

Work as Key to the Social Question

The Great Social and Economic Transformations and the Subjective Dimension of Work



A Role for Intermediate Bodies in Social Insurance: Precedents in the "Ghent System" and the Weimar Republic

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Abstract

As a case study of progressive social policy, the paper focuses on the history of two schemes of unemployment insurance in the period after World War I, including their effect on the shape of the post-World-War-II welfare state in those countries. The role of organized labor movements is brought out, noting however the indispensability of coming to terms with other interest groups in a democratic society. The principled communitarian thrust of Catholic social teaching is pragmatically suited to pursue such coalitions in the most varied situations.

Introduction

Let me address at once what is meant in the title of this presentation by 1) the “Ghent system” of Belgian origin and 2) the social insurance scheme adopted by the Weimar Republic in the 1920s. I am focusing on unemployment benefits as an aspect of social policy important to the world of work. By “the Ghent system” is meant that public funding, municipal or national, is made available for unemployment compensation, but only as a matching contribution to the unemployment insurance fund built up and administered by a labor union for its members. Unionized workers could contribute to this union insurance fund, separate from any strike funds or union dues, while they were working. When laid off, they received in lieu of wages a benefit set by contract for a given length of time. As disbursements were made, the union fund administrators forwarded the receipts of the benefits to the appropriate governmental agency for repayment. The governmental subsidy permitted higher benefits than the self-financed fund itself could afford to pay its members.

As to Weimar Germany, where unemployment also reached crisis levels in the 1920s, various prewar and emergency measures already existed to assist laid-off workers. In 1927, federal or “Reich” legislation was finally passed that set up an ambitious unemployment insurance program that was compulsory for most industries. In the Weimar model, employers and employees contributed equally to an autonomous fund administered by representatives of, again, employers and employees equally. These were typically delegates of industry employer associations on the one hand and of trade unions on the other. The board set benefit rates and oversaw the collection and distribution of funds. Distribution took place through intermediate bodies formed for this purpose, again mostly affiliates of labor unions.

One can easily compare the two approaches and note the mix of public and private elements peculiar to each. The Ghent system was financed by the workers on the one side and the public authority on the other, with no direct funding from the employers and no payroll deduction. In Germany, there was payroll deduction for the worker’s contribution, forwarded to the national fund by the employer along with the company share. The Ghent system was entirely administered by union personnel, whereas in Germany a central public agency collected the funds and distributed them to the labor agencies for their members. The Ghent system was voluntary, the Weimar approach was compulsory. Nevertheless both included the decisive participation of workers and workers’ organizations, at least in the form of worker payments to the system and in the form of labor oversight on the governing boards. Both, that is, were anti-paternalistic or democratic in their approach to social welfare. Both created contractual entitlements and took unemployment compensation out of the realm of mere beneficence.

Hence my original thought was to hold both developments up, each in its own way, as straightforward and distinctive exemplifications *avant la lettre* of Catholic social teaching: teaching that would appeal to the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity and that endorsed intermediate bodies between the state and the individual citizen and between the employer and the individual worker in the labor market (cf. *Laborem Exercens* 18-20). After all, Catholic labor movements prized and supported both these plans. Catholics were involved in the carrying them out and defending them against employer opposition.

However, closer examination revealed complications in this simple and straightforward approach. The welfare state took different forms; its anticipations in the age of *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno* had many roots. The Ghent system was, after all, the brainchild of a Belgian liberal, Louis Varlez. It took root also in the Netherlands, where social Protestantism of the school of Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) was further advanced and more influential than social Catholicism; it spread also to non-Catholic Scandinavia. The Weimar labor legislation, though shepherded by the Center Party labor minister who was also a labor priest close to the Christian unions, Heinrich Brauns (1868-1939), was supported by the social democrats in parliament as well. Furthermore, the Christian unions in Germany were interconfessional, not just Catholic.

The thesis of this paper, therefore, is not simply and misleadingly to claim for Catholic social ideas the paternity of these particular advances in social policy. Rather,

another conclusion suggested itself. In a period when one scarcely thought of dialogue with liberals, Protestants, or socialists to be a desirable thing, it was such dialogue, or at least interaction, that enabled the social Catholic avant-garde to contribute its bit to the realization of social justice for the working person. Furthermore, a detailed case study of these particular forms of unemployment compensation will bring out some structural elements of value today, especially in view of the lot of workers in industrializing countries in the face of economic globalization.

