

THE PERSON: CENTER AND OBJECTIVE OF ECONOMIC LIFE

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Abstract: This essay begins with the person in order to demonstrate that all individual action takes place with other persons in a common framework of meaning. The observed reality is the individual action. But there is action with other persons, which is social action, and action endowed with meaning, which is cultural action.

All the facets of the dynamic structure of personal reality are revealed in the action. This is a reality that is an ethic because man has to make himself, deciding what is to happen to himself by means of adaptation. Man has to justify the creation of some possibilities and the blocking of some others.

1. Introduction: human action and economic reality.

In the economic and social realms... the dignity and complete vocation of the human person and the welfare of society as a whole are to be respected and promoted. For the person is the source, the center and the purpose of all economic and social life (Gaudium et spes, 63)

This quote from the encyclical *Gaudium et Spes* is very useful for recognising that man has needs that must be satisfied. That is to say, to speak of economic reality is to speak of needs. Man needs to procure food, shelter and a mate, etc. In our society, we are used to providing for our needs by means of market exchanges. We are accustomed to providing for our needs through mercantile relations; we work for a wage which allows us to buy what we desire.

The only thing that we are stating is that man does things. This manufacturing capacity is what generates the whole range of possibilities we have at our disposal. It is undeniable that the development of the productive capacity of the last few centuries has generated an increment in the possibilities of action, that has never been seen before in the history of humanity. We can be sure that a person of the last century would be surprised by television, plane journeys, computing, etc. This situation of change is such that it not uncommon to hear a person of a certain age say that the world is not what it used to be. It is quite true that our world today is much wider and much more complex than that of a century ago.

We have deliberately chosen this example to show something that is already in peoples' mind. Many people will think that it is not necessary to be organised in market economies and, in fact, there are other economic regimes based on planning and state control. And people who think like that are right. But if we consider what we have just said, we encounter something that is apparently paradoxical. Eating, drinking, and clothing oneself are essential needs for the human being. But what is no longer so essential is the way of satisfying them. That is, the capitalist or socialist economic structures are not determined by the needs that they satisfy. In other words, *there is not*


any necessity in the manner of satisfying our needs. This is apparently paradoxical but it was to be expected, when studying people. If we were dealing with animals, trapped in a world of stimuli, we would not speak about economics. Nobody would claim that the “work” of the lion is to hunt antelopes. On the other hand, man is a hunter, farmer, rancher, engineer, etc. Economics is exclusive to man.¹ Man has freed his behavior from pressing needs and has joined his behavior together with his response to the world of values, feelings and projects, etc. He has *built* a world, not only of stimuli but also of thought that direct his action. This abandonment of savagery, means that the life of man is not developed among things, but among things, that are transfigured by the meaning that we give them and so we live among things-meaning. We enter fully into the symbolic world of culture and society, which is the field where economics acquires its complete meaning.

We can consider that economic reality constitutes a part of what E. Husserl called *Lebenswelt*. He describes this network of relations and symbols that man lives socially, and which he transmits through generations. Let us say, therefore, that man is a *with-being*, implying that the essence of man is being-with. That is to say, to form himself as he is, other men and culture are essential. As Zubiri points out: “This *with* (*with* things, *with* other men, *with-me* myself) is not something extra, an extrinsic relation, added to man in the exercise of his life. This would be absolutely chimerical. It is something much more radical. The *with* is a formal structural stage of life itself and therefore of human substantiveness in its vital dynamism”.²

Our study of economics in this introduction is strictly limited in scope. We are restricting ourselves rigorously and methodically to describing what the things obviously are, that is to say, how they are revealed to us in the scope of the primary radical reality, which is our life. We can show that that economic reality is manifested in personal action in a determined society and culture. It is in the co-existence and in the participation in common values, beliefs and knowledge, where the structures of means and ends are formed, which constitute the task of economics. It is entirely appropriate, therefore, to define man as a *with-being*, denoting with this expression the essential opening of the person to his fellow men through society and culture. This definition of man clashes with dominant economic view, in which man is reduced to a mere maximizer of utility. The aim of this article is to show the complexity of economic reality with all its social and cultural components. This is a reality, whose objective is the full development of the real possibilities of people.³ It is a development that cannot be reduced to mere monetary maximization, as is often done in the usual economic models.

