving is the ultimate manifestation of the *imago dei*. In fact, the apparent contradiction of the Law, Wojtyla suggests, is based on a disintegrated view of freedom, a view that places freedom *over* love. Freedom, he emphasizes, exists *for the sake of* love; if freedom is deprived of this *telos*, “it becomes a negative thing and gives human beings a feeling of emptiness and unfulfillment.” Indeed, “man longs for love more than for freedom—freedom is the means and love the end.”⁹⁰ Elsewhere, Wojtyla explains that “Love consists of a commitment which limits one’s freedom—it is a giving of the self, and *to give oneself means just that: to limit one’s freedom on behalf of another.*”⁹¹

And so, when we accept limitations, accept a narrowing of choices available to us, for the sake of another, our freedom is indeed diminished. That is, we no longer have as many alternative possibilities available to us. However, in a more profound sense, freedom is enriched, since it is elevated and transformed by love.⁹² Therefore, though the freedom of “having choices” (“doing whatever I want”) is limited when one gives himself to another, the will itself is actualized, perfected; a positive, richer kind of freedom is gained. This is authentic freedom, freedom at the service of love.⁹³

Notes

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- ¹ The “Law” is found in paragraph 24 of the conciliar document *Gaudium et spes*. See *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, ed. Thomas Shannon et al. (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2000), p. 180.
- ² Karol Wojtyla, *Sources of Renewal* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 224.
- ³ *TB*, p. 451.
- ⁴ See *The Theology of the Body* (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1997) p. 58 (hereafter “*TB*”).
- ⁵ In what follows, I will refer to the following works of Wojtyla, in addition to *The Theology of the Body: The Acting Person* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), *Love and Responsibility* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1993), and several essays from *Person and Community*, ed. Theresa Sandok. Hereafter I will abbreviate these works, respectively, as “*AP*,” “*LR*,” and “*PC*.”
- ⁶ *TB*, p. 37.
- ⁷ *TB*, p. 43. Wojtyla notes that man and woman represent two complementary “ways of being a body.”
- ⁸ *TB*, pp. 39-40.
- ⁹ See *TB*, p. 38. Cf. p. 273, where Wojtyla states that in the “duality” of the man-woman union each person is “‘alone’ before God, with God.”
- ¹⁰ See his essay “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being,” in *Person and Community*, esp. pp. 213-215.
- ¹¹ From his essay, “What It’s Like to Be a Christian,” *First Things* (June/July 2004), pp. 26 and 27. See also his book *On Karol Wojtyla* (Wadsworth, 2001).
- ¹² See *LR*, p. 21.
- ¹³ *LR*, pp. 22 and 23. In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyla distinguishes between several senses of “object.” A person is an “object,” or has objective being, because he is a concrete, embodied entity (not merely a hypostasized consciousness or “thinking substance”). However, what is used, taken as a means to an end, is also called an “object.” This latter sense of “object,” however, is synonymous with “thing,” and so does not describe the human being (see pp. 21-24). Wojtyla also uses the term “subject” in various senses. He considers the human person to be a “subject” in the sense of a metaphysical subject or *hypostasis* (in this sense, an individual tree or horse would also be a “subject”). However, he also understands the person as a “subject” in the modern sense, as a being unique because of its spiritual, “inner self.” In this sense, only rational beings are “subjects.” “Subjectivism,” on the other hand, is not concerned with the true good, but with what *seems* good based on emotion or the desire for pleasure (see, eg., *LR*, pp. 153-158).
- ¹⁴ *TB*, p. 38, my emphasis.
- ¹⁵ “Thomistic Personalism,” p. 168, my emphasis. Likewise, in *Love and Responsibility*, he states, “Man differs from all other creatures of the visible world in that his reason is capable of understanding...Reason is at the same time the foundation of personality, the necessary condition of the ‘interiority’ and spirituality of the being and life of a person” (p. 223).
- ¹⁶ “St. Thomas gives us an excellent view of the objective existence and activity of the person, but it would be difficult to speak in his view of the lived experiences of the person” (“Thomistic Personalism,” from *PC*, p. 171). In *The Acting Person*, Wojtyla writes that “to *experience* one’s self as the subject of one’s own acts and experiences” is due to the reflexive function of consciousness (p. 44), whereas merely *cognizing* oneself, having “self-knowledge,” is due to the “reflective” function of consciousness (cf. pp. 35-41).
- ¹⁷ “Thomistic Personalism,” from *PC*, p. 170. Thus, Wojtyla’s view of personal existence or the self is to be distinguished from any theory of personhood that identifies the person exclusively with interior, subjective experience or consciousness, divorcing him from his reality as an individual substance. Cf. *AP*, pp. 33-34.
- ¹⁸ *TB*, p. 38, my emphasis. Cf. his statement in “Thomistic Personalism:” “That which is most characteristic of a person...is morality. Morality is not the most strictly connected with thought; thought is merely a condition of morality” (*PC*, p. 172).
- ¹⁹ *Love and Responsibility*, p. 117.
- ²⁰ Thus, Wojtyla states that “each action is directed toward definite objects or sets of objects, and is aimed outward and beyond itself. On the other hand, because of self-determination, an action reaches in and