The Ghent System

Why did the Ghent system arise in Ghent? Let us first note the practice of *liberté subsidiée* dear to Belgian Catholics but found satisfactory as well to the liberal party. The best-known example of this “subsidized freedom” was implicit in the compromise dating from the founding of the Belgian state in 1830. It guaranteed liberal freedoms, including freedom of religion, with the provision of subsidies to cultural communities for public services they provided their own. Thus the Roman Catholic Church could count on state subsidies for education under religious auspices. To take one well-known example, such subsidies were crucial for the flourishing of the Catholic University of Louvain (founded or re-founded in 1835).

In line with this precedent for subsidizing non-governmental organizations, Louis Varlez took the step in 1900 of proposing to the city council of Ghent his plan to match (from 50% to 100%) the outlays of the existing union unemployment funds. [1] Up till the First World War these were not huge sums. Though the scheme encouraged union membership, that was not the intention. (A variation known as the Liège system *was* deliberately intended to strengthen the unions. It called for payments from the provincial authorities directly to the union funds, even if they were merely accumulating reserves, whereas the Ghent system was more cautious and only matched actual benefits after the union paid them out. The Ghent system was more widely adopted than that of Liège.) A provision was even made for the non-union worker to pay into a municipal unemployment fund and be covered, just like the union worker, for up to fifty days of unemployment. Trade unions were already strong in Ghent at the turn of the century, however. They were willing and able to implement the policy. The non-union channel thus withered into innocuous desuetude. Naturally, when unemployment threatened, as it did massively in the 1920s and 1930s, the Ghent and Liège systems did wonders for the recruiting of union members. [2]

The Ghent system, as compared with a dole, also encouraged workers to participate in looking ahead to avoid likely difficulties during layoffs. It inculcated the notion of insurance, of sharing risks with many others in an attempt to protect the unfortunate among them. Since it was proportioned to the level of funds in the unions’ own accounts, it encouraged economy and discouraged fraud on the part of fellow union members. Corruption seems to have been a non-issue, excluded as it was by the ten-member commission, drawn from unions of different political coloration, that oversaw its work. The Ghent system could be and sometimes was implemented on a provincial or national level, but in Belgium it started in cities like Ghent or Brussels, where labor could muster great

electoral strength.

After World War I and the introduction of one man, one vote suffrage, labor clout meant that among other things a system of unemployment benefits could find parliamentary approval at the national level. Cities and towns could still do what they liked, but a national fund was set up and became the most dependable and important source of support. The union funds remained the administrative pivot of the system, with elements from both Ghent and Liège integrated. On the Liège model, the state fund transferred “directly to the union unemployment funds a subsidy calculated as a percentage of the total contributions paid in (originally 50 per cent, later 66 per cent).” [3] On the Ghent model, the union was expected to pay from its own resources an unemployment benefit for up to sixty days on the basis of an insurance contract concluded between the fund and its members. The state would however step in if the union fund was exhausted or if the unemployment lasted beyond sixty days. The state also paid a family or child benefit on top of that if the family income was below a certain level. Where did the jobless worker go to apply for and receive unemployment compensation? Nowhere else but to his or her union local. The effect of this on workers’ appreciation of the value to them of their trade union proved to be hugely positive.

Unemployment insurance, then, was of a piece with the logic of “pillarization,” the process by which (particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands), the socialist and Catholic populations developed their own nearly complete social worlds in the first half of the twentieth century. [4] From cradle to grave, one was to be nurtured and live with the aid of institutions created and run by persons with the same worldview and basic convictions, while respecting the right of others to do the same. One’s trade union, too, was either “Christian” (i.e., in Belgium, Catholic) or socialist in cultural orientation. Elsewhere, however, as in the Scandinavian countries, the Ghent system was adopted without the creation of “pillars,” with the help of a farmer-labor coalition.

In these countries, as might be expected, union membership grew with the threat of unemployment, quite spectacularly during the Depression, when unions suffered great membership losses in other countries. While this was good for the unions and the unionized part of the work force, it left other unemployed persons to the vagaries of public relief. The voluntary character of this scheme of unemployment insurance was a serious limitation. Automatic, compulsory payroll deduction was an alternative that was discussed in Belgium. Early on, employers were against it as they were against any kind of unemployment compensation. Later, in the Depression, they came around to regarding unemployment compensation as a cost of doing business, but they wanted to be able to influence benefit levels and eligibility. They also wanted to dilute the identification of workers with their unions, so the employers advocated payroll deduction, while union people questioned their motives. Christian unions envisaged a tripartite system of compulsory unemployment insurance involving themselves, the employers, and the state, just so it remained under the administrative control of the unions. [5] The mutual health insurance organizations of the Catholic pillar (“mutualities”), by contrast, opposed compulsory health insurance, fearing that it would weaken the ties that connected the workers to the Catholic pillar. They also feared an employers’ or state “takeover” of their autonomous and serviceable insurance

institutions. [6] The Christian trade unions shared the latter reservation (about *étatisation*), and they insisted on retaining administration of any compulsory system. The socialist union leadership preferred a government-run system. This disagreement delayed approval of a plan put forward in the late 1930s for compulsory unemployment compensation.

