ON BEING TRULY PRACTICAL: WHY VIRTUE MATTERS IN BUSINESS*

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St Augustine once said that he knew very well what time was . . . until someone would ask him to define it. We might say the same thing about practicality. We are confident that we know what it is (and what it is not) to be practical until we are pressed to give an explanation. But like the definition of time, a general definition of what it means to be practical is elusive. As is so often the case, Aristotle get us started when he says that practical wisdom (phronesis or prudence) is the ability to "deliberate well about what is good and expedient . . . , about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general."[1]

There are a couple of important points we should note about this definition. One is that Aristotle understands practical wisdom not to be a kind of knowledge but rather an ability to deliberate, to think correctly, about the good. In his discussion of practical wisdom he distinguishes it from knowledge, which properly speaking is about what is enduring and invariable. The good here, by contrast, is not the good as known, not the good in principle, not the good in the abstract, but the good as achievable and possible. It is not the good as an object of understanding but the good as the object of action. Therefore, it is the good for this person or this group at this time and place, a particular good not a universal good. The person of practical wisdom is able to think consistently and correctly about particular goods to be pursued and about the means ("expedient") that should be chosen to attain them. Practical wisdom, then, is always deliberation about contingent things and is always conditioned by circumstances.

A second point to notice is that, on Aristotle's account, practical wisdom is not merely about isolated goods but rather about the "good life in general." That is to say, the genuinely practical person is able to do much more than identify goods to be pursued. Anyone can do this, though many of us have some difficulty distinguishing between genuine and false goods. The truly practical person not only can distinguish between the true and the false, but can also situate possible present goods to be pursued within the larger context of living a good life. This person recognizes that to pursue some goods now may be inconsistent with obtaining more substantive goods later. Most of us, for example, encourage our children to develop an ability to defer gratification in preference for more important goods. Thus, it is not the ability to distinguish the real from the apparent goods that defines practical wisdom but the ability to think well about the integration of real goods into the larger context of a good life.

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* Please consider this paper to be an exploration of some ideas concerning management, business organizations and business education, not a finished exposition. As such, it is an experiment of sorts and parts of it may not work well. This being the case, I particularly welcome questions, criticisms, and suggestions for clarity, coherence and improvement.

[1] See the *Nicomachean Ethics*, book VI, chapter 5, at 1140a25.

A third point has to do with means. The ordinary person probably associates "practical" with the ability to get things done, with the man of action. This sense is more about means than ends. While Aristotle is more concerned about ends, he is not indifferent to means. The truly practical person is adept at finding means that lead to the desired end effectively and efficiently. At the same time, since practical wisdom concerns "the good life in general," the means chosen by the practical person will not be immoral. Bad means destroy real goods. While it may seem reasonable to a less-than-prudent person to employ bad means in pursuit of an otherwise good end, such bad means are inconsistent with the pursuit of a good life. A truly practical person thinks about action in an integrated way, where each choice of concrete means in pursuit of concrete ends must be integrated with a larger ensemble of goods.

A final point leads us to another discussion that moves beyond Aristotle's analysis here. Socrates changed Western thought permanently by insisting that it was the task of philosophy to inquire systematically into the nature of the good life for human persons. He rejected the all-too-common notion, which is certainly well represented in modern thought and culture, that the good life was simply the creation of each individual, that it was no more than the satisfaction of each person's appetites. If this were the case, ethics would be the study of singulars and no subject for philosophy or any science. Instead, Socrates insisted that however much the particulars might vary from one person to another, there were common elements to a good human life, a life worthy for a rational being to live. And while it might be difficult to do so, these common elements could be discovered by rational inquiry. Such an inquiry was the calling of each person and a noble objective for philosophy.

Socrates provoked (not too strong a word) his fellow Athenians to search diligently for the elements of the good life and he mercilessly exposed their ill-considered responses. We can learn something from this (in addition to the need for caution and tact in doing ethics). The good life in general that is the object of Aristotle's practical wisdom and Socrates questioning is not immediately evident to us. Indeed, not only do many people think it can be described but there are many imposters that are embraced by different societies and different cultures in different times and places.[2] As a consequence, each culture with a different concept of the good life will have a different understanding of what it means to be practical. For our purposes, it is important to note the obvious: secular Western culture has a conception (or perhaps a number of loosely-related conceptions) of the good life that is quite different from the conception rooted in the Catholic tradition. Therefore, what it means in contemporary Western culture to be practical is sharply at odds with practical wisdom as understood from a Catholic perspective, and it is to a brief consideration of that difference that we now turn.[3]

Two Visions of the Person and the Good Life

Every culture presents a model, perhaps several models, of a good life, of the goods that members of that culture ought to aspire to experience, possess, or achieve. And underlying each model is an anthropology, a set of convictions about the nature of the human person. This set of

[2] Aristotle provides a classic taxonomy and analysis in *NE*, book I, chapter 5.