penetrates into the subject, into the ego, which is its primary and principal object” (AP, p. 150). Cf. Wojtyła’s essay “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in PC, and *Gaudium et spes*, 35.

²¹ Thus, Wojtyła writes that “the deepest significance with respect to the real existence of morality can be grasped as man’s fulfillment, whereas his allegiance to evil means in fact nonfulfillment” (AP, p. 153).

²² “What It’s Like to Be a Christian,” p. 27.

²³ “The Family as a Community of Persons,” PC, p. 322.

²⁴ “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” PC, p. 194.

²⁵ We should remember, however, that the human nature of Christ, while a complete rational nature, is nonetheless not a person, since it is taken up in the existence of another, the second Person of the Trinity.

²⁶ TB, p. 451.

²⁷ ST I, q. 29, a. 4, c., my emphasis.

²⁸ p. 61. Cf. his statement, on p. 121, that “As faith advances, it will always have in view, as its ultimate reality and model, the *communio personarum* of God himself in the Trinity of Persons.” Wojtyła shares with other Thomistic Personalists the concern to understand the human person in light of Trinitarian theology. For example, in *Person and Being* (Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1993) Fr. Norris Clarke suggests that the highest levels of human activity are reflections of the divine activity of self-giving (see, e.g., p. 97). Likewise, in *The Selfhood of the Human Person* (Washington: CUP, 1996), John Crosby (though not an unqualifiedly Thomistic Personalist) argues that individual subjectivity and community are not incompatible, in human beings, by pointing to the divine *communio Personarum* (see, e.g., p. 58).

²⁹ *Sources of Renewal*, p. 62.

³⁰ See LR, p. 96: “The person is always, of its very nature, untransferable, *alteri incommunicabilis*. This means not only that it is its own master (*sui juris*) but that it cannot give itself away, cannot surrender itself. The very nature of the person is incompatible with such a surrender.” Cf. Wojtyła’s comment in *The Theology of the Body*, regarding Eph. 5:28, that “If husbands should love their wives as their own bodies, this means that uni-subjectivity is based on bi-subjectivity and does not have a real character but only an intentional one. The wife’s body is not the husband’s own body, but it must be loved like his own body. It is therefore a question of unity, *not in the ontological sense, but in the moral sense*—unity through love (p. 319, my emphasis).”

³¹ GS, 24.

³² LR, p. 41. Wojtyła correlates the Personalistic Norm with the New Testament “commandment to love” (cf. P. 40 ff.).

³³ LR, p. 41, my emphasis.

³⁴ LR, p. 27.

³⁵ LR, pp. 26-27.

³⁶ p. 24.

³⁷ LR, p. 126.

³⁸ For Wojtyła’s discussion of “love as goodwill,” see LR, pp. 82-84.

³⁹ See “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” p. 194. Cf. *The Family as a Community of Persons*, p. 322.

⁴⁰ CA, ¶ 41.

⁴¹ LR, p. 127.