World War II and Nazi occupation brought a temporary disappearance of the autonomous mutualities and of the trade unions with their insurance funds. Even before liberation was achieved, a draft accord between labor leaders and representatives of industrial employers, the so-called “Social Pact” of 1944, pledged mutual recognition of each other’s place in postwar Belgian society and outlined a social policy of what could be called social partnership. The union heads agreed that unemployment insurance should be made compulsory and nationalized, in one of the main departures from the Ghent system that took place in 1945. The other changes were to institute payroll deduction, thus removing the unions from the collection of insurance premiums. Since the employers were now contributing financially, they got equal representation on the policy-making board of the new fund. The Christian unions, thanks to a compromise accepted by a socialist minister of social welfare, retained what was most important to them, the distribution of the unemployment benefits to their members. [7]

The Weimar Case

In Weimar Germany, the democratic breakthrough of the Weimar Constitution included provisions for labor-management cooperation and consultation, in the recognition that there existed an *Arbeitsgemeinschaft* or partnership between these two indispensable parties in industrial production. This rapprochement under the threat of a Communist uprising was initially conceived as a continuation of the wartime truce between labor and capital. Social democrats, moderate liberals, and the Center Party supported these provisions in the Weimar national assembly (1919). Heinrich Brauns was prominent in these negotiations. Soon, however, tensions rose to the surface again between labor representatives and industrialists. Each side doubted with more or less valid cause the commitment of the other to any such partnership. In these circumstances, Brauns, the Catholic clergyman in the labor wing of the Center Party, was chosen to become Labor Minister. He held the post continuously in changing cabinets from 1920 to 1928. He found it necessary to insist again and again, even against members of his own party, that elevating the condition of the working class (“social policy”) was not irreconcilable with stimulating the economy (“economic policy”). [8] Indeed, in the long run it was an economic necessity to enhance the purchasing power of the working class. Conversely, of course, a more productive and competitive economy was a necessary condition for an effective social policy. Nevertheless many industrialists (in Germany as in Belgium) continued to regard organized workers as a “class enemy,” out to proletarianize the bourgeois or at least soak the rich, rather than as indispensable social partners for a prosperous nation.

What with the reparations demands from the Versailles Treaties after World War I and the uncontrolled inflation of the early 1920s, the Labor Minister had his hands full trying to

minimize the social damage, rather than to build on the prospects opened up in the Weimar constitution. In a brief period of economic recovery, however, his long harbored aim of making unemployment insurance compulsory and hence more dependably available was enacted into law in 1927. In German industry even before World War I insurance programs for old-age pensions, disability and health care were in place. What was missing was income during forced unemployment, an issue that became more and more pressing in the postwar economy. The creation of a cabinet ministry for labor issues was a reflection of the increased relative political strength of working-class voters, but also a recognition on the part of the other classes in German society that the labor market needed positive government attention. Thus labor offices were created to make the labor market more efficient by bringing jobs and job-seekers together.

The Brauns bill built on these beginnings, and on the existing precedents of compulsory sickness, disability, and old-age insurance plans. A true unemployment insurance plan would deal with the most threatening remaining risk. The proposal bore the stamp of Catholic social thinking of the time, though not exclusively. It aimed to realize three principles: self-financing (the insurance principle), self-administration, and the subsidiary role of the state. Most important to Brauns against the background of the German Reich's previous heavily paternalistic or authoritarian social policies was the principle of covering unemployment risk by *insurance*, rather than just by emergency relief out of the public pocket. [9] The provision that the contributions of the employees and the employers would finance the benefits was to make the role of public officials not leading, but subsidiary. The law itself, by making such insurance compulsory in the industrial labor market, created a framework but entrusted the operation of the program to semi-public bodies set up at local, provincial, and national levels with equal representation of labor, management, and public officials. The public officials, moreover, were those concerned with the placement services or labor exchanges; they could vote only on those matters, not on the actual insurance issues. What was really new was the uniformity of practices throughout Germany, in contrast with the various local or regional initiatives that had struggled with the problem previously. This too can be recognized as an application of the principle of subsidiarity, in the sense that the higher or broader authority should step in to assist with such frameworks, when the efforts of more localized bodies do not suffice. Coupling the unemployment insurance scheme with the existing labor exchanges and lending the whole employment policy greater consistency of practices from one place and level to another were further advantages Brauns and with him the German labor movement in all its parts was pursuing.