2. The social framework of the action.⁴

The following diagram shows the development of the next sections:



This diagram provides the evidence that man is a with-being, that is, in order to understand any human action we need a systemic view. We need to include it in person-society-culture to understand its genesis. With this, we do not wish to place society or culture above the individual reality of the person. We do not want to say that the what is social or cultural is a unity superior to the individual. This would lead us to the opposition between the what is individual and what is social. It would be absurd. Our aim is to demonstrate that individual reality is only comprehensible in its totality, that is to say, a personal being, a social being and a cultural being. As Zubiri points out: “as a substantive reality, there is not anything else than the individuals who make it up...The individuals are the substratum of the social elements, but what is social is purely and simply a unit connecting men as a form of reality”.⁵

Therefore, this relation between person-society-culture belongs to the dynamic structure of individual action. Since the action is exclusive to the individual and it thus organises the means for the attainment of the ends. But it is the original framework of the action because individual action is only comprehensible from the world of life, of which the individual forms part. It is important to emphasise this point because there is a tendency to give excessive importance to the individual person in isolation from culture and society, and this can have no other consequence than the destruction of the world of life.

The approach to society comes from the study of the regulation of the world of life. These regulations, according to W. Pannenberg, “are the regular forms of life in common of the individuals, which are denominated institutions”.⁶ The social system is centred on the person and his relations with other persons. Man is not limited to finding himself with others, as if he found himself with a stone. As Zubiri points out: “each man has in himself, in his own himself and by reason of himself, something that concerns other men”.⁷ The social system and its organising in institutions derive from individual action in its primary aspect, co-existence. The institutions are derived from human interaction. But the institutions transcend the person and the social system acquires a cultural sense which constitutes it as a regular form of life. We do not want to say with this that in their process of constitution, the institutions acquire their fullness, when they are characterised as cultural elements. This would corroborate the idea of giving pre-eminence to the cultural system over the social one. The idea to be developed is that the characteristic note of the institutions, the regulation of the forms of life, is not the characteristic note of the culture. The culture is needed for its maintenance. However, the social system organises life in common, when it acquires a cultural sense.

The study of the institutions, in this dimension, starts from the interaction of individuals. The analysis of the interaction of individuals as a basis for the institutions has three constituent stages: the first stage is the satisfaction of needs, the second is the stabilization of behaviour and the third is the objectivization of the institutions.

- *First constituent: The satisfaction of needs.*

The study of the institutions starts from the first work carried out by B. Malinowski.⁸ The approach to institutions is made taking into account their diversity in the satisfaction of the fundamental needs of man. Needs such as food, reproduction, security, hygiene and growth. All these needs have a basic character since the person belongs to the human species. A person cannot stop providing for his needs if he wants to conserve his life. The success of these institutions will be measured against the degree of satisfaction of the needs. So, the institutions are co-ordinated for the satisfaction of more than one satisfaction at a time. Malinowski states that the formation and maintenance of auxiliary institutions which co-ordinate other institutions is the best means for the simultaneous satisfaction of a whole series of needs.

To this statement of Malinowski, Pannenberg poses two problems:

1)- If it is not possible to identify the satisfaction of a particular need with a certain institution, "the singular institutions cannot be correlated exclusively with singular necessities. Evidently, their existence also has to rely on other causes".⁹ Pannenberg refers with this criticism to the impossibility of studying the institutions depending on the ends which they make it possible to attain. In the study of institutions the same problem is posed as arises in economics, if one proposes its study by dividing the needs to be satisfied. The classification of the institutions depending on needs does not make it possible to unite each institution with a need, and in economics there is no way to separate economic behaviour from extra-economic behaviour depending on the ends that are pursued. Therefore, for the comprehension of both market phenomena and the institutions it necessary to take human action as a starting point.

2)- The needs of food, shelter and sexual union are procured without the need for institutions. A society can be constructed on the basis of robbery, piracy and the systematic sacking of the neighbouring peoples. Therefore, the explanation of the social institutions cannot be reduced to the satisfaction of needs. In reality, what do the social institutions contribute to the needs of men? "What then is their special yield?"¹⁰ The answer to these questions brings us to the following constituent of the institutions.