⁴² LR, p. 127.

⁴³ SR, p. 120, my emphasis.

⁴⁴ See LR, pp. 28-29, 38.

⁴⁵ Buttiglione, p. 91.

⁴⁶ TB, p. 309. In the next paragraph, Wojtyła writes, “The mystery of Christ, penetrating their hearts, engendering in them that holy ‘reverence for Christ’...should lead them to ‘be subject to one another’—the mystery of Christ, that is, the mystery of the choice from eternity of each of them in Christ to be the adoptive sons of God.” In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła states that the *particular* common good of marriage is “procreation, the future generation, a family, and, at the same time, the continual ripening of the relationship between two people” (p. 30; cf. p. 226).

⁴⁷ Thus, in *The Theology of the Body*, Wojtyła states that “The God of the Covenant has entrusted the life of every individual to his or her fellow human beings...according to the law of reciprocity in giving and receiving, of self-giving and of the acceptance of others” (p. 554).

⁴⁸ LR, p. 129.

⁴⁹ *FCP*, p. 321.

⁵⁰ *LR*, p. 130.

⁵¹ One could also argue that the very notion of self-giving presupposes that there is a “self” to give, and so desires for self-preservation, emotional well-being, and, in general, personal integrity, far from being incompatible with sincere self-giving, provide the foundations for it. John Crosby makes this point in his attempt to harmonize individual subjectivity with relations towards others (see, e.g., his *The Selfhood of the Human Person*, p.).

⁵² “In fact, the sublimity and inner worth of the [imperative] are so much the more evident in a duty, the fewer subjective causes there are for it and the more they oppose it,” from Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), p. 33 (hereafter *GMM*). See also p. 11, where Kant offers as an example of moral superiority the one who benefits others against his own inclinations: “even though no inclination moves him any longer, he nevertheless tears himself from this deadly insensibility and performs the action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty—then for the first time his action has genuine moral worth.”

⁵³ *GMM*, p. 35.

⁵⁴ *GMM*, p. 36. See also *LR*, p. 28. Indeed, there is a deontological element in Wojtyła’s ethics. He states in one place that “the freedom of the human will is most fully displayed in morality through duty” (*LR*, p. 120).

⁵⁵ That is, the second formulation does not violate the first, most general formulation of the Imperative, namely, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (*GMM*, p. 30).

⁵⁶ Thus, in his account of *Love and Responsibility*, Buttiglione writes: “The solution of the problem of ethics requires the reestablishment of the unity of the ethical act, and especially an understanding of the real relation of its emotive and cognitive aspects. Phenomenology provides an access to this authentic unity because it begins from a unified experience which is there before abstraction. It is this which allows it to see that an emotional and empirical aspect is always the basis upon which the activities of the mind and will are exercised” (p. 72).

⁵⁷ For Wojtyła’s description of his concept of love as “analogous,” see, e.g., *LR*, pp. 73 and 77.

⁵⁸ See *LR*, p. 104 ff.

⁵⁹ For Wojtyła’s explanation of “sentiment” and “sympathy” see, respectively, *LR*, p. 109 ff. and pp. 88-95.

⁶⁰ See *LR*, p. 82.

⁶¹ I am purposefully avoiding the term “weak,” here, since Wojtyła does not understand his view as *compromising* goodwill—as a kind of “concession” to natural self-centeredness.

⁶² *LR*, p. 133, my emphasis.

⁶³ *LR*, p. 298, n. 31.

⁶⁴ *LR*, p. 154.

⁶⁵ *LR*, p. 82.

⁶⁶ Stanford UP, 2002.

⁶⁷ *Being Given*, p. 77, my emphasis.

⁶⁸ I should note, however, that in *Being Given*, it is not clear that Marion is pointing to the apparent incompatibility of desiring *fulfillment* through giving or the apparent incompatibility of desiring to be *thought of* as fulfilled (i.e., thought of as virtuous) through giving. But even if we are to interpret Marion’s critique in this way, it does no harm to Wojtyła’s account, since “fulfillment,” for Wojtyła, refers to moral perfection, which perfection certainly excludes an empty desire for approval.