How did such a bill ever get enacted in 1927? This is what I would like to stress, not only that it contained much Catholic social content, but that it was acceptable to a whole spectrum of political parties and interest groups. It was the fruit of what Grsta Esping-Andersen calls a "class-political coalition." [10] In the fourth cabinet headed by the Center Party politician, Wilhelm Marx, a remarkable if short-lived coalition came together and passed this foundation-stone of the future social state. It is worth emphasizing that the Protestant employees and labor leaders in the Christian union federation, the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, supported the Brauns bill. Their influence in its passage is evident. The Protestant labor contingent voted mostly for a right-wing nationalist party, whose

deputies would normally not be enthusiastic for advances in social policy. However, the Center Party, pressured by its larger Catholic labor contingent also belonging to the DGB, made support for unemployment insurance a condition for the formation of a government coalition with the right called the *Bürgerblock*. Many employers saw in it “a sensible reform that would eventually decrease the welfare burden by rationalizing its administration.” In the event, only “six Nationalist delegates broke party ranks to vote against it” in 1927, when it became law. [11] At the left end of the political spectrum, the Social Democrats did not form part of these mid-1920s coalitions; socialists tended to see a straight program of income maintenance for all citizens as the ideal solution. Nevertheless their delegates in the Reichstag supplied the votes needed to pass the bill into law. They regarded the tripartite corporatist composition of the administrative bodies (employers, employees, and public officials) as borrowed from the proposals of the socialist unions. They were also of course happy to avoid means-testing and have a contractual entitlement to unemployment compensation made mandatory. [12]

Thus a broad political coalition across the spectrum from right to center to left converged over the issue of unemployment. In the limited realm of unemployment insurance, at least, one could realize the ideal of *Mitbestimmung* (“codetermination”), of equal employer and employee participation over a matter affecting the lives of workers in their jobs (cf. *Laborem Exercens* 14.6). What Gustav Gundlach was starting to call the principle of subsidiarity was operative in this equal participation as well as in the background role of the state in authorizing the labor agencies that administered the compulsory contributions. The producers themselves, the employers and the employees, not the public purse, were the source of the funds to cover the normal risks of industrial cycles. Unfortunately the risks were underestimated, which became clear at the latest by 1929. Here is where another effect of the principle of subsidiarity came in. The state served as a backup when the self-insurance plan could not meet the needs. –The program’s implementation was of short duration, overwhelmed as it was by the Depression and then, after 1933, “coordinated” under National Socialist totalitarian control. Despite its limitations (no coverage for temporary workers, farm workers, no family supplements), the July 1927 Unemployment Insurance Act “represented the high point of the republic’s development as a social welfare state.” [13] Its principles served in the construction of the West German social state after World War II.

The Welfare State: Corporatist or Liberal

In Belgium and Germany, as well as in other Western European nations, the economic miracle after the Second World War enabled a policy of a “social market economy” (or “social partnership” between labor and capital) to issue in the social policies characteristic of a welfare state. A comparison with the best-known welfare state, that of the United Kingdom, serves to bring out the characteristically different spirit and form of the welfare or “social states” of the continent with that of Britain. The prominent role of intermediate bodies in the unemployment compensation schemes that we have examined can serve as a sort of touchstone to the differences between the neo-corporatist arrangements of much of

the European continent and the “liberal” (or “lib-lab” [14]) welfare state more typical of the Anglo-Saxon world.

Thus, on the question of unemployment compensation, the British wartime ideator of the welfare state, William Beveridge, assumed early on (1908!) that a social insurance plan in Britain would best be run by a centralized administration. When he came to work on the Beveridge Report during the Second World War, he looked for “simplicity, economy and efficiency,” as well as universality. Hence he recommended abolishing approved societies and replacing them with a Social Security Board. In the interests of making a subsistence income available to everyone, he folded unemployment insurance as one category into a comprehensive scheme that also insured the self-employed, housewives, and those who were too young or old to work etc.. Altogether there would be seven different kinds of cash benefit. [15] On the continent, too, social insurance was extended after the war to these other categories of “social partners.” One difference was that, as in the case of the trade unions and unemployment insurance, the role of intermediate bodies was maintained to a considerably greater degree. In these economies organized labor has a recognized claim to sit at the table where the details of social policy are thrashed out.