- *Second constituent: The stabilisation of behaviour.*

Basing himself on the work of Parsons,¹¹ and of P. Berger- Th. Luckman,¹² Pannenberg develops the importance that the stability of the institutions has for the social system. The cause of the stability of the institutions is based on people's behaviour patterns. Parsons bases the cohesion of the social system on the existence of the role. The role or rather the roles which a person may play defines them, "as the organized system of interaction between the ego and the alter".¹³ *The expectations of the role* arise simultaneously as the role: "they are the reciprocal expectations with regards to the mutual actions".¹⁴ The characteristic feature of the institutions is: "the integration of the expectations of the human agents in an appropriate system of interactive roles which

have a pattern of rules and a sharing of values".¹⁵ In this model the institutions constitute an integrated system where the expectations of the roles are based on norms. These norms should be interpreted as a reciprocal stabilization of conduct. This conduct becomes a habit. P. Berger- Th. Luckman point out in this respect: "from this perspective, an institutionalisation is always reached where the habits of behaviour of a multiplicity of individuals are co-ordinated in a typified and constant way".¹⁶

To explain this process Pannenberg utilizes the following example taken from Berger and Luckman: "Let there be two individuals, A and B. A observes the conduct of B. He attributes motives to B's actions and, in view of the repetitions of those actions, he typifies the motives as recurrent. The same thing occurs with A with respect to B. This means that A and B begin to interpret roles with regard to the other".¹⁷

We can explain with this conception of expectation the origin of the division of labour. The division of labour is an *expectation of a role*. It is a particular case, of great importance, in the process of institutionalisation. The division of labour is a role in so far as it permits a person to become a specialist in a task, and so expecting the exchange of goods produced by each person. This possibility of exchange is based on the fact that the division of labour has been normalised. It has been institutionalised.

The importance of the division of labour in the general process of interaction is highlighted by Pannenberg. In his analysis of the different theories of the institutions, he underlines the importance given, in the work of Gehlen,¹⁸ to the division of labour as the determining factor in the duration and the resistance to time of the institutions. What is this statement based on? On the satisfaction of basic needs which are the foundation for the formation of the institutions. He states: "such needs cause the process of becoming accustomed to the actions, immediately give place to cooperation in the division of labour, which is directed towards the object of satisfying the needs".¹⁹

It is possible to consider that the institution is constituted when the conduct is normalized. The stability of the culture rests on the normalization of the role expectations. But the question can be posed, What makes it possible for the person to classify some behaviour as recurrent? The process of repetition of the types of behaviour allows the expectation, and the hope, to be typified. The reiteration of the behaviour explains how the institutionalisation is produced, but it does not include the integration of a role expectation within the social system. In order to classify an act as recurrent it is supposed that the primary motivation is repeated. The motivation refers us to the sense which a person gives to a thing. We recognise a type of behaviour as recurrent when we attribute to it motivations that are also recurrent. The recognition of a pattern of behaviour means giving it a sense. The person must be capable of identifying motives and responses. In other words, in order to recognise a pattern of behaviour, it is necessary to distinguish between means and ends. The only thing that is necessary is to recognise that in order to attain the ends, whatever they may be, society offers the means for attainment of these ends.

The following text, taken by Pannenberg from the work of Berger and Luckman, is illuminating: "the individuals carry out their specialised and institutionalised actions in the context of their personal histories. What is more, this is a complete reflection of the fact that special actions do not appear as isolated events, but as parts of a universe, that make sense to the person, and whose important contents are not restricted to the

individual, but are socially articulated and are objects, in which everybody participates. It is only by describing this roundabout through the common totalities of sense that the need for institutional integration can be understood".²⁰

Let us sum up what has been stated up to now: the study of the institutions started from the satisfaction of primary needs. The success in the provision of satisfactions originated the appearance of auxiliary institutions. The relation between the institutions does not make it possible to relate one-sidedly, the singular needs with each one of the institutions. The simultaneity in the satisfaction of needs denotes a greater complexity in the institutions. The second constituent bases the study of the institutions of their role of regulating behaviour. The interpretation of behaviour as being recurrent, needed a framework of common sense in which activities could be integrated. In order to study the importance of the unity of sense as a type of cement of the social system, we introduce the third constituent of the institutions.