[3] I write here as a Catholic but realizing that much of what I have to say from a Catholic perspective would also be consistent with Protestant and Orthodox traditions.

convictions may not be critically examined, it may not be coherent or even consciously held by members of the culture but it is there.

The Catholic tradition also has an anthropology to offer and a model of the good human life. Since this anthropology begins from what God has revealed about the human condition (especially through the Incarnation) it differs from secular anthropologies that begin from what human persons can discern about themselves. In any given time and place Catholics are necessarily engaged in an encounter with secular culture. Sometimes this engagement is more or less congenial and sometimes it is more or less antagonistic. Sometimes the tradition has had a powerful influence in shaping a culture so that it became authentically (even if not perfectly) Christian but at other times the tradition has had little influence. It seems safe to say that the engagement of Catholic thought with contemporary Western culture, or at least its dominant strain, has grown more antagonistic in recent decades.

In what follows I propose to offer a brief (and therefore incomplete) account of some of the key points of difference between the two schools of thought. This account should help us to understand why these different visions lead to different conceptions of what it means to be practical, different ideas about how business organizations ought to be shaped and to function, and different views about what characteristics successful managers ought to have (and therefore how they ought to be trained and formed).

Contemporary Western culture is not rooted in a coherent and unified body of thought. It has been deeply influenced by the Christian tradition, retaining a residue of that tradition even if in a somewhat distorted form. Between the two there are many points of contact but for our purposes I will focus on only four, which concern the soul, society, freedom and work.

Modern thought tends to be materialist, which is to say that it adopts the axiom that all reality is physical and that all phenomena can be adequately explained in terms of physical causality. In its more extreme forms, the human person is understood to be merely a very complex physical organism, the human mind a biochemical computer of sorts, and human thought no more than a complicated arrangement of physical structures, chemical compounds, and electrical impulses. The human soul is a metaphor referring to the psychological dimension of human life or perhaps just to the state of being alive. (Given this foundation, it is not surprising that there are serious conversations in some quarters about how we ought to be prepared to treat computers and robots when they reach a level of sophistication comparable to human life and intelligence. Should they be given rights and privileges as persons? Would it be possible for a human being to marry a robot?) It goes without saying, then, that on this view human persons have no transcendent destiny. Furthermore, human fulfillment, if it is to happen at all, must take place within a material world. The goals toward which human persons strive in this world will therefore be essentially material: possessions, experiences and relationships.

By contrast, the Catholic tradition does not see the human person as merely a material being but rather as an embodied spirit. It insists that, while the material world is real, it is by no means all that exists. In addition to the material world we inhabit, there is also an immaterial level of being and causality. Human persons, in fact, exist on both levels, the material and the immaterial. The complete human being is a union of physical body and immaterial soul. The soul, which is the

seat of thinking, understanding and willing, naturally employs the organs of the body (principally the brain) to carry on its activities. Thus the human person cannot be explained merely in physical terms, nor is rationality merely an extension in degree of the mental capabilities of animals (or, for that matter, physical computers); it is an operation of an entirely different kind.

Human fulfillment, then, will not be entirely, or perhaps even principally, material. Genuine human fulfillment may be largely immaterial, a matter of the soul rather than the body. Indeed, this was the position of Aristotle, that human fulfillment (happiness) consists in rational activity in accord with virtue. While this requires a certain level of material resources, these are merely instrumental, supporting what is essentially spiritual. Catholic doctrine goes one step further and insists that each person has a transcendent destiny, an invitation to share in the life of God. This provides a radically different orientation to practical wisdom from the dominant posture of contemporary Western culture.

Another key difference concerns the understanding of the relation of the person to society. On the secular view, especially as it emerges in economics and law, the human person is essentially solitary, a monad, an individual whose participation in society is instrumental. One of the principal challenges for political activity is to protect individual rights (though this can easily degrade into the protection of the interests of the majority).