⁶⁹ *LR*, p. 88.

⁷⁰ See *LR*, pp. 86 and 132. Cf. p. 140: “Man is a being condemned, so to speak, to create. Creativity is a duty in the sphere of love, too.”

⁷¹ Wojtyła writes that “the partnership of man and woman constitutes the first form of communion between persons” (*SR*, p. 115).

⁷² *LR*, p. 86.

⁷³ See *SR*, p. 62.

⁷⁴ See *LR*, pp. 129, 88, and 39.

⁷⁵ *LR*, p. 88.

⁷⁶ Cf. *LR*, p. 86.

⁷⁷ *LR*, p. 105.

⁷⁸ In fact, according to Wojtyla, giving with an attitude of sensuality only amounts to a false declaration. For the body, he thinks, has a “nuptial” meaning, such that the physical union of persons signifies their union *as* persons. In other words, physical union is not meant to *be* the gift but to be a *sign* of the gift (see esp. *TB*, pp. 60-63). Thus, in *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyla comments that “The unification of the two persons must first be achieved by way of love, and sexual relations between them can only be the expression of a unification already complete (*LR*, p. 127).” The physical union asserts that there is, on an ontological level, a unity of persons; for this assertion to be *true*, there must be in fact *be* such a unity to which it corresponds. John Milbank has remarked to me that Wojtyla’s theory of the “nuptial” meaning of the body seems to be post-Kantian; the body, Milbank suggested, should be considered as the very means or vehicle of self-giving, as *really* part of the self, and not merely the *sign* of self-giving. However, understanding the role of the body in self-giving as semiotic is not to detach the body from the person: it merely points to the need for an integration of love in the human person, a subordination of “bodily” loves to goodwill.

⁷⁹ In the case of marriage, for example, Wojtyla observes, “it is only the woman, or at any rate it is above all the woman, who feels that it is her role in marriage to give herself; the man’s experience of marriage is different, since, ‘giving oneself’ has as its *psychological* correlative ‘possession’” (*LR*, p. 99, my emphasis).

⁸⁰ Wojtyla has argued in several places that a *purely* emotional attitude towards a person cannot perceive his full value, but only leads to subjectivism. For an account of Wojtyla’s critique of Scheler’s emotivism, see Buttiglione, esp. pp. 69-71.

⁸¹ Wojtyla writes, “it is essential that betrothed love should ally itself closely with goodwill and friendship. Without these allies it may find itself in a very dangerous void” (*LR*, p. 100). See also pp. 126-129.

⁸² *LR*, pp. 253 and 98.

⁸³ *LR*, p. 96. That the Law can be *fulfilled*, but also merely *respected or obeyed*, means that it is applicable to *all* of a person’s other-directed actions. That is, to be morally good I need not “betroth” myself to each person I encounter: I need only have *goodwill* towards them and *accept* them (recognize their dignity). Thus, we can see why Wojtyla feels justified in calling the last sentence of *Gaudium et spes*, 24 a “law.” However, though in doing so Wojtyla seems to hearken back to the *natural* law tradition, his Law is based, not on nature, but on personhood.

⁸⁴ Cf. *TB*, p. 244.

⁸⁵ *LR*, p. 255.

⁸⁶ *LR*, p. 255.

⁸⁷ Cf. Wojtyla’s statement that “the need to give oneself to a person has profounder origins than the sexual instinct” (*LR*, 253). Perhaps the most prominent example of self-giving in Wojtyla’s mind, within the context of the religious vocation, is the self-sacrifice of St. Maximilian Kolbe.

⁸⁸ *LR*, p. 253.

⁸⁹ *TB*, p. 565.

⁹⁰ *LR*, p. 136.

⁹¹ *LR*, p. 136, my emphasis.

⁹² Wojtyla states that “the will aspires to the good, and freedom belongs to the will, hence freedom exists for the sake of love, because it is by way of love that human beings share most fully in the good” (*LR*, p. 135).

⁹³ I thank, especially, Bryan Cross and Gregory Beabout, without whose insights and critique this paper would not have been possible.