- *Third constituent: the objectivization of the social institutions.*

When a person recognises the behaviour of another person as recurrent and as a result adjusts his own conduct, both persons create a nexus of sense. But this nexus of sense is only possible when both people agree on the common conscience of the sense. What is this conscience of sense? Pannenberg notes: "they are lasting configurations of sense for the common life of men...evidently they have something to do with the reciprocity of men's conduct in concrete, concurrent situations, or in relations which go on extending themselves temporarily without a solution of continuity".²¹

This configuration is shaped, for example, in language. When the reciprocity of the conduct is articulated, it acquires its independence of the individual and enters into the symbolic world. It acquires a cultural sense. In other words, there occurs the curious circumstance that the world in common is arrived at by a process of depersonalization. Zubiri says: "the process of communization is made precisely thanks to the dynamism of depersonalization".²² This cultural dimension of the social institutions is of maximum importance. The institutions' unity of meaning makes their own dynamism possible. The institution has not only allowed the desired ends to be attained in the past, but it also has to make it possible for each present action to achieve the ends that each person indicates. The unity of meaning gives the stability and the independence of individual people to the social system and this leads us the cultural framework of the action.

3. The cultural framework of the action.

Social institution are fashioned into forms of life when they are stabilised and transcend the individual person who acts. One may imagine that once human relations are depersonalized, the person disappears. But this would be to recognise the superiority of what is social over the individual, which is untenable as we have demonstrated in the previous section. We face the key problem expounded in the encyclical *Gaudium et Spes*²³ and this is to analyse how the world of life (*Lebenswelt*) is transmitted, assimilated and transformed by the person when acting. The answer is to bear in mind that nothing is created from nothing. The symbolic activity is formation and transformation, starting from something received. It is not *ex-nihilo* creation. Pannenberg states: "the creativity of man basically serves to capture and exhibit states of things, that only in that *medium* [culture] can they be captured and exhibited, but

they do not owe their reality to the whim of being human creation however. What is accumulated in the process of the tradition in culture is the treasure of access to reality; and it is only conserved in the tradition which allows the treatment of a reality that can be experienced to continue extending and deepening".²⁴

This human creativity is not free from tensions. On the one hand, the institutions tend to perpetuate themselves and on the other hand, the person tends to transform what exists. As E. Cassirer points out: "in all human activities we find a fundamental polarity, that can be described in various ways. We can talk about a tension between stabilisation and evolution, between one tendency which leads to fixed, stable forms of life and to another which inclines to breaking this rigid scheme of things. Man moves between these two tendencies, one of which tries to preserve the old forms while the other tries to produce new ones".²⁵

This symbolic world, as a means of cohesion in culture, concentrates us in the study of the individual. The aim of this section is to explain this process, so, why the approaches to reality are presented to the individual and are brought up to date. This explanation is based entirely on what Zubiri expounded in his article "The historical dimension of the human being".²⁶ Zubiri begins by recognising that culture is strictly tradition, since tradition is the bequest of modes of being in the reality. Etymologically, tradition is *paradósis*, *traditio*, whose meaning is bequest.²⁷ But tradition is not an a-critical acceptance of past usages. So as the bequest of physical characteristics is transmitted genetically, so what is radically human, and the ways of being in the world are bequeathed in tradition. When a man is born, he is placed in the world and he is endowed with ways of being in the world. The bequest, as it comes from his parents, "is formally a continuation of what these have wished to bequeath to the man from their very selves".²⁸ The bequest by the parents of what they consider to be the best or simply what they have known has a recipient, who himself is living another reality. The son, by the mere fact of being a man, is another different reality from his parents. When we say different, we are referring to both the specific corporal differences of the son with respect to the parents and to the different social environments in which he will lead his life. He is the heir who decides if what he has received allows him to face up to reality. Zubiri says: "continuity is the result of a positive act of the recipient to what is bequeathed: the act of receiving it and of reliving oneself from what is received."²⁹

The individual, as far as he belongs to human species, has to respond to the same problems as his forbears: food, clothing, education and social relations, etc. Depending on the person's progressive opening to wider fields of activity, he has to ask himself whether to accept the received solution, or whether to transform it, or whether to reject it. The fact of continuing to receive the traditions, or of seeking solutions in history to the problems that are posed, implies a progressive transformation of tradition. The key problem comes from the fact itself of man's opening up, and of not being finished by as a species. He has to opt for the possibilities, already received, to transform them or to create new possibilities from what he has received.³⁰