By contrast, the Catholic view (which is consistent with Plato and Aristotle) is that the human person is essentially social. Participation in society is not merely instrumental (though individuals do derive benefits from it) but is a good in itself. By and large, people prefer to conduct their activities in collaboration with others and are enriched by such collaboration. As a consequence, the challenge for political activity on this view is to instantiate, sustain and protect the common good of the civic community. Through this common good individuals flourish, since the common good consists in the set of circumstances that make it possible for citizens to lead lives of virtue and to shape the particular dimensions of their fulfillment. This fulfillment is understood to be crafted in collaboration with others, not in isolation as the secular view would have it, and the collaboration itself is a constitutive element of that fulfillment.

A third point of contrast has to do with freedom. Secular views on freedom are varied and even contradictory in some cases. Not every thinker agrees that freedom of choice is possible (some maintain that it is an illusion, as committed materialists would have to do) but on the assumption that human beings can exercise freedom of choice and action, Western culture seems inclined to two convictions (I am painting in broad strokes here).

The first conviction is that human freedom is sharply limited by a variety of circumstances internal and external to the individual. Fear and desire, for example, do not simply make choices defective; they can often nullify freedom and compel persons to act without choice. Dire threats, passionate desires, and strong emotions do more than cloud judgment; they can make it impossible on this account for a person to choose and therefore extinguish freedom. (The homosexual, for instance, has no choice in general about affectional preferences, does not choose the particular object of his/her affection, and is not truly free to choose or not choose a corresponding lifestyle.)

The second conviction is that the most authentic exercise of freedom is absolute self-determination. On this view, crafting a good life entails discerning one's idiosyncratic inclinations and desires, and then choosing to construct a life that corresponds and makes it possible to follow those inclinations and satisfy those desires. There is no good life in general, as Aristotle thought, but only the particular characteristics of a good life for this or that individual. Indeed, what may be abhorrent to one individual may be supremely attractive to another. There is no general principle or appeal to a common human nature that can objectively evaluate the choices an individual makes in this regard as long as they are "freely" made.[4]

The Catholic tradition, once again channeling Aristotle, insists that human persons are radically free. To be sure, all of the circumstances that secular culture sees as extinguishing human freedom can indeed, on the Catholic view, make it much more difficult for individuals to choose freely in concrete situations. But these circumstances do not usually extinguish freedom. Instead, it is incumbent on individuals to develop the personal characteristics that make it possible for them to cope with these circumstances and make free and reasonable choices in spite of the difficulties. We call these characteristics virtues.[5]

As to the second point about freedom, the Catholic tradition is sharply at odds with secular culture. In brief, the Catholic position is that we all share a common human nature and that a genuinely good human life will have some common features regardless of who lives it and when and where he does so. The challenge to freedom is not to invent this good life but to make choices (and to develop the actual capacities to make such choices) that conform to it. Perhaps an example will help. Consider what a good diet might be for a human being. On the secular account, constructing a good diet is a matter of examining one's personal preferences and learning to live with the consequences. On the other hand, a Catholic diet (so to speak) would acknowledge that human beings require certain sorts of nutrients to be healthy but that there may be a wide variety of foods that supply these nutrients. A wise person would freely choose to include the necessary nutrients in his/her diet but at the same time is free to choose what foods to eat to supply them. The result can be, and is, the enormous variation in diet around the world and throughout history but all good diets have it in common that they provide essential nutrients. Similarly, in crafting an individual good life, there are general elements that we do not choose but that follow upon our natures as human beings and other elements that consist of concrete options that conform to the general rule. And thus it becomes possible to describe the good life in general and to recognize choices and lifestyles that are opposed to it.[6]

The final point of contrast has to do with work and here two points are important. The first concerns the very nature of work. While Western culture (especially in its American version)

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[4] Some philosophers who took this position quite seriously argued that, considering the insurmountable obstacles that face most of us in our quest to fulfill our inclinations and satisfy our desires, the only truly free and authentic action open to any of us is suicide.

[5] Though it is not a matter for us here, another resource is available to support free choices in accord with reason: grace.