Such a role for organized labor, as well as for business and civil service officers in the formulation and conduct of social policy (in “social partnership,” as it is called), is known as democratic or societal *corporatism*. The term is often avoided so as not to suggest a fascist heritage, but since Schmitter’s 1974 reconsideration of the concept, [16] it has found its way into social scientific language as a neutral term. As an ideal type, it is useful for highlighting the pervasive differences between, as one says, the “Anglo-Saxons” and the continentals. The salient feature of democratic or “societal corporatism” is that a limited number of organizations are recognized as representing their constituents in the appropriate public bodies that regulate their activities, classically labor and business or agrarian interests (peasant leagues) for socio-economic affairs. The activity of labor unions in handling unemployment insurance payments is no anomaly in such a political economy.

Concluding Remarks

One could say that the two mini-histories being recounted here display the democratic political aspects of the Catholic social tradition decades before these aspects received any acknowledgment in the papal magisterium. People like Heinrich Brauns and the Catholic lay leaders of the Christian unions had to forge ahead and adapt the tradition to the new conditions of parliamentary democracy and coalition-building without, in this respect, much hierarchical support.

The struggle has been largely against two main opposing tendencies. One was the paternalism of manufacturers and other employers, mixed with the economic liberalism of a free-market ideology. The other was the Marxist-socialist remedy for social injustice of collectivization of the means of production and elimination of a capitalist class. Between these two fronts, democratic socialists, democratic and progressive liberals, Protestant social

reformers and social Catholic activists converged on pragmatically and morally acceptable arrangements. Procuring an influential role for the workers themselves was most urgent. The classic labor imperative to organize remained and remains basic. An equally necessary next step was the willingness to negotiate pragmatically and to enter into coalitions with others, liberals and socialists. This too was characteristic of the Christian labor movements fostered by Christian democrats. [17] As the original hostility between these parties diminished, the scope for effective collaboration expanded more and more.

Does the upshot, a corporatist “Third Way,” manifest a particularly close affinity to Catholic social teaching? [18] In principle, no, according to *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, Pope John Paul’s encyclical of 1987 (par. 41.7); “the church does not propose economic or political systems or programs” (par. 41.1). Apart from particular models, however, Catholic social teaching and social-policy players, along with others, have favored the organization of society and of labor in forms other than and alongside those of the state and the market. [19] One realization of this quite distinct characteristic was the involvement of intermediate bodies such as labor unions and employer associations in public insurance programs (or to put it the other way around, the involvement of the state in a subsidiary fashion in the establishment and workings of private social programs).

Catholic social teaching, then, with its supple principle of subsidiarity, does not strive to create a single model of an ideal economic system. As Pope Paul VI declared in *Octogesima Adveniens* (4), “to put forward a solution which has universal validity is not our ambition, nor is it our mission.” [20] Yet the principles call for applications or “implementation.” Given the inevitable conflict or at least pluralism of views and perspectives in any question of social justice, the need to promote the right of participation [21] of the poor and the otherwise unrepresented is one way of expressing the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. How should we link the broad general principles that ground the role of mediating institutions of civil society to the particular circumstances of a given advanced postindustrial economy in a democratic society? How should we do it in developing countries of different cultures and political economies? This paper has highlighted the practical resourcefulness that Catholic social activists have shown in making the most of opportunities and alliances that furthered the cause of social justice. Similar and even greater resourcefulness is required now in the face of the many challenges to social justice in today’s global economy.

If I may suggest one more application of the principle of subsidiarity, taken from Pope Paul VI’s 1971 apostolic letter, *Octogesima Adveniens*, [22] it would be to encourage local, regional, national and continental initiatives of study and action at the level appropriate to the issue. Scholars and activists familiar with the Catholic tradition of social justice *and* with the situation and cultural diversity of the area in question are best suited to address problems and perhaps to lead the way to new realizations of enduring principles and ideals.

NOTES

[1] See Guy Vanthemsche, "Unemployment Insurance in Interwar Belgium," *International Review of Social History* 35 (1990), pp. 349-76 for the following account of unemployment insurance in Belgium and the adoption of the Ghent system elsewhere. See also Carl Strikwerda, *A House Divided: Catholics, Socialists, and Flemish Nationalists in Nineteenth Century Belgium* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 260-61.