The living world is constructed with the bricks bequeathed by previous generations. New constructions may be built, but the materials used are to be found in social transmission. This conflict appears in each new generation. The bequest of the previous generations of what they consider the best or simply of what they have known, has a recipient who lives another reality. Now one can understand the sentence: "reality is

retained in the past". But if we take human time in its triple dimension, past, present and future, the first one of these is inseparable from the other two. Man receives from the past ways of being in the world, which he projects into the future, with his present action. He is, therefore, acting as each man realises his life and interacting with other men in accordance with the social plexus. Each generation is forming its changes in its own new realities. It is this new generation, that has to decide whether to accept the received traditions and to revive them in their own situation; or it has to decide to change them. The motor of the institutional process, whether it is the market or another institution, is the critical revision of what is received. It is the assimilation in the present that decides if the institution suffers a crisis or survives in its traditional form.

This meaning that an institution acquires, allows it to survive, although the reality that originally created it, has disappeared. Many institutions become a tradition, but in a pejorative sense. They are not a bequest to the coming generations which must be updated. They become a repetition of forms of behaviour which have no apparent reason. This possibility poses the problem of the maintenance and the disappearance of institutions. It may happen that the disappearance of an institution does not create a problem.³¹ This situation will occur provided that the primary needs are covered and the institution has lost its meaning as a possibility of real action. Other changes or transformations will create tensions in the social system.

One may conclude that tradition is a transmission of meaning. This is true. But one must point out that the meaning transmitted by tradition is the *had* sense. That is to say, the past meaning. Looking at an object of a previous century, the first question is, what was it or what did it mean? We ask ourselves about the meaning it had for a human action that is now in the past. Examining utensils, whose use we cannot understand, tradition tells us what human activity could be carried out with such a utensil. Thus, the object acquires meaning with an action.


For example, let us take Roman ploughs. It is true they have a meaning. But, do they have any meaning in our modern reality? If what we really want to do is obtain the maximum yield from a piece of land, is there any sense in using a Roman plough? This example leads us to introduce the second idea of meaning, which is the important one for a theory of action. With regards to the first meaning, the *had* meaning that has already been explained, Zubiri states: we should not mind [the meaning of the institutions] in our problem if it were not for the meaning of some human actions, that not only have to have a *had* meaning, but that by their very own nature must *have* some meaning in order to be what they are: human actions. Therefore, meaning is not the *had* meaning, but the meaning that it has to have, the *have meaning*. Thus, the meaning is not the meaning that it has, but *the reality itself of having meaning*".³²

In this explanation the following paragraph acquires importance: "The world 'culture' in its general sense indicates everything whereby man develops and perfects his many bodily and spiritual qualities; he strives by his knowledge and his labor, to bring the world itself under his control. He renders social life more human both in the family and the civic community, through improvement of customs and institutions. Throughout the course of time he expresses, communicates and conserves in his works, great spiritual experiences and desires, that they might be of advantage to the progress of many, even of the whole human life".³³ Tradition not only bequeaths the *had* meaning but it also bequeaths the reality of a possibility. This possibility must have meaning for the

recipient. That is, it must have a real and present possibility of action. On the other hand, when what is received is not meaning as a real possibility in the present of action, it is transformed. If it is considered that with the existing institutions the desired ends cannot be attained, then the institutions are creatively transformed. The forms of life are objectivized as culture and thus the *had* meaning of tradition is transmitted. But, in the second stage, tradition has to initiate an action: It has to have real, present meaning; in other words, the here and now of a project has to be an incentive. This bequest is received by each person. There is no collectively possessed tradition. These are the reasons why we can talk about the individual dimension of culture and it is referring us to the person who acts. As in the previous section we conclude that society is not something that is external to the person, but something that is intrinsic to him, and it something that is transferred to other people in so far as they are persons. In this section, we conclude that culture as a bequest of ways of life, is only bequeathed individually. In this way culture is integrated in the action projected into the future by each person.