[6] It is no sound argument to say that a good life is whatever makes people more or less content. A vicious person is contented with and takes pleasure in choices and actions that will eventually corrupt him, just as intemperate diners enjoy foods and a diet that will eventually undermine their health. In any event, as C S Lewis reminds us, the tragedy of human life is not that we demand so much but rather that we are willing to settle for so little.

places a great deal of emphasis on work, the focus is entirely on its external dimension, on the effects of the work on persons and things outside the person working. This emphasis often leads us to place more value on the product of work than on the persons doing the work. We categorize and evaluate people by the work they do and we often see employees merely as instruments of production rather than human collaborators in a common project.[7] Furthermore, Western culture tends to regard employment as simply an exchange of labor for a wage (or a compensation package). The principal reason employees work is to earn money. Regardless of how unpleasant, boring or dangerous a job might be, if the pay is high enough people can be found to do it. Or to put this another way, if the pay is high enough, it is reasonable to expect people to do almost anything under almost any conditions. On this view, job satisfaction, pleasant working conditions, participation in decision making, freedom in executing tasks are all merely instruments for managing productivity, not legitimate ends in themselves.

By contrast, the Catholic tradition emphasizes another dimension of work. Aristotle first distinguished two broad kinds of human action, making and doing. In commenting on this distinction, Aquinas noted that *making* concerns the order that the rational creature is able to impose on realities external to the mind, while *doing* concerns the order that the rational creature is able to impose on his own voluntary behavior.[8] Pope John Paul II expanded on this thought and made it a central theme in his encyclical *Laborem exercens*.[9] There he spoke about the objective and subjective dimensions of work, in which the objective dimension corresponds roughly to *making*, to the result or product of human labor. The subjective dimension, on the other hand, is the effect of work on the person *doing* the work. Every act of work has a subjective dimension, since the human worker is always in some way affected by what she does (but not every act of work has an effect outside the worker). And because every act of work has an effect on the worker, who is a person with dignity, the design, execution and evaluation of work cannot be focused only on its objective dimension. We must take into consideration the personal consequences of the work for the worker.

The second point about work has to do with its social character. Western culture, with its bias toward individualism, readily sees work as something people may do in the same place but not necessarily do together. That is, while it may be expedient to bring numbers of people together to do their work, we often structure the work so that it is done individually (think about a factory assembly line or an office with cubicles). When collaboration does occur, it is generally seen to be instrumental, not as an important element of the work itself.[10] It goes without saying, then, that such possible elements of organizational life as common aspirations, participation in

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[7] With this in mind, it does not seem that the adoption of the term "Human Resources" as the preferred name for the organizational function we used to call "Personnel Management" is an improvement. It suggests that employees are just one of the resources an organization requires to conduct its activities, on a par with financial resources, raw materials, energy resources and so on.

[8] See Aquinas's *Commentary on Aristotle's* Nicomachean Ethics, book I, lecture 1.

[9] See Pope John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, paragraphs 5-6 (1981).

[10] A little thought experiment: if it would be equally effective to have a number of workers perform a task individually, without contact with one another, and to have a group collaborate actively to do the task, which alternative would organizations prefer? Probably the individual alternative because experienced managers would prefer to avoid the inefficiencies of coordinating group behavior. If both effectiveness and efficiency were equal, I suspect most managers would have no preference because they do not consider collaboration to be a good in itself.

decision making and so on are likely to have no place unless they have a demonstrated instrumental value.

On the Catholic view, however, since human persons are social creatures, collaboration in something so important to human life as work is natural and is a good in itself (akin to friendship). If one took this view seriously, the structure of work would be significantly different. There would be a preference for collaboration and forming friendships, a concern to orient the behavior of workers by clearly communicated common goals, and an openness to broad participation in decision making.
If this extended description of the characteristic anthropologies of Western culture and Catholic tradition is more or less accurate, there are dramatic differences between the two. Assuming, as I do , that the shape and operation of our organizations must follow from the convictions we hold about human nature and human action, it should be the case that an organization derived from a Catholic anthropology will be quite different from the ones we are accustomed to see. We will now turn to a consideration of what such an organization might be like.

The Shape and Operation of Organizations

When Aristotle turned his attention to politics and the governance of societies he made the observation that states can be distinguished into two broad groups.[11] Some are states properly so called and are organized "in accordance with strict principles of justice." Rule is exercised in such states for the good of the members of the society, which is to say for the common good. In other states, however, rule is exercised for the good of the rulers and to the detriment of the common good. Such states are shadows of proper states and Aristotle calls them "defective," "perverted" and "despotic."