[2] Patrick Pasture, "The April 1944 'Social Pact' in Belgium and Its Significance for the Post-War Welfare State," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28 (1993), 695-714, here 698.

[3] Vanthemsche, "Unemployment Insurance," 358.

[4] Harry Post, *Pillarization: An Analysis of Dutch and Belgian Society* (Aldershot: Gower, 1989), 270; J. C. H. Blom and Emiel Lamberts, *History of the Low Countries* (New York: Berghahn, 1999).

[5] Jozef Mampuy, "Le syndicalisme chrétien," in Emmanuel Gerard and Paul Wynants, eds., *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier chrétien en Belgique* (Leuven University Press, 1994), 201.

[6] Emmanuel Gerard, "Les mutualités chrétiennes," in Gerard and Wynants, eds., *Histoire du MOC*, 103.

[7] Pasture, "The Social Pact in Belgium," 699; Vanthemsche, "Unemployment Insurance in Interwar Belgium," 371. See also Guy Vanthemsche, *La sécurité sociale: Les origines du système belge* (Brussels: De Boeck Université, 1994).

[8] Franz Josef Stegmann and Peter Langhorst, "Geschichte der sozialen Ideen im deutschen Katholizismus," in Helga Grebing, ed., *Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland: Sozialismus – Katholische Soziallehre – Protestantische Sozialethik. Ein Handbuch* (Essen: Klartext, 2000), 759. The most recent fuller treatment of Brauns' social engagement is found in Markus Lingen, "Heinrich Brauns und der 'Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland' (1900-1933)," in *Im Gedächtnis der Kirche neu erwachen. Studien zur Geschichte des Christentums in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Festgabe für Gabriel Adriányi zum 65. Geburtstag* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000), 235-64.

[9] Hubert Mockenhaupt, *Weg und Wirken des geistlichen Sozialpolitikers Heinrich Brauns* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1977), 207-209.

[10] Grsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton University Press, 1990), 30: "It is a historical fact that welfare-state construction has depended on political coalition-building."

[11] William L. Patch, Jr., *Christian Trade Unions in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1933: The Failure of "Corporate Pluralism"* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,

1985), 117.

[12] Walter Euchner, "Ideengeschichte des Sozialismus in Deutschland," in Helga Grebing, ed., *Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland*, 202-203.

[13] Hans Mommsen, *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 226.

[14] Alexander Hicks, *Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 19. Cf. especially Grsta Esping-Andersen, *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 75 for "the liberal welfare regime" of the Anglo-Saxon countries and 81-84 for "the conservative welfare regime" of Germany and much of Western Europe. "Conservative" and "liberal," like "corporatist," are used in a descriptive social-scientific sense and not in the sense of the American vernacular.

[15] Jose Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography*, 2d ed. (Oxford University Press, 1999), 380-81.

[16] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in *The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 85-131.

[17] See, for some early examples, Paul Misner, *Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization to the First World War* (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 258, 267, 273-76, 319-25.

[18] Paul Misner, "Christian Democratic Social Policy: Precedents for Third-Way Thinking," in Thomas Kselman, ed., *Proceedings of the Conference on Christian Democracy in Europe and Latin America*, University of Notre Dame, April 9-11, 1999, in press.

[19] *Quadragesimo Anno* was often taken as proposing a state-corporatist economic or political system, as is notorious. This in particular was what made the clarifications by Popes Paul VI and John Paul II necessary. See Oswald von Nell-Breuning, "Die katholische Soziallehre--Aufstieg, Niedergang und bleibendes Verdienst: ein Rückblick auf ihre Leistung und ihr Versagen in acht Jahrzehnten," in his *Wie sozial ist die Kirche? Leistung und Versagen der katholischen Soziallehre* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1972), 71-96.

[20] Cf. Andrea Riccardi, "Rerum novarum: il mito e l'avvenimento," in "*Rerum novarum*". *Écriture, contenu et réception d'une encyclique. Actes du colloque international organisé par l'École française de Rome et le Greco no 2 du CNRS (Rome, 18-20 avril 1991)* (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1997), 22-24; also Mary A. Elsbernd, "What Ever Happened to Octogesima Adveniens?," *Theological Studies* 56 (1995), 39-60.

[21] See David Hollenbach, *Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic*

Human Rights Tradition (New York: Paulist, 1979).

[22] Bernard F. Evans, "Octogesima Adveniens," in *The New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought*, ed. Judith A. Dwyer (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 683-92.