4. Conclusion: the person and his possibilities of action.

Here we reach the last section and, as was to be expected, the analysis of the original framework has brought us back to the person and his possibilities of action. Let us return to the diagram, presented in the initial analysis of the theory of action:



The execution of an action has fundamental consequences on the person who acts and on society and culture. These three dimensions can only be separated analytically. The observed reality is the individual action. But action with other persons is social action, and action with meaning is cultural action. In the action all the facets of the dynamic structure of personal reality are manifested. It is a reality, that is ethical because man has to make himself, determining what is going to become of himself by adaptation.³⁴ Ethics in the usual meaning of norms, goods and virtues is possible in a reality, which is constitutionally ethical because man had to justify the creation of some possibilities and the blocking of others. What he truly has to justify to himself and what is going to definitely distinguish his morality is the general project of his life.

Our study of institutions showed that things are possessed by attachment to the body. The human body as resource for the action is an object with distinct possibilities. We continue to point out that having corporality is fundamental for the satisfaction of primary needs. The original framework of the action places man in society. The social

institutions make it possible to cover his needs through a typification of his behaviour. The importance of the theory of action for economics is shown at this level. If this possession of corporality did not exist, then neither would economics exist.

The characteristic form of this possession of corporality is living in the world. Man produces worlds which he inhabits. To inhabit is to establish references to things with the body. Things possess a meaning for the person who acts. But the attachment implies that the behaviour is typified. With this we wish to say that the thing has in itself a meaning for a line of action. The meaning is not possessed by the individual man. The meaning is held in common, although it is only received individually. This means that the relations are not only between things and a man who acts. The relations are between things and the persons. They form what we call an instrumental plexus. This plexus is possessed in common. Every instrument refers to other instruments. So the nail is related with the hammer and the wood. They form a unity. A unity, based on the real value, we voluntarily give to the meaning of things. *The whole economic system is not a real property of man, but is a real possibility that man has decided to maintain in common.*³⁵

In short, the possibilities of action do not arise from a matter in order to act upon another reality. The possibilities are conditioned by the resources available to man. That is to say, the possibilities are real properties of man. Naturally, the possibilities are not given to man just like that. The possibilities fashion a system of capabilities and each capability constitutes the possibility of action and each capacity is more or less rich according to whether the scope of the possible which it constitutes is greater or smaller.³⁶

But man has to justify the creation of some possibilities and the blocking of others, and he has to justify the preferred possibility, and as well he has to justify, above all, the general attitude in the face of distinct systems of possibilities, in so far as this attitude conditions the moral decision of his life: what is going to happen to him and what he himself wants. The scope of the reality constituted by the possibility is the result of the evaluation of this possibility with the best model of man.³⁷ The possibilities are structured in the moral framework. The possibility that man chooses may be moral or immoral, but never amoral. In the possibilities there occur the three key dimensions of the moral life: perfection, duty and happiness.

¹ On this point see the encyclical *Laborem Exercens*.

² Cf. Zubiri, *Estructura Dinámica de la Realidad*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1989, p. 225. Cursives in the original.

³ Cf. *Gaudium et spes*, 67-72.

⁴ A basic draft of this section has been published previously. See J. Aranzadi, "The Social Division of Labor and Personal Realization", *Acts of Congress Work as Key to the Social Question*, in <http://www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst/mgmt/le/papers/aranzadi.htm>

⁵ Cf. Zubiri, *Sobre el Hombre*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1998, p. 259.

⁶ See W. Pannenberg, *Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1983, p. 500.

⁷ See Zubiri, *Estructura Dinámica de la Realidad*, op.cit., p. 251.

⁸ See B Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (1944).

⁹ In the original: "Wen die einzelnen Institutionen nicht ausschliesslich den einzelnen Bedürfnissen zugeordnet werden können, dann muss das Bestehen solcher Institutionen offenbar noch auf anderen Ursachen beruhen". See Pannenberg, *Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive*, p. 389.