Aristotle gives little attention to the sort of stable organizations which are so much a feature of modern. Such organizations, or specialized associations, were virtually unknown until the 19th century, in which various forms of corporations became popular. While it is a mistake to regard specialized associations as either large families or small societies—they have their own distinctive features—the comments that Aristotle makes about the exercise of power in states can be helpful in understanding the intentional structure of organizations.

I will take it as a given that everyone is familiar with the common way in which business organizations are structured.[12] They are usually intentionally governed not for the common good but for the good of some particular group. This group might be the owner (in which case we have something corresponding to Aristotle's description of a tyranny), the shareholders and investors (an oligarchy), or perhaps even a group of employees (a defective democracy). We have come to regard this as so normal that it is difficult for us to imagine an alternative, but let's try.

[11] See Aristotle, *Politics*, book III, chapter 6 (1279a20).
[12] I will focus here on business organizations but my comments about communities of work can be applied, I think, to not-for-profit organizations and government agencies as well.

If we were to take seriously the comments in the previous section about the nature of the human person from the Catholic perspective, business organizations would aspire to be, in the words of Pope John Paul II, "communities of work."[13] What would such a community be like?

First of all, if they are to be proper communities rather than mere organizations, they must be governed, or managed, for the common good of their members. Since specialized associations like businesses do not, by definition, aim at the comprehensive well-being of their members but only at some aspect of their well-being, the common goods of a community of work are limited. These include, at minimum, satisfying some genuine human needs of others (i.e., customers or clients), creating economic value so as to provide a livelihood for employees and a return to investors and offering opportunities for good work, collaboration and friendship.

Furthermore, the "strict principles of justice" that Aristotle said are observed in a properly constituted civil society assume and respect a certain sort of equality among the members of a community. Everyone in the community is subject to the ultimate rule of law, even the king, the prime minister, and the president. This does not mean that communities cannot be or should not be hierarchical—Aristotle was quite clear that the best form of government is the rule of the virtuous—but rather that good government implies some level of participation in decision making and the exercise of power by citizens.

So, too, in a community of work. Managers are always necessary to coordinate the work of employees but the coordination is for the sake of the common good, which includes the good of the individual employees. An employee does not work for a manager, as a slave might work for a master, but accepts the direction of the manager for the sake of the good of the community. But the fundamental equality of the manager and employee as persons implies that it is appropriate that everyone in the community have an opportunity to participate in some way in the governance of the community.

Finally, we should note that a community of work would be characterized by the genuine good work that it provides to its members. This good work would be worthwhile (i.e., it addresses genuine human needs not merely empty wants), free and open to creativity (i.e., it provides some possibility of personal expression and avoids being so highly structured that a worker can put nothing of herself into the work), and conducive to developing and sustaining virtue in the worker.

What sort of managers would be needed to govern these communities of work?

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[13] See Pope John Paul II, *Centesimus annus*, paragraph 35, a portion of which deserves to be quoted: "The Church acknowledges the legitimate *role of profit* as an indication that a business is functioning well. When a firm makes a profit, this means that productive factors have been properly employed and corresponding human needs have been duly satisfied. But profitability is not the only indicator of a firm's condition. It is possible for the financial accounts to be in order, and yet for the people—who make up the firm's most valuable asset—to be humiliated and their dignity offended. Besides being morally inadmissible, this will eventually have negative repercussions on the firm's economic efficiency. In fact, the purpose of a business firm is not simply to make a profit, but is to be found in its very existence as a *community of persons* who in various ways are endeavoring to satisfy their basic needs, and who form a particular group at the service of the whole of society. Profit is a regulator of the life of a business, but it is not the only one; *other human and moral factors* must also be considered which, in the long term, are at least equally important for the life of a business.

Practical Wisdom and the Management Professional

We began this paper with the question of what it means to be truly practical, especially in business. Now perhaps we are better prepared to offer an answer.

In the most general terms, a manager is practical who has developed a species of the virtue of prudence. Both Aristotle and Aquinas observed that specific areas of human life, such as politics, war and so on, required a specific form of prudence.[14] Though they did not speak directly of this, the shaping and governance of a community of work also requires a specific form of prudence, which we might call "managerial prudence."