- ¹⁰ In the original: "Worin also besteht deren besondere Leistung?". Ibid., p. 399.
- ¹¹ See T. Parsons, *Towards a General Theory of Action*. 3rd printing. Harper & Row, New York, 1965.
- ¹¹ See P. Berger-T. H. Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality*, (1966).
- ¹³ See Parsons, *Towards a General Theory of Action*, p. 19.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 19.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., note 26, p. 20.
- ¹⁶ P. Berger & T. Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality*, p. 51.
- ¹⁷ "A beobachtet das Verhalten von B. Er schreibt B's Handlungen Motivationen zu und *typisiert*, angesichts der Wiederholungen dieser Handlungen, die Motive als wiederkehrend... Dasselbe geschieht mit A in Beziehung auf B... Das heisst, A und B beginnen, Rollen zu spielen im Verhältnis zueinander". Pannenberg, *Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive*, p. 392.
- ¹⁸ See A. Gehlen, *Urmensch und Spätkultur: Philosophische Ergebnisse und Aussagen*. Athenaion Verlag, Frankfurt, 1977.
- ¹⁹ "Diese Grundbedürfnisse veranlassen, dass die Habitualisierung von Handlungen sofort in arbeitsteilige Kooperation zum Ziel der Befriedigung solcher Bedürfnisse übergeht". Pannenberg, *Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive*, p. 391.
- ²⁰ P. Berger & T. Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality*, p. 61.
- ²¹ "Offenbar um solche, die es mit der Gegenseitigkeit menschlichen Verhaltens in konkreten, wiederkehrenden Lebenssituationen oder in kontinuierlich fortdauernden Beziehungen zu tun haben". See Pannenberg, *Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive*, p. 394.
- ²² Cf. Zubiri, *Estructura Dinámica de la Realidad*, op.cit., p. 222.
- ²³ See GE, 2^o part., ch. 2 "The proper development of culture".
- ²⁴ "Überwiegend dient die schöpferische Tätigkeit des Menschen der Erfassung und Darstellung von Sachverhalten, die erst in diesem Medium erfassbar und darstellbar werden, aber doch ihre Realität nicht einer Willkür menschlichen Schaffens verdanken. Was in Prozess kultureller Überlieferung akkumuliert wird, das ist der Schatz der Erschliessung von Wirklichkeit, und nur was fernerhin den Umgang mit erfahrbarer Wirklichkeit zu erweitern und zu vertiefen verspricht, wird in der Überlieferung bewahrt". See Pannenberg, *Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive*, p. 305.
- ²⁵ See E. Cassirer, *Antropología Filosófica*, 18^a reprinting, FCE, México, p.328. From the original *Essay of Man* (1944).
- ²⁶ Cf. Zubiri, "La dimensión histórica del ser humano" in REALITAS I, 1973, p. 11-69.
- ²⁷ Ibid. p. 21.
- ²⁸ Ibid. p. 25.
- ²⁹ Ibid. p. 25.
- ³⁰ In philosophy, the term for creation ex nihilo is reserved for God. It is the only reality that can be created from absolutely nothing. On the other hand, man never finds absolutely nothing. The most successful term for man is quasi-creation. On this subject X. Zubiri says: "human beings produce the possibility of reality before producing the reality. Precisely this resembles divine Creation. Therefore I have written from time to time that human life is quasi-creation. It is a quasi-creation because it consist, rather than of producing reality, precisely of producing the possibility that is going to be actualized in the actions of its reality". See X. Zubiri, *Estructura Dinámica de la Realidad*, op. cit., p. 157.
- ³¹ Macintyre offers, as an example, the astonishment of Captain Cook and his men on observing the contrast which existed between the sexual freedom shown by the Polynesians and the strict separation of the sexes when eating. It was taboo to eat together. When asked about the origin of this taboo, the Polynesians were incapable of giving a reasonable explanation. His prohibition, which regulated the behaviour of the Polynesians had lost all the sense that it once had. It is not surprising that there were not social consequences when Kamemeha II abolished the taboos. See A. Macintyre, *After Virtue*, Duckworth, London, 1981, page. 105.
- ³² Zubiri, *La dimensión histórica del ser humano*, op.cit., p. 36.
- ³³ See *Gaudium et Spes*, 53.
- ³⁴ On this point see K. Wojtyla, *Acting Person*, Reidel Publishing Company, Holland, 1982.
- ³⁵ See *Gaudium et Spes*, 69.
- ³⁶ We can conclude that the different economic systems are susceptibles of moral evaluation so far they increase or reduce the possibilities of personal action. At this respect see P. Koslowski, *Ethik des Kapitalismus*, J. C. Mohr, Tübingen, 1982.
- ³⁷ On this subject see G. Abba, *Felicità, vita buona e virtù*, LAS, Roma, 1989.