There may be many elements of managerial prudence just a few obvious ones. First of all, the prudent manager must be able to identify, or to discern with counsel, a set of genuine human needs that can be successfully addressed through the actions of his company.[15] This involves both an active imagination and an understanding of what genuine needs and human goods are, which in turn requires a correct anthropology. A manager who merely knows how to bring resources to bear on the task of satisfying customer wants and who deliberately prescinds from any evaluation of the goodness of those wants, cannot be prudent. For example, there is much conversation in the United States about the possibility of decriminalizing the possession, sale and use of what we euphemistically call "recreational" drugs (i.e., marijuana, cocaine, etc). If this were to be done, the question facing the prudent manager of a pharmaceutical company would not be: Can we make and sell cocaine at a profit? but rather: Would we be satisfying a genuine human need by producing our own brand of cocaine? I leave the answer to your own judgment.

Second, the prudent manager must know what conditions must be established in the company to sustain the common goods of that particular community of work. In general, these conditions would include a reasonable set of goals (potential common goods) which would give direction and alignment to the actions of all of the employees, as well as the conditions that would allow workers to flourish humanly in their work and to form friendships with one another. In addition, the manager would need to make judgments about what level of profitability, what forms of participation in decision making and what specific ways of cooperation between employees would be appropriate to foster. (This is probably not a complete list.)

More particularly, a prudent manager must know what good work is in the concrete. He or she must be able to design it and to make good judgments about which individuals are best suited to do which tasks. Allied to this is the ability to make good decisions about which persons to bring into the community of work (and perhaps also which persons who ought to be invited to leave that community).

Managerial prudence, however, is not the only virtue that a business leader requires to truly practical. He or she also needs to develop the cardinal virtues of justice, courage, and discipline.

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[14] See Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IIaIIae, q. 50, a 1.

[15] See Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, IIaIIae, q. 51, where Thomas speaks of the importance to prudence of the ability to take counsel from others.

A manager in a community of work needs to exercise common good authority, which is to say authority that makes decisions about the allocation and use of scarce resources and other decisions about how best to preserve the common good. Some of these decisions are issues of commutative justice (e.g., some compensation questions) while others are issues of distributive justice. Aristotle reminds us that the vicious person has become blinded to the good. A corollary of this is that a manager cannot discern what is fair, much less implement it, without the virtue of justice.

Similarly, courage and discipline, by which virtues individuals are able to resist external and internal (respectively) threats to the good, are necessary for the prudent manager. Some decisions are clear but difficult. The cowardly manager avoids making them to the detriment of the community. Other decisions are clear but the manager's convenience or personal preferences (or anticipated rewards) make a contrary decision more attractive. Here discipline is necessary.

In sum, a truly practical manager possesses a species of the virtue of prudence, managerial prudence, which consists in being able to discern the goods of a community of work and to identify the means appropriate to securing those goods. Prudent judgment in this area is assisted by the cardinal virtues of justice, courage and discipline.

Are We Educating Managers in Practical Wisdom?

As an addendum of sorts to this discussion, I would like to make a comment or two on contemporary business education. As I have tried to establish, true practical wisdom in business consists in knowing the goods to be served through a community of work and in knowing how to order voluntary human behavior to realize those goods. Is this what we teach business students to do?

For the most part the answer is negative, though we are not entirely failures in this regard. I mentioned above the classic distinction between making and doing.[16] This maps on to a distinction between the virtue of prudence, which is concerned with doing, and the virtue of art (ars, or techne), which is concerned with making. In my judgment, most of business education focuses on art, which is to say that it aims to make students technicians of a sort. They are trained (not so much educated) to develop a set of skills, whether in accounting or financial manipulation, or in marketing, or even in management, to employ these skills efficiently and effectively. That is, they receive an intense training in means and, sadly, little education to understand and commit to worthwhile ends.

A commitment to means without a proper orientation to ends produces extremes of behavior, even professional behavior. When ends are in view, maximization (for example) is rarely an issue. When the end is achieved, activity stops; when there is no end, neither is there an end to activity. In business, if the end is to satisfy a certain genuine human need and to provide a livelihood to the workers who do this, there is a foreseeable end to the activity. If the end is to

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[16] Supra, p 5.

accumulate maximum profit there can be by definition no cessation of the activity. And when extremes are present and encouraged, fairness is driven away.

In educating, not merely training, business students we need to be more aggressive about presenting an appropriate anthropology. Medical students still learn something about the health of human beings, which they hope to serve; law students still learn something about justice, which they hope to serve; architecture students learn something about beauty and functionality, which they hope to serve. What corresponding good do business students learn about? If we can be clear about this, we can begin to form our students more effectively to be truly practically